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Unsupervised Feature Selection for Anomaly-Based
Network Intrusion Detection Using Cluster Validity Indices
Abstract
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in Internet usage, which has in turn led to a
rise in malicious network activity. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are tools
that monitor network traffic with the purpose of rapidly and accurately detecting malicious
activity. These systems provide a time window for responding to emerging threats and
attacks aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities that arise from issues such as misconfigured
firewalls and outdated software.
Anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems construct a profile of legitimate or
normal traffic patterns using machine learning techniques, and monitor network traffic for
deviations from the profile, which are subsequently classified as threats or intrusions. Due
to the richness of information contained in network traffic, it is possible to define large
feature vectors from network packets. This often leads to redundant or irrelevant features
being used in network intrusion detection systems, which typically reduces the detection
performance of the system.
The purpose of feature selection is to remove unnecessary or redundant features in a fea-
ture space, thereby improving the performance of learning algorithms and as a result the
classification accuracy. Previous approaches have performed feature selection via opti-
mization techniques, using the classification accuracy of the NIDS on a subset of the data
as an objective function. While this approach has been shown to improve the performance
of the system, it is unrealistic to assume that labelled training data is available in opera-
tional networks, which precludes the use of classification accuracy as an objective function
in a practical system.
This research proposes a method for feature selection in network intrusion detection that
does not require any access to labelled data. The algorithm uses normalized cluster valid-
ity indices as an objective function that is optimized over the search space of candidate
feature subsets via a genetic algorithm. Feature subsets produced by the algorithm are
vi
Abstract vii
shown to improve the classification performance of an anomaly–based network intrusion
detection system over the NSL-KDD dataset. Despite not requiring access to labelled
data, the classification performance of the proposed system approaches that of effective
feature subsets that were derived using labelled training data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the current state of security for networked computer
environments, which includes their weaknesses and security threats that these environ-
ments are susceptible to. Mechanisms that are used to protect against such threats, which
includes network intrusion detection systems, and the problem that is intended to be solved
are discussed. The proposed research that will be carried out is outlined in this chapter
as well.
1.1 Background
In modern day society, networked computer systems play a significant role in the com-
pletion of everyday tasks and activities. These tasks include daily financial transactions,
often dealing with exorbitant sums of money, the execution of vital government services or
the day to day social interactions between billions of people. These activities are typically
communicated over the Internet, which is a universal network of millions of interconnected
computer systems and smaller networks [2].
Networked computer systems have a large number of application areas, with vast amounts
of valuable and confidential information being transmitted between them. This has led to
networked computer systems becoming an attractive target for cybercrime. Cybercrime
1
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can be described as any act involving a computer and a network that aims to intention-
ally harm the reputation, or cause physical, mental, emotional or financial harm or loss
to an individual or group of individuals [8]. These acts are frequently carried out over
telecommunication networks such as the Internet, through the illegitimate use of, or ac-
cess to network services such as chat rooms, notice boards, file servers, web servers, mail
servers, network routers, etc, or mobile phone network services such as SMS and MMS [8].
Typical cybercrimes can include the theft of large sums of money, identity theft, fraud
and copyright infringements. The total cost of cybercrime based on 24 major countries
around the world, including South Africa, was 113 Billion US Dollars in 2013 [9]. Russia,
China and South Africa were the top three in the number of victims of cybercrime, with
85%, 77% and 73% of all adults surveyed, respectively.
Cybercrime often involves some form of network intrusion. Network intrusions constitute
any unauthorised activity on a computer network that leads to the loss of confidentiality
and integrity of data transmitted or accessed via a network, the denial of network resources,
or the unauthorised use of network resources. An example of network intrusions that may
concern a system administrator include; the illegitimate usage of existing user accounts
by unauthorised individuals, which provides unauthorised access to confidential system or
user information [10]. This may lead to:
1. The unauthorised alteration of a user’s confidential files or information, or
2. the unauthorised editing of system information in network components, such as
altering router tables to deny a user access to the network (denial of services).
In general, network vulnerabilities can be defined as flaws in the design, implementation
and management of a networked system and its security mechanisms. Their existence cre-
ates weaknesses in networked systems as these vulnerabilities can be exploited by various
types of network attacks, leading to a loss in confidentiality and integrity of information,
the denial of resources, or unauthorised use of resources [2]. An example of a vulnerability
involves the use of outdated software which may have weaknesses in its code that were
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fixed in newer versions. Due to a lack of updating and patching, these weaknesses cre-
ate vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit. Bhattacharyya et al. [2] identify several
vulnerabilities that weakens the security of networked computer systems.
• Network configuration vulnerabilities — These vulnerabilities occur due to networks
and security mechanisms being improperly set up and managed by an inexperienced
administrator, or due to human error. These vulnerabilities are caused by [2]:
1. incorrect configuration of security equipment, such as firewalls,
2. unprotected password transmission, and
3. use of the same passwords or weak passwords for extended periods of time.
• Network perimeter vulnerabilities — This occurs due to a lack of network perimeter
security and appropriate access control mechanisms. If the perimeter of the net-
work is not well defined, the network may be susceptible to unauthorized access by
illegitimate users [2].
• Communication vulnerabilities — A system can be rendered vulnerable if the com-
munication between devices on a network is not properly secured. Examples of
communication vulnerabilities are, the data transferred between network devices
are not properly encrypted, or devices are not properly authenticated prior to data
transmission. Well documented security protocols need to be adhered to in order
to ensure that connections between nodes are secure. Additionally, proper authenti-
cation measures and data integrity checks need to be followed to ensure that users,
data and devices are legitimate [2].
• Wireless communication vulnerabilities — These occur due to a lack in proper user
authentication methods, as well as poor encryption policies for the data transmission
over the wireless network [2]. Additionally, the use of weak passwords increases the
risk of unauthorized access to a networked system.
A network attack is a sequence of operations or actions executed on a networked system
that leads to the occurrence of a network intrusion. Network attacks are typically accom-
plished by exploiting some vulnerability in the networked system. A taxonomy of network
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attacks is provided in what follows [2]. Examples of these attacks are provided in table
1.1.
1. Infection — The aim of these attacks is to infect a computer system by tampering
with computer software, or installing malicious programs on the target system.
2. Exploding — These attacks add flaws to the target system with the intent of over-
flowing the system, thereby rendering it unusable.
3. Probe — This involves the use of various tools to gather vital information about
the target system or network. Typically the primary goal is to identify networked
systems and services that possess vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
4. Cheat — These are attacks that involve the use of fake identities in order to access
private information on the target system.
5. Traverse — This is an attempt to access a protected target system by trying a list
of commonly occurring “keys” until the correct “key” is found which allows access
to the target system. Typically, the “keys” are user login passwords.
6. Concurrency — The aim of these attacks is to flood a system that provides a service
with a vast amount of requests. This exhausts the capacity of the system to respond
to additional requests by consuming all available system memory or bandwidth. The
result of this attack is to render the system or service unusable and unavailable to
legitimate requests.
7. Others — These attacks make direct use of system weaknesses, as may be present
in outdated software, in order to infect the target system.
Table 1.1 shows several subcategories of attacks that networked systems are susceptible
to.
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Table 1.1: Taxonomy of network attacks (from [2]).
Main Category Subcategory
Infection Viruses, Worms, Trojans
Exploding Buffer overflow
Probe Sniffing, port mapping security scanning
Cheat
IP spoofing, MAC spoofing, DNS spoofing,
session hijacking, XSS (Cross Site Script) attacks,
hidden area operation, and input parameter cheating
Traverse Brute force, dictionary attacks, doorknob attacks
Concurrency Flooding, DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service)
1.1.1 Conventional security mechanisms
The RFC2828 standard defines a security service as, “a processing or communication
service that is provided by a system to give a specific kind of protection to system re-
sources; security services implement security policies and are implemented by security
mechanisms” [4]. A list of five broad categories of security services, as defined by the
X.800 standard is provided in what follows [4].
1. Authentication — A service that guarantees that a communicating source is the
source that it claims to be.
2. Access control — This service prevents the use of computing resources by unautho-
rised entities. Access control determines who is allowed to access a resource, the
degree to which they may use a resource, and the conditions under which a resource
may be accessed.
3. Data confidentiality — A service that aims to protect confidential data from disclo-
sure to unauthorised entities.
4. Data integrity — This service guarantees that data received from an authorised com-
municating source is received without being modified or altered during the transmis-
sion process.
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5. Nonrepudiation — A service that aims to protect against entities denying participa-
tion in a communication that said entity was apart of.
Several security mechanisms that are used to implement security services include [4].
• Encipherment — This mechanism involves the application of mathematical algo-
rithms to data, with the aim of encoding the data in such a way that it is incom-
prehensible when viewed using traditional means. The application of a decoding
algorithm is required to revert the data back to its original state.
• Digital signature — A digital signature allows a recipient to verify that the data
received is in fact from the originating source, and confirms that the data has not
been modified or altered. A digital signature is a segment of data added to the unit
of data intended for transmission, or a specific form of cryptographic transformation
applied to the data prior to transmission.
• Access control — There are multiple mechanisms that can be used to control access
to resources, such as user login procedures for computer systems.
• Data integrity — Several security mechanisms may be applied to assure that data is
unaltered during transmission.
• Authentication exchange — This mechanism uses information exchange to verify the
identity of a communicating entity.
• Traffic padding — Extra information in the form of bits are added to network packet
data in order to encode the data such that an unauthorised entity is unable to
comprehend the data.
• Routing control — A mechanism that selects secure routes for data transmission
or alters the route of data currently being transmitted when a breach of security is
detected.
• Notarization — This involves the use of a third-party which manages the data trans-
mission between two entities.
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Table 1.2 maps each security mechanism to the security service that they provide.
















Authentication Y Y Y
Access control Y
Data confidentiality Y Y Y
Data integrity Y Y Y
Nonrepudiation Y Y Y Y
Examples of conventional security mechanisms that are used to provide authentication and
access control security services include firewalls, anti-virus software and Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs).
Firewalls, deployed at the perimeter of a network, contain a set of rules that describe
the types of network activity (malicious or legitimate) that are allowed to traverse the
firewall [4]. Firewalls employ a form of access control for data transmitted to a network
using either blacklisting or whitelisting. Blacklisting allows all network activity to pass into
the network or networked system except the network activity mentioned in the rule set,
whereas whitelisting blocks all network activity from accessing the network or networked
system except for the network activities that are specified in the rule set.
Anti-virus software typically monitors a host for activity that is already known to be
malicious activity. The malicious activity is captured in the form of a signature, where
the anti-virus software compares the signature to the observed activity of the monitored
system. An example of malicious activity that anti-virus software may detect involves,
the execution of a malicious executable file on the windows operating system which may
initiate a sequence of events that results in the collection of confidential information for
an attacker to exploit. This sequence of events may be known to the anti-virus software
if the signature is available as an intrusion, thus, the anti-virus software will stop these
events in mid-sequence.
VPNs are typically used by businesses to securely connect several offices. Communica-
tion between offices and between offices and the Internet are encrypted allowing for safer
communication.
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Although these security mechanisms do prove effective in protecting against casual intru-
sion attempts, it has been demonstrated that these preventative measures are no longer
sufficient [2, 11]. Attackers have found means to create fake identities or use existing
identities in order to masquerade as legitimate users on a network. User login details
can be acquired through brute force attacks, or through social engineering. Firewalls and
VPNs can often be misconfigured due to inexperience which creates vulnerabilities, allow-
ing traffic from malicious sources to penetrate the firewall or VPN. The lack of an updated
anti-virus software implies that the anti-virus will not recognize a sequence of events that
describes new or novel types of malicious activities. Though VPNs attempt to safeguard
networks from malicious content found on the Internet using encryption, they are suscep-
tible to malicious content that may be found on the devices (such as laptops) of legitimate
users that connect to the VPN. Once connected to the VPN, the malicious content on a
users device may have access to the VPNs resources and confidential information.
1.1.2 Intrusion detection systems
The inability of conventional network security measures to reliably safeguard networks and
networked systems against network intrusions, led to the creation of an additional layer
of security. This layer of security, known as intrusion detection and prevention, was intro-
duced by James P. Anderson in the early 1980s [12–15]. Mukherjee et al. [10] state that,
“The goal of intrusion detection is to identify, preferably in real-time, unauthorized use,
misuse, and abuse of computer systems by both system insiders and external penetrators.”
Intrusion detection functionality is carried out by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs),
which consists of hardware and software elements for automatically detecting intrusions.
IDSs monitor systems for illegitimate usage patterns which are typically different from
legitimate usage patterns. The detection of intrusions can be used to prevent further harm
caused by an intrusion, for instance, denying access to unauthorised users, effectively limits
the scope of malicious activity and harm.
It is important to note that IDSs are not intended to replace conventional security mecha-
nisms, but rather act as an additional line of defence, with the intention of strengthening
the security of information communication systems [1]. For instance, IDSs can be used
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to detect various types of malicious activities that a firewall may inadvertently allow to
pass through into the network. In addition to this, an IDS can act as a tool for post
mortem analysis, namely to determine the extent of the harm caused by an attack, and
to potentially track down the source of the attack [1, 11, 13, 16, 17].
Intrusion detection systems can be classified as either host-based or network-based. Host-
based IDSs monitor the events on a single computer system or host, where events may
be operating system based or application based. For instance, it can detect whether log
files, security policies, or other important information on that host has been modified in
any way by an attacker. Host-based IDSs may impose high processing overheads on hosts,
depending on the resources available to the host, however, these systems are traditionally
simpler to implement and manage, as they are contained within a single host.
A network-based IDS monitors traffic patterns between network routers, network servers
or network switches, which are ingress and egress points of a network [18]. The network-
based IDS does not have access to information that is specific to individual hosts, which
does not allow for the granular protection that the host-based IDS has. However, the
network-based IDS is able to detect attacks that the host-based IDS may not be able to.
For instance, probing attacks that span several hosts are not detectable on a single host,
but would be detected as an intrusion over the entire network. Network-based systems
are often more complex to implement and manage owing to the need to monitor multiple
hosts, but they are able to detect attacks that span multiple hosts [19, 20]. Both host-
based and network-based IDSs are complementary to each other in the sense that both
are used to detect intrusions in different contexts.
IDSs may also be classified based on the detection approach that they utilize. Typically,
the two main approaches are misuse-based detection and anomaly-based detection [1].
1.1.2.1 Misuse-based detection
Misuse-based detection approaches compares network traffic features to predefined pat-
terns or signatures of known intrusions. Signatures represent a set of rules that describes
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the sequence or set of network activities that characterise an intrusion. Misuse-based ap-
proaches typically have lower false positive percentages owing to the fact that it detects
intrusions that are known. The shortcoming is that misuse-based systems are unable to
detect unknown intrusions or variants of existing intrusions. [1, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20–22].
1.1.2.2 Anomaly-based detection
Anomaly-based detection approaches assumes that the feature values of malicious net-
work traffic is vastly different from that of legitimate network traffic. Anomaly-based
approaches involves the construction of models that represents the expected behaviour of
legitimate network traffic. Incoming network traffic is compared against these models and
any deviation from these models is regarded as an anomalous activity, which may indicate
that malicious network traffic has penetrated the system being monitored. Anomaly-based
detection systems are generally able to detect novel intrusions, however, they often have
high false positive percentages [1, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20–22].
While all types of IDSs have their own strengths and weaknesses, this research focusses
on anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), owing to their ability
to detect novel intrusions. Anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems typically
follow a basic structure, which is provided in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Anomaly-based NIDS structure (from [1]).
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Parameterization involves representing the data observed in the monitored environment in
a form that is suitable for the application of analysis techniques to the data. The training
stage subsequently characterises and models the legitimate behaviour of the monitored
system. Network traffic observed on the monitored system is parameterized and subse-
quently compared against the model in the detection stage, any deviation from this model
results in the anomaly-based NIDS raising an alarm [1].
Data mining involves the analysis of data with the aim of uncovering valuable informa-
tion which may be transformed into knowledge [23]. Anomaly-based network intrusion
detection systems essentially perform data mining tasks on network data in order to gain
knowledge of the behaviour of a system. In anomaly-based NIDS, there exists a variety of
techniques that may be used to accomplish such data mining tasks, for example, machine
learning techniques have been used previously in this regard [1]. Machine learning is a
branch of computer programming that focusses on developing computer algorithms that
build models based on input data which allows them to make predictions or decisions
on new input data. Machine learning methods typically belong to one of two categories:
supervised machine learning or unsupervised machine learning. The former uses labelled
data to learn a general rule on how to map input data to output data; the latter does
not require labelled data, it learns patterns from the input data itself, using these learned
patterns to make predictions based on new input data [2].
Machine learning based anomaly-based NIDS typically constructs models of legitimate
network traffic based on patterns observed in the network packets of network traffic. These
patterns are observed through the analysis of specific features and their values, embedded
in network packets. These feature values characterise or define various types of network
activity occurring on a networked computer system.
1.2 Research problem statement
The effectiveness of various techniques used to implement network intrusion detection
systems rely heavily on the set of features used. A feature set should provide a good
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distinction among the classes present in the data, allowing for quick and accurate clas-
sification of these classes [2]. Network traffic is rich with contextual information and as
a result large feature vectors can be constructed. While larger feature vectors may hold
more information, it has been shown, particularly for the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24],
and the NSL-KDD dataset [25], that features within a feature vector can be irrelevant in
detecting certain types of attacks or that certain features are redundant [7, 26–34].
The consequence of performing network intrusion detection on redundant and irrelevant
features is that it leads to a reduction in classification accuracy in certain cases [26, 31, 35],
as well as introduces a high computational complexity which increases the detection delay.
Irrelevant features do not contribute to the detection of certain types of attacks, as they
are unable to capture significant characteristics that are required for the detection of these
attacks [36, 37]. Redundant features do not add any new knowledge with regards to the
detection of attacks [36]. A study performed in [7] revealed that several features of a
well-known network intrusion detection dataset provided little to no information on any
of the classes present in the dataset.
A candidate solution to this problem is feature selection, which is a procedure commonly
used to remove redundant or irrelevant features that may be present within feature vec-
tors [2, 23, 38]. Feature selection has been applied successfully in various application
areas [7, 26–33]. Applying feature selection techniques to the data prior to analysis by a
NIDS has the potential to improve the performance of network intrusion detection sys-
tems. It has already been demonstrated that a reduced set of more significant features can
lead to an improved detection accuracy and false positive percentage as compared to the
original set of features when detecting certain attacks [7, 26–33]. Additionally, the reduced
feature set may consume fewer resources and take less time to process. Higher dimensional
data makes the detection of attacks more difficult due to complex relationships between
features, this increases the processing time, which increases the detection delay.
Feature selection, as applied in the context of network intrusion detection, typically in-
volves the use of supervised methods that require access to labelled network data [30–
33, 35, 39, 40]. Labelled data consists of network traffic samples (feature vectors) that
have been previously classified by experts in the field as legitimate or associated with
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malicious activity. While these implementations demonstrate the effectiveness of feature
selection, they are impractical in the sense that labelled network data is not available in
practical environments, and difficult to construct without the aid of experts in the field.
Constructing features from network packet data is a non-trivial task; it involves an in-
depth analysis of network packet headers and the content of network packet payloads,
which is a time consuming task [38]. Given the lack of availability of labelled network
data, supervised methods cannot always be used to perform feature selection, thus an
unsupervised feature selection algorithm which does not rely on the availability of labelled
data would provide a solution to this problem. To the best of the author’s knowledge, an
unsupervised feature selection algorithm using cluster validity indices, has not yet been
implemented for use in network intrusion detection.
This research introduces an unsupervised feature selection algorithm for use in network in-
trusion detection. The algorithm makes use of unsupervised machine learning techniques.
It does not require labelled data in its execution, making the technique practical, and suit-
able for deployment in an operational environment in which labelled data is unavailable.
This research focusses specifically on utilizing clustering algorithms, cluster validity in-
dices, and evolutionary algorithms in the implementation of the proposed feature selection
algorithm.
1.3 Research objectives
The objectives of this research are.
• To investigate and compare the performance, in terms of true positive and false pos-
itive percentages, of several clustering algorithms in the context of network intrusion
detection using the NSL-KDD dataset [25].
• To compare the performance, in terms of true positive and false positive percentages,
of performing network intrusion detection using several candidate feature subsets of
the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] and the NSL-KDD dataset [25], that were proposed
in the literature [31, 35].
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• To design and implement a feature selection algorithm for network intrusion detection
that does not rely on labelled network data, and to compare the overall anomaly
detection system to that of other anomaly detection systems that use supervised
feature selection algorithms.
1.4 Delineations and limitations
This section defines and limits the scope of the investigations performed in this research.
• This study is limited to the use of the NSL-KDD dataset [25]. This dataset has
original candidate features that are already defined. Constructing network traffic
related features involves an in-depth analysis of network packet headers and payloads,
which requires significant domain knowledge and is time consuming. Thus, feature
construction is outside the scope of this research.
• The use of the NSL-KDD dataset limits the study to the investigation of 41 standard
network features.
• Feature selection is considered in this research, whereas feature construction and
feature extraction are not.
• Unsupervised anomaly detection techniques are considered, specifically: the k-means,
k-medoids, expectation-maximization, and distance-based outlier detection algo-
rithms.
• Only the Davies-Bouldin cluster validation index is considered as a metric in the
feature selection algorithm.
• Only genetic algorithms are considered for the purpose of optimisation.
• Performance is measured based on true positive and false positive percentages using
both training and testing sets.
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1.5 Motivation
This section motivates the need for the work performed in this research by providing a
brief overview of the current work that has been done with regards to feature selection in
network intrusion detection. This is provided in table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Techniques used for feature selection.
Reference Class Technique
[26] Filter Correlation and mutual information
[27] Filter Bayesian networks and classification and regression trees
[7, 29] Filter Information gain
[28] Filter Degree of dependency
[35] Filter Information gain and correlation
[30] Filter Correlation
[31] Wrapper Support Vector Machine (SVM) with Matthews correlation coefficient
[32] Wrapper Genetic Algorithm (GA) and SVM with true and false positive percentages
[33] Wrapper Bayesian network with classification accuracy
Table 1.3 shows that the works that implement either filter-based or wrapper-based fea-
ture selection algorithms in the context of network intrusion detection, requires the use of
labelled data, which is not always available in practical environments. Creating a labelled
network dataset is a non-trivial task. It requires the collection of vast amounts of raw
network data, which then requires a further in-depth analysis of network packets and net-
work packet payloads. Unsupervised feature selection in the context of network intrusion
detection would not be constrained by the need for labelled network data.
1.6 Contribution
This section highlights the contributions made by this research.
• This research provides a comparison between several clustering algorithms used to
perform classification in the context of network intrusion detection on the NSL-KDD
dataset [25].
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• This research provides a comparison of the performance achieved when performing
classification on the NSL-KDD dataset [25] over several feature subsets.
• In this research the author designs and implements a feature selection algorithm
for network intrusion detection that does not rely on labelled network data, and
provides a comparison between the performance obtained when using feature sub-
sets obtained through the proposed feature selection algorithm and other supervised
feature selection algorithms.
1.7 Definitions of terms and concepts
Cybercrime: Cybercrime is defined as an act that is intended to cause harm to an indi-
vidual, group of individuals or an organisation through the illegitimate use of, or access
to network services [8]. These acts may negatively affect the victims reputation, or may
cause physical, mental, emotional or financial harm to the victim. Cybercrime may be
detrimental to a nation’s security or financial health. The consequence of cybercrime
can include the theft of large sums of money, the theft of vital information, rendering of
services unusable, or copyright infringements.
Network intrusion: A network intrusion constitutes any unauthorised activity on a com-
puter network that causes the loss of confidentiality and integrity of data, the denial of
network resources, or the unauthorised use of network resources [10].
Network attacks: A network attack is a sequence of operations executed on a network that
leads to the occurrence of a network intrusion. Network attacks are typically accomplished
by exploiting some vulnerability in the system [2].
Network vulnerabilities: Network vulnerabilities can be described as flaws in the design,
implementation and management of a network. Their existence creates weaknesses in
networked systems as these vulnerabilities can be exploited by various types of network
attacks [2].
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Network anomalies: Any network activity that is considered as being out of the ordinary
when compared to expected network activity. Anomalies may be associated with legitimate
or malicious network activities [2].
Malicious network activity: Features of network traffic may be used to characterize the
patterns of network activity, which may be associated with legitimate or malicious activity.
Malicious network activity includes those traffic patterns that are associated with network
attacks [41].
Network event or activity: In this research, a network event is described as any change in
network feature values such as the change in traffic volume, change in IP addresses and
service ports [1].
1.8 Thesis overview
This dissertation is structured as follows; chapter 2 consists of a review of the work that
has been performed in the anomaly-based network intrusion detection field, and a review
of feature selection in the context of network intrusion detection systems. Chapter 3
introduces an unsupervised anomaly-based classifier for network intrusion detection and
presents the experimental results obtained from the comparison of several clustering algo-
rithms, as well as several feature subsets using the proposed classifier. Chapter 4 presents
an unsupervised cluster validity-based feature selection algorithm, and provides the ex-
perimental results obtained from a comparison of the proposed feature selection algorithm
to feature selection algorithms found in the literature. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions
that are drawn for the work performed in this research and Chapter 6 provides future work
that is to be conducted.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of network intrusion detection systems, as well as a
review of literature related to anomaly-based network intrusion detection using unsuper-
vised machine learning techniques. A review of literature related to the application of
feature selection in network intrusion detection is also provided.
2.1 Introduction
NIDS are typically classified as anomaly-based or misuse-based systems. In recent years,
research efforts focus on the improvement of anomaly-based NIDS, as they show promise
in detecting novel or unobserved intrusions [1]. Anomaly-based NIDS have been imple-
mented using machine learning techniques, which are divided into supervised and un-
supervised methods. Supervised methods require labelled data, whereas unsupervised
methods do not [2]. Both supervised and unsupervised methods have been used to im-
plement anomaly-based NIDS [42]. In general, it is unrealistic to assume that labelled
data is available in practical network environments. Many researchers have overcome this
constraint by focussing on using unsupervised methods in the implementation of anomaly-
based NIDS [43–51]. Specifically, researchers have used clustering and outlier mining
techniques to implement anomaly-based NIDS. Clustering techniques typically involves
the use of a clustering algorithm such as k–means to cluster network data, prior to la-
belling the data in an unsupervised manner [43–46]. Outlier mining techniques typically
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use distance or density measures to identify unusual instances of network traffic, which are
subsequently labelled as intrusions [48–51]. Both of these unsupervised techniques have
been demonstrated to produce promising results in detecting network intrusions.
It has been shown that using irrelevant and redundant features in the application of these
machine learning techniques in the context of network intrusion detection, can lead to a
reduction in classification performance [7, 26–33, 35]. Thus, a number of researchers have
applied feature selection algorithms to select relevant features that allow for the accurate
classification of intrusions in network intrusion detection. One approach involves the use of
statistical measures such as mutual information to measure feature relevancy [7, 26–30, 35],
while the other approach uses the performance of a machine learning method, typically
supervised methods such as support vector machines, to identify relevant features [31–33].
The design and implementation of a feature selection algorithm that does not rely on
labelled data and is able to achieve a gain in classification performance is a priority.
2.2 Network intrusion detection systems
This section discusses a typical NIDS structure, and provides a more detailed description
of the two major detection approaches, namely misuse-based detection and anomaly-based
detection.
2.2.1 Structure
Despite various detection methodologies, network intrusion detection system designs typ-
ically adhere to a general structure in terms of functionality. Figure 2.1 shows a block
diagram of the general structure of intrusion detection systems [1]. The monitored en-
vironment in figure 2.1 consists of the network traffic flowing between network routers
and/or networked computer systems. Each block of figure 2.1 is discussed in what follows.
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• E-boxes (Event-boxes) — Event boxes are composed of sensors or nodes that ob-
serve the monitored environment gathering information on events1 that may require
further analysis.
• D-boxes (Database-boxes) — These boxes store the information collected by the
E-boxes. The stored information is passed on to the A-boxes for analysis.
• A-boxes (Analysis-boxes) — These process the event information collected by the E-
boxes, with the aim of detecting malicious or potentially malicious activity occurring
within the monitored environment.
• R-boxes (Response-boxes) — If malicious activity is detected, the response boxes
will raise an alert and may attempt to either stop the potential intrusion, or prevent
a confirmed intrusion from spreading or progressing.
Figure 2.1: Structure of a typical intrusion detection system (from [1]).
2.2.2 Detection approaches
This section provides a more detailed description of the two major approaches toward
detection of intrusions in computer networks.
1Events on a host-based IDS include process identifiers and system calls related to operating system
information, while events on a NIDS includes traffic volumes, protocol usage, service ports, IP addresses,
etc. [1]
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2.2.2.1 Misuse-based detection
Misuse-based detection compares network traffic features, collected on an event basis, to
predefined patterns or signatures of known attacks. Signatures may be defined using a rule-
based approach, where a set of rules describes a specific network attack. For example, a set
of keystrokes executed in a certain sequence may be used to define a specific attack [14].
Masri et al. [52] create signatures based on the sequence of events that occur during an
attack; this sequence of events defines a specific network attack.
Misuse-based NIDS are often more accurate and have lower false positive percentages
than anomaly-based detection approaches, but at the cost of not being able to detect
unknown attacks or previously unobserved variants of existing attacks. Signatures require
constant updating in order to keep up with new and emerging threats. They are typically
created manually by administrators or security experts, which places an extra workload
on them [16]. Thus, constant updating of signatures can be a time consuming exercise,
where a new threat could cause a significant amount of harm to a system long before a
security expert creates a signature for it [10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20–22].
Automated techniques for generating signatures for intrusion detection systems are found
in [52, 53]. The misuse-based approach is commonly used in commercial NIDS and network
intrusion prevention systems owing to their lower false positive percentages as compared
to anomaly-based approaches. A common misuse-based open source NIDS is Snort [54]
and a common commercial misuse-based NIDS is Bro [55].
2.2.2.2 Anomaly-based detection
Anomaly-based detection techniques operate based on the assumption that the observed
statistics of key features of malicious traffic deviates from that associated with legitimate
traffic [10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20–22, 56]. These techniques typically involve the construction of
explicit or implicit models of legitimate network traffic. The statistics of observed network
traffic features are subsequently compared to the model, where any deviation from the
model is classified as anomalous, which may indicate that malicious network traffic has
infiltrated the networked computer system.
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The advantage of anomaly-based detection schemes is that they are able to detect those
novel attacks which have not been observed previously [1, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20–22].
Anomaly-based systems do not attempt to identify specific attack sequences, but rather
identifies unusual network traffic, thus, attacks can be identified regardless of whether
they have been observed previously. Anomaly-based systems often suffer from high false
positive percentages owing to the fact that every deviation from the legitimate traffic model
will be classified as anomalous, which may not necessarily be caused by malicious network
traffic. The performance of anomaly-based systems relies on how accurately the legitimate
traffic models represent legitimate traffic. Creating models of legitimate traffic is not a
trivial task in dynamic environments with non-stationary network traffic with constantly
changing statistical profiles, or cyclic trends. Often there is a discrepancy between the
models and the statistics of true legitimate traffic. This increases the need to constantly
update legitimate traffic models or construct models that take cyclic trends into account,
which can be computationally expensive.
In recent years, commercial anomaly-based NIDS have become more prominent [1, 57].
Commercial NIDS that utilize anomaly-based methods include: SPADE [58] and Pre-
lude [59].
2.3 Unsupervised anomaly-based NIDS
Two commonly used unsupervised machine learning techniques for anomaly-based network
intrusion detection are clustering and outlier mining. Clustering techniques group similar
data samples together to discover patterns that may be present within the dataset, while
outlier mining techniques discover those data samples that are different from the majority
of the data over the feature space considered [2]. Data samples that are similar with
regards to feature values over a feature space, and are in the majority, are considered to
be legitimate data samples. This is essentially an implicit model of legitimate network
traffic. Those data samples that are dissimilar to the legitimate samples with regards to
feature values over a feature space, and are in the minority (outliers), are considered to
be attack data samples. The advantage of creating models in this manner is that labelled
data is not required during the classification stage.
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Both clustering and outlier mining techniques have been successfully applied in anomaly-
based NIDS [43–51, 60, 61]. In what follows, NIDS that utilize these techniques are
reviewed.
2.3.1 Clustering based methods
Clustering is an unsupervised learning method commonly used for data mining tasks. It
partitions a dataset into groups (clusters), where those data samples that are similar to
one another with respect to feature values, will be clustered together. While data samples
belonging to different clusters are highly dissimilar to one another, with respect to feature
values. Clustering allows for the identification of patterns and interesting distributions in
the underlying data which in turn allows for the derivation of useful conclusions [2, 62]. In
the context of NIDS, this is the detection of network intrusions. In various fields, clustering
is found under different names: unsupervised learning in pattern recognition, numerical
taxonomy in biology and ecology, typology in social sciences and partitioning in graph
theory [63].
Anomaly-based NIDS that use clustering techniques [43–46] typically follow a common
structure, this structure or functional block diagram is provided in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Anomaly-based NIDS functional block diagram.
Preprocessing involves the application of various algorithms to a dataset in order to rep-
resent the data in a form that is suitable for the machine learning algorithm that the
data will be applied to. Normalization and dimensionality reduction are two examples of
preprocessing methods [38]. Clustering involves the application of a clustering algorithm
to the preprocessed data samples, and cluster labelling involves the assignment of a class
to each cluster. A class or label may correspond to legitimate or malicious network traffic.
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Labels are assigned based on the assumption that legitimate network traffic vastly out-
numbers malicious network traffic. Thus, data samples belonging to smaller clusters, with
respect to the number of data samples assigned to the cluster, are labelled as malicious
traffic samples.
Training and testing is used in supervised machine learning algorithms, where labelled
training data is used to create an inferred function, which is called a classifier. Testing is
subsequently performed by introducing new/previously unseen data samples to the classi-
fier, which classifies or labels the data based on the knowledge inferred from the training
data [64]. Given that clustering does not require labelled data, the equivalent of training
lies in the clustering of data samples and the labelling of cluster centres and data sam-
ples assigned to those cluster centres. The labelled cluster centres form the basis for the
classifier in this case. “Testing” is typically carried out by assigning to new/previously
unseen data samples, the label of the cluster centre that they are closest to with regards
to distances computed over a feature space. In what follows, a review of anomaly-based
NIDS that make use of clustering techniques is provided.
Portnoy et al. [43] introduced an anomaly-based intrusion detection system that does
not require labelled data in its execution. The proposed system makes use of a single-
linkage clustering technique and an innovative cluster labelling scheme that is utilized
by researchers in more recent works as well. The proposed system was applied to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24], and follows the processing sequence illustrated in figure
2.2. Preprocessing involves the normalization of the numeric data of the KDD Cup 1999
dataset, using the statistical normalization technique (refer to section 3.3.1). A variant
of the single-linkage clustering algorithm [65] is used to cluster the normalized data. The
algorithm first selects one random data sample from the dataset to be used as the initial
cluster centre. Subsequent data samples are assigned to the cluster centre that they are
closest to, based on the Euclidean distance metric, or assigned as new cluster centres if
the distance to their closest cluster centre is greater than a threshold value. Clusters are
labelled based on the assumption that legitimate network traffic samples vastly outnumber
malicious network traffic samples. Additionally, it is assumed that legitimate network
traffic will be clustered together. Based on these assumptions the algorithm labels a
predefined percentage of the largest clusters, in terms of the number of data samples
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belonging to the cluster, as legitimate clusters. The remaining smaller clusters are labelled
as malicious or attack clusters. Training and testing sets are created by dividing the KDD
Cup 1999 dataset into ten components, to be used for cross-validation testing. However,
only four were used for training and testing owing to the remaining components not being
representative of various types of attacks. Testing sets are normalized, and performance
is evaluated by assigning each data sample within the testing sets to the cluster centres
that they are closest to. The data samples are assigned the label of the cluster centre to
which they are assigned to. Performance was evaluated in terms of true positive and false
positive percentages. Cross-validation testing revealed that the classifier obtained true
positive percentages between 18% and 57%, and false positive percentages between 0.3%
and 12%, where a majority of the false positive percentages were approximately 1%. The
results varied depending on which training and test set combinations were used.
Syarif et al. [44] proposed an anomaly-based detection algorithm that follows the structure
of figure 2.2 using five different clustering techniques to detect network attacks in the NSL-
KDD dataset [25]. The anomaly-based detection clustering techniques include: k–means,
improved k–means, k–medoids, Expectation-Maximization (EM) with Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMM), and distance-based outlier detection. Note that all algorithms, exclud-
ing the improved k–means clustering algorithm are discussed in greater detail in chapter
3, section 3.4. The anomaly-based detection module consists of four steps. Preprocess-
ing consists of the application of feature extraction and normalization to the NSL-KDD
dataset [25]. Feature extraction was used to create an optimized feature set, though the
exact algorithm or technique was not specified. Normalization was performed on the
numeric data using the statistical normalization technique (refer to section 3.3.1). The
preprocessed data is subsequently clustered using each of the five clustering algorithms
namely: k–means, improved k–means, k–medoids, Expectation-Maximization (EM) clus-
tering, and distance-based outlier detection. The cluster labelling algorithm is unspecified.
Unobserved data samples are subsequently classified by assigning to each sample the class
of the cluster centre it is closest to. The authors compared the performance of the five
clustering techniques used for anomaly-based detection on the NSL-KDD dataset, against
each other and against four misuse-based classifiers that make use of machine learning
algorithms. The misuse-based algorithms were applied to training and testing data in the
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supervised sense of training and testing. Based on classification accuracy and false positive
percentage, the results showed that the misuse-based methods were unable to detect novel
attacks that are within the NSL-KDD testing set, with the highest accuracy being 63.97%
with a false positive percentage of 17.90%. The distance based outlier detection algo-
rithm of the anomaly-based system was shown to have the highest classification accuracy
of 80.15%, however, the false positive percentages were above 20% for all anomaly-based
techniques.
Wang [45] proposed an improved k–means clustering algorithm for use in anomaly detec-
tion applied to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. The algorithm overcomes the sensitivity
in performance to the selection of initial cluster centres experienced in k–means. The dif-
ference between the two algorithms is that improved k–means computes the initial centres
differently; k–means chooses the initial centres randomly, while improved k–means selects
the most decentralized samples as the initial cluster centres by iteratively selecting the
samples that are furthest from each other with regards to the feature space, as cluster
centres. The algorithm consists of a training and a testing phase, where training consists
of preprocessing, clustering and labelling of the data samples and cluster centres, as de-
picted in figure 2.2. Clusters are labelled based on the assumption that legitimate data
samples vastly outnumbers attack data samples. Testing introduces new/unobserved data
samples from a testing set into the classifier produced in the training phase, and assigns
to these data samples the label of the cluster centre to which they are closest to, based on
Euclidean distance with respect to the feature space, which is similar to [43]. Improved
k–means is shown to outperform ordinary k–means when applied to the KDD Cup 1999
dataset [24]. This minor change to the original algorithm results in an increase in true
positive percentage, and a decrease in false positive percentage. Both algorithms were
demonstrated to be capable of detecting unknown attacks.
Papalexakis et al. [46] proposed two co-clustering methods to perform network intrusion
detection when applied to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. Co-clustering is essentially a
combination of clustering and feature selection, where the algorithm clusters data samples
together over different feature subspaces rather than the entire feature space. Two forms of
co-clustering is presented in reference [46]: hard and soft co-clustering. Hard co-clustering
involves the assignment of data samples to a single cluster, with 100% membership. The
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application of hard co-clustering involves the use of an Information Theoretic (IT) ap-
proach that utilizes Bregman divergences [66]. Soft co-clustering involves the assignment
of data samples to clusters based on fuzzy membership, in which data samples belong
to each cluster to a certain degree. It is implemented using a Sparse Matrix Regression
(SMR) technique [67]. SMR co-clustering is applied to the dataset, where binary clustering
is performed over ten iterations. Two clusters were obtained through SMR co-clustering
where one contained 99.36% attack samples, and the other 73.21% legitimate samples, on
average. This implies that SMR co-clustering is capable of distinguishing between legiti-
mate and attack data samples. SMR performed clustering over a subset of features that
it selects and it was discovered that on each execution the same seven features were used
to distinguish the attack cluster. IT clustering was performed with five clusters and using
only the features identified in the SMR clustering stage. By combining SMR’s ability to
identify features that can distinguish between attack and legitimate data samples, and
IT’s ability to run over the entire dataset, authors achieve results that are argued to be
comparable to the winning entry of the KDD Cup 1999 competition [68] and that is not
tailored for the KDD Cup 1999 dataset only [24].
2.3.2 Outlier mining methods
Outlier mining uses the distances between data samples and their neighbours or the densi-
ties surrounding a data sample, determined over a feature space, to discover data samples
that are significantly different to the rest of the data samples. These are referred to as
outliers. Hence, outliers are those singular data samples that possess a large distance to
their neighbouring data samples, or those data samples that occur in less dense regions of
the feature space [2].
Given that distance and density are used to identify outliers, outlier mining techniques
will generally not be able to identify those small clusters of attack data samples that
clustering techniques can identify. This is owing to the fact that samples within these
small clusters are likely to be close to one another based on their distributions in the
feature space. Thus, clustering techniques identify those attack data samples that occur
in small compact groups within the feature space, while outlier mining identifies those
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attack samples that are disjoint from the rest of the data with respect to their distribution
over the feature space considered.
For these reasons, it is common for outlier mining techniques to be combined with a
clustering algorithm [47–51, 69], which allows for the detection of both attack clusters, as
well as singular attack data samples that are disjoint from the rest of the data samples
with regards to their distribution over the feature space. Training in this regard is similar
to the clustering based “training”, where smaller clusters are labelled as those that consist
of attack data samples. The difference lies in the fact that outliers are also labelled as
attack data samples, resulting in more compact clusters, though they are not utilized in
the testing phase. Thus, the testing phase is the same as with the clustering techniques,
where new/unobserved data samples are assigned the labels of the cluster centres to which
they are closest to.
The authors of [47, 70, 71] proposed an Unsupervised Network Intrusion Detection System
(UNIDS) that is able to detect novel network intrusions without the use of signatures or
labelled traffic data. This is achieved by applying a novel outlier detection technique. The
proposed system operates in four steps to detect network intrusions, as shown in figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3: UNIDS functional block diagram
The UNIDS captures network traffic data and aggregates it into traffic flows, which are
subsequently divided into a series of intervals containing traffic flows which occurred within
a certain time period. A standard time series change-detection technique, presented in [72],
is applied to the aggregated traffic flows over each time interval, to detect unusual changes
in feature values. Three volume based features are analysed: the number of bytes, the
number of packets, and the number of flows within a specific time interval. Intervals which
possess abrupt changes in these feature values are flagged as anomalous.
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UNIDS [47, 70, 71] applies a multi-clustering algorithm to the traffic flows contained within
each anomalous time interval, over the feature space of the three considered features. An
outlier score is subsequently assigned to each interval. The multi-clustering algorithm con-
sists of Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) [73], Density-based Spacial Clustering of Applications
with Noise (DBSCAN) [74] and Evidence Accumulation Clustering (EAC) [75]. SSC seeks
to find clusters of data samples within different feature subspaces of a multi-dimensional
dataset [73]. SSC divides the dataset into multiple n-dimensional feature subspaces, each
comprising of a distinct combination of n features from the dataset. DBSCAN is sub-
sequently applied to cluster the data samples within each feature subspace. DBSCAN
clusters data samples based on density, using a nearest neighbour approach. Data sam-
ples with a large number of data samples that are within close proximity of each other
with regards to distances over the feature space are considered to be in a highly dense
region in the feature space, and are clustered together. Data samples with a small num-
ber of neighbours within close proximity regarding their distances over the feature space,
are considered to be in a region of low density in the feature space, and are labelled as
outliers. The output of this step is thus a set of clusters and outliers for each feature
subspace. EAC assigns a score to each outlier in each subspace which indicates the degree
of abnormality of each outlier. The outlier score is computed within each subspace as the
distance between an outlier and the centroid of the largest cluster within that subspace.
A larger score indicates that the outlier has a high degree of abnormality as it has a larger
distance from the majority of the data samples in the subspace. The result is a set of
scores for each outlier in each subspace. All outliers from all subspaces are subsequently
ranked based on their scores in descending order. All outliers that possess a value above
a threshold are classified as attack data samples.
UNIDS [47, 70, 71] takes advantage of the observation that DBSCAN performs more accu-
rately when applied to lower dimensional data [47]. The advantage of clustering multiple
low dimensional subspaces is that a finer-grained analysis is performed, allowing for the de-
tection of low intensity anomalies that are hidden within high dimensional network traffic,
as demonstrated via experimentation in [47].
In [48], an anomaly detection approach known as NADO (Network Anomaly Detection
using Outliers) was introduced. It is effectively a combination of outlier mining and
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clustering, where the outlier mining technique is the Reference-based Outlier Detection
technique for large Datasets (RODD), as described in [76], which uses the density of each
samples neighbourhood to identify outliers.
NADO is a two stage algorithm. It first uses a k–means clustering technique to partition
the data samples of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. A reference point from each cluster
is then calculated and mean-based profiles are constructed for each cluster. A profile is a
vector containing the mean of each feature over the data samples belonging to a cluster,
which is essentially the cluster centre of a cluster. Each cluster centre is used as a reference
point to compute the degree of neighbourhood density of each data sample, computed as
the sum of the absolute difference in distance between a sample and a cluster centre, and
the samples neighbour and the cluster centre, for each neighbour. This is computed for
each data sample, over each corresponding cluster centre. The minimum value computed
over each reference point is assigned to the data sample as its outlier score. Samples with
scores greater than a user specified threshold are labelled as attack data samples.
Songma et al. [49] proposed a two-phase classification method for performing intrusion
detection on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. Preprocessing consists of the removal of
redundant data samples from the dataset, and the conversion of categorical features to
numerical values prior to normalization. The first phase of classification applies k–means
clustering to the data and the second phase utilises a distance-based technique to identify
outliers. Outliers are defined as those data samples whose k nearest neighbours are a
distance dr from it, where k is a user defined fraction of the entire dataset, and dr is a
user specified threshold. Thereafter, each sample of the dataset is assigned a class label.
Authors demonstrate that their method outperforms SVMs and rough-set fuzzy SVMs [77]
in terms of true positive and false positive percentages and overall accuracy.
Said et al. [78] performed intrusion detection using several preprocessing techniques and
distance-based outlier detection on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. Their goal was to
compare the performance of various attribute normalization techniques, distance metrics,
and PCA threshold values, in terms of true positive percentages when applied to distance
based outlier detection. The numeric data of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset was first nor-
malized using either, Z-Score (statistical normalization), log normalization, or min-max
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normalization. PCA was subsequently applied to the normalized numeric data using seven
different threshold values. Authors identified outliers based on the definition that outliers
are the top Nout data samples that possess the largest sum of distances to their k nearest
neighbours in the feature space. The distances for the numeric data are computed using
either the Euclidean distance metric or the Mahalanobis distance metric, while the dis-
tances for the categorical data are computed using the Hamming distance metric. The
hamming distance is computed by counting the number of categorical features which do
not have the same category. All samples identified as outliers are labelled as attack sam-
ples. Experimentation was performed with and without applying PCA to the numeric
data. The outcome of the study indicated that, overall, the best result was obtained using
the log normalization technique in conjunction with the Euclidean distance metric, while
applying PCA to the numeric data.
Chawla et al. [50] performed intrusion detection by combining the k–means clustering
algorithm with a distance-based outlier detection technique that utilizes the Euclidean
distance metric. This algorithm is a modified version of k–means, and is referred to as
k–means--. First, k initial centres are randomly chosen, and data samples are assigned to
the cluster centres to which they are closest to. All samples are ranked in descending order
based on the distance between a sample and its corresponding cluster centre. The top Nout
samples are selected as outliers and removed from the dataset. New cluster centres are
computed over the feature space as the mean of the remaining data samples belonging
to each cluster. The process was repeated using the new cluster centres as the initial
cluster centres. This continues until convergence is achieved. Cluster labelling was not
required for performance evaluation. Experiments were performed using a subset of the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24], where the three largest classes, in terms of number of data
samples, of the dataset (smurf, neptune and normal), were considered as non-outliers,
and the remaining classes were considered as outliers. The performance was measured
based on the algorithms ability to identify these samples as outliers. Using precision and
purity as performance measures, the k–means-- algorithm, was compared against the k
nearest neighbour (kNN) approach for distance-based outlier detection, in which outliers
are defined as the Nout samples with the largest distance to their k
th nearest neighbour.
The difference between the two methods is that the kNN approach does not perform
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clustering, outliers are removed from the entire dataset in one iteration. The k–means--
algorithm was demonstrated to outperform the kNN approach.
Authors of [51] proposed a cluster-based outlier detection technique, which classifies both
small clusters and single data samples as outliers. The algorithm LDBSCAN [79] is used
to find both the Local Outlier Factors (LOFs) [80] for each data sample and to assign data
samples to clusters. The LOF is a density-based outlier detection method that identifies
outliers based on their kth nearest neighbour distances. The LOF is local in the sense
that it only considers a certain number of samples as the neighbourhood of a sample in its
computation of outlier scores for each sample in the dataset. The algorithm was applied to
the backbone network anomaly detection system of CSTNET, which monitors the input
and output throughput of CSTNET, which is the internet service provider for all institutes
of the Chinese academy of science. The network administrators of CSTNET report that
the proposed algorithm produced fewer alerts when compared to the LOF technique alone,
where the LOF technique raised many false positives.
2.4 Feature selection
In general, feature selection is an important preprocessing step for data used in machine
learning applications [38]. Network traffic is rich with contextual information that are
characteristic of various types of network activities, which may be legitimate or malicious.
Due to this richness, large feature vectors may be constructed from network packet data for
the purpose of network intrusion detection, which may result in redundant and irrelevant
features being used for classification. This may inadvertently reduce the classification
performance of the machine learning algorithms used in the design of NIDS (as discussed
in section 1.2). In sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, many of the works did not perform feature
selection prior to the application of machine learning techniques
Several works [7, 26–33, 35, 39, 81] improve the classification performance of NIDS by
performing feature selection in the context of network intrusion detection. These feature
selection methods are typically applied to either the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] or the
NSL-KDD dataset [25].
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The following section is divided into filter and wrapper feature selection methods [82].
A filter method uses a statistical measure to assign scores to each feature. Features
are subsequently ranked according to the scores produced by these statistical measures,
where the top n features are selected. The degree of correlation, and information gain
are commonly used statistical measures [7, 27, 29, 30, 35]. The degree of correlation is
measured between features and between features and classes. A significant feature is one
that is highly correlated with a class, while showing little or no correlation to other features.
Information gain measures the level in which a particular feature is able to discriminate
between classes.
Filter methods require the class labels in order to determine the significance of features and
thus require labelled data. Filter methods are independent of the classification algorithm,
and are typically less computationally intense than wrapper methods [83]. However, ap-
plying data over the resultant feature subset to a classifier may not produce classification
accuracies as high as that obtained when applying the same data over a feature subset
produced by a wrapper method, which optimizes feature subsets for a particular classifier.
Wrapper methods rank features based on the results obtained from performing classifica-
tion on a dataset over various feature subsets. An example of this approach is the use
of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to perform classification on a dataset, in which the
predicative accuracy of the SVM is used to indicate the significance of a feature subset or
of a single feature [31]. This approach requires labelled data to compute the predictive
accuracy of the SVM.
Wrapper methods are dependent on the classifier, and can be more computationally in-
tensive than filter methods, if the classification algorithm is computationally intense [83].
Wrapper methods generally produce feature subsets that produce results that are bet-
ter than that obtained using feature subsets produced by filter methods, provided that
the same classifier is used as was used during feature selection. Thus, wrapper methods
produce feature subsets that are tailored to specific classification algorithms [2, 31, 82].
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2.4.1 Filter methods
Amiri et al. [26] proposed two feature selection algorithms for network intrusion detection
over the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. The algorithms are the Linear Correlation-based
Feature Selection (LCFS) algorithm, and the Modified Mutual Information-based Feature
Selection (MMIFS) algorithm. LCFS ranks features using the linear correlation coefficient
between features and classes and between pairs of features. The first feature selected is the
feature that possesses the highest correlation with the class. The remaining features are
selected iteratively based on the greedy search algorithm. The next feature is selected as
the one that maximizes the difference between the correlation to the class and the sum of
correlations to each previously selected feature. The process is repeated until the desired
number of features are selected. The MMIFS algorithm functions in a similar fashion to
LCFS, where instead, features are ranked using the mutual information between features
and classes and between features and selected features. Both proposed algorithms are
compared against the Forward Feature Selection Algorithm (FFSA). This method utilizes
mutual information to rank features, but differs from MMIFS by only computing the
mutual information between features and classes. Classification is done using a least
squares variant of a support vector machine (LSSVM). The LSSVM method solves a set of
linear equations in the optimization stage, rather than convex quadratic equations as with
traditional SVMs. Utilizing the LSSVM method with a Radial Basis Function (RBF)
kernel was demonstrated to reduce computational costs [84]. The LSSVM is used to
perform binary classification on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The dataset is divided into
five broad classes, thus five LSSVMs were implemented where each LSSVM is a binary
classifier for a different class. Using true positive and false positive percentages, over each
LSSVM classifier, the results showed that MMIFS was the most effective in producing
feature subsets that were able to detect probe and Root-to-Local (R2L) attacks, while
both FFSA and MMIFS performed comparably in producing feature subsets that were
able to detect User-to-Root (U2R) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and legitimate
traffic samples.
Chebrolu et al. [27] proposed two filter-based feature selection algorithms based on Bayesian
Networks (BN) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART). The Bayesian network
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consists of a set of nodes and directed edges; in this case, the nodes represent features and
the edges represent the conditional dependency, or conditional probability between the
features that the edge connects. Thus, the edges indicate the level of dependency between
pairs of features. The Markov blanket of a Bayesian network consists of those nodes that
are conditionally independent of one another. The Markov blanket of a particular class C
is defined as the set of features that are conditionally independent of C. Thus, defining
a feature subset of features that are independent of one another, that is, they are uncor-
related to one another, which implies that the feature subset will contain features that
are not redundant. A CART is a binary recursive tree, where each node is split exactly
two times. The CART is constructed by using features as the nodes, where the Gini rule
is used to split each node, essentially creating a path of features leading to a leaf node.
The tree is complete if nodes cannot be split further, these final nodes are leaves and
represent the classes of the dataset. Feature subsets are then constructed based on the
maximal tree that leads to the identification of the various classes. Classification was done
using a combination of the Bayesian network and CART, applied to the KDD Cup 1999
dataset [24], the feature subsets produced by the Bayesian network were demonstrated to
return higher classification accuracies when compared to using the full feature set.
Kayacik et al. [7] used information gain to perform an analysis of each feature of the KDD
Cup 1999 dataset [24], with respect to its ability to discriminate between the classes in
the dataset. Information gain was computed between each feature and each class, which
allowed the authors to construct a list that maps each class to the feature that best discrim-
inates it. It was found that normal, smurf, and neptune classes were easily distinguishable
owing to the fact that a large number of features possessed a large information gain for
those classes. It was also found that a number of features had very little information gain
for all classes in the dataset, implying that some features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset
are irrelevant for network intrusion detection. A list of class labels and the feature that is
most relevant in discriminating the class is provided.
Tang et al. [29] performed feature selection on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] using the
information gain between features and classes, which is a similar approach to [7]. Authors
construct a list that maps a class to the feature with the highest information gain to that
class. All features that appear within this list are selected as the featute subset. Authors
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apply a Triangle Area-based Support Vector Machine (TASVM) to perform classification.
TASVM is a combination of the k-means clustering algorithm and the SVM learning
algorithm.
Olusola et al. [28] performed feature selection on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] using
the rough set degree of dependency and dependency ratio to measure the relevance of each
feature in distinguishing each class. Feature selection is conducted using two approaches.
The first approach computes degree of dependency for each class based on the available
number of data samples belonging to a class. This signifies how well the feature can
distinguish one class from other classes. The second approach maps each class label to
others for each feature. Authors produce a list that highlights which features are the most
relevant for detecting each class present in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Zargari et al. [35] reviewed the findings of [7, 26–29], providing a table that lists the
features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] along with those attack classes that are strongly
correlated with each feature. The authors proposed two feature selection algorithms: in the
first, feature subsets are selected based on their degree of correlation, where better feature
subsets are those that consist of features that exhibit a high correlation with the classes
and a low correlation with each other [85]. Features are selected in a similar manner to the
LCFS algorithm in [26], using a greedy approach. The second algorithm uses information
gain as a measure of feature relevance, and selects the top features as the feature subsets
based on the ranking of individual features. Intrusion detection performance is computed
over these feature subsets in the dataset via a random forest algorithm. The feature
subsets produced by the two proposed algorithms were reported to produce results that
outperform the results produced when performing intrusion detection over a feature subset
constructed through a majority vote of the feature sets from [7, 26–29].
Eid et al. [30] performed feature selection on the NSL-KDD dataset [25] using a linear
correlation-based feature selection approach. The proposed method is based on the analy-
sis of Pearson correlation coefficients. The approach consists of two phases, the correlations
between pairs of features are first computed, and constructed into an NF -by-NF matrix,
where NF is the total number of features in the feature space considered. The pairs of
features with the highest correlations to one another are found, and one of the features are
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discarded, if the coefficient is greater than a threshold, if not, neither feature is discarded.
The second phase involves the computation of the correlations between the features se-
lected in the first phase and the classes, where features that are highly correlated to the
classes are selected as the final feature subset. Classification is done using a decision
tree (C4.5) [86] implementation. The proposed method is shown to produce a feature
subset that achieves a higher classification accuracy when compared to using all the fea-
tures within the dataset. The feature subset produced by the proposed algorithm is also
shown to achieve higher classification accuracies when compared to using feature subsets
produced by two commonly used feature selection methods, gain ratio and information
gain, as well as a widely used feature extraction method, Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [87]. Both the feature selection and classification stages of the proposed algorithm
require labelled data in their execution.
2.4.2 Wrapper methods
Li et al. [31] proposed a Gradual Feature Removal (GFR) method that was applied to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] for network intrusion detection. The classification algorithm
output, the average Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), as computed over a feature
subset of labelled data is used as a measure of the fitness of a candidate feature subset.
The GFR method begins with the full feature set and iteratively removes the least signif-
icant feature, until only one feature remains. More specifically, given NF features in the
feature space, an iteration involves the computation of the average MCC over NF candi-
date feature subsets. Each subset consists of NF − 1 features, where a different feature
is excluded from each subset.The subset that produces the highest average MCC value
reveals the least significant feature as the one that was excluded from that subset; the
feature is then removed from the candidate feature space. The process is subsequently
repeated with NF − 1, NF − 2, NF − 3 features and so on, until only one feature remains.
The final result is a list of all the excluded features ranked from most to least significant.
Using an SVM, the best accuracy was obtained when the 19 most significant features were
used. The resultant feature subset was compared against feature subsets produced by
three similar feature selection algorithms, namely the Feature Removal Method (FRM),
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the Sole Feature Method (SFM) and a hybrid of these two methods. The FRM is per-
formed in a similar manner to the GFR method in that features are ranked based only
on the first iteration of the GFR method. The SFM computes the average MCC for one
feature at a time, where higher average MCC values shows a higher level of significance
for a feature. The authors demonstrated that the GFR method produced a feature subset
that was able to attain classification accuracies that were higher than the feature subsets
produced by the other three feature selection algorithms. It is noteworthy that all the
feature selection algorithms considered in [31], require the use of labelled data.
Dastanpour et al. [32] proposed the use of a genetic algorithm and an SVM to perform
feature selection on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] for network intrusion detection. A
feature subset is selected based on the true positive percentage of the SVM, which is
produced by performing classification on the dataset over a candidate feature subspace
selected by the GA. The proposed method is compared against two filter-based feature
selection methods, namely the linear correlation-based feature selection method, and the
forward feature selection algorithm. Both these algorithms were utilized by Amiri et
al. [26], as reviewed in section 2.4.1. Applying the KDD Cup 1999 dataset to the SVM
over the feature subsets selected by all three feature selection algorithms demonstrated
that the proposed method was able to produce a feature subset that attained higher true
positive percentages, and lower false positive percentages than the feature subsets produced
by the two filter-based feature selection methods.
Zhang et al. [33] proposed the use of a Bayesian network classifier to perform feature se-
lection and classification on the NSL-KDD dataset [25]. The classification accuracy of the
BN classifier is used to measure the relevance of features in the NSL-KDD dataset. The
classification accuracy when utilizing the full feature set is first computed as a benchmark
for ranking features. Ranking consists of an iterative process which involves the removal
of one feature and the recalculation of the classification accuracy over the reduced feature
space, during each iteration. If the classification accuracy produced by performing classi-
fication over the reduced feature subset is less than the classification accuracy produced
over the full feature set, then the removed feature is significant. The process is repeated
until the classification accuracies of all features that are deemed significant is lower than
the classification accuracy attained over the full feature set. The proposed method was
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compared against four filter-based feature selection methods, namely information gain [88],
gain ratio, ReliefF [89] and ChiSquare [90]. It was demonstrated that the proposed method
produced a feature subset of the NSL-KDD dataset, that attained a higher classification
accuracy than the feature subsets produced by the four filter-based methods. Addition-
ally, the method produced the candidate feature subset in less time than the filter-based
methods.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed several works that design and implement anomaly-based network
intrusion detection systems through the application of two unsupervised machine learning
techniques. These include clustering and outlier mining techniques. The literature re-
veals that anomaly-based NIDS typically follow a common structure, which involves data
preprocessing, clustering, and cluster labelling. While outlier mining techniques are typ-
ically implemented in conjunction with a clustering algorithm. It was found that cluster
labelling is commonly achieved by making the assumption that legitimate network traffic
vastly outnumbers malicious network traffic. The literature reviewed, demonstrates that
anomaly-based NIDS using unsupervised machine learning techniques produces promis-
ing results with regards to classification accuracy. These methods also provide the added
benefit of not requiring labelled data. Thus, unsupervised machine learning techniques
are considered in this research for the design and implementation of an anomaly-based
network intrusion detection system.
Additionally, this chapter reviews several works that design and implement feature se-
lection algorithms for use in network intrusion detection. Feature selection algorithms
are divided into filter-based and wrapper-based methods. It was found that filter-based
methods commonly used in the literature include the use of statistical measures such as:
information gain, mutual information and degree of correlation. From the literature re-
viewed, commonly used wrapper-based methods includes the use of classification accuracy
as a measure of the quality of features or feature subsets. The literature demonstrates
that both methods are capable of producing feature subsets that produce classification
accuracies that are higher or comparable to the classification accuracy produced when
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performing classification over the full feature set. The shortcoming of the feature selection
methods reviewed in this chapter is that all techniques require labelled data to determine
feature relevance. Labelled data is not always available in practical environments, thus,
this research focusses on designing and implementing a feature selection algorithm that
does not require labelled data.
Chapter 3




The proposed classifier for anomaly-based NID is presented in this chapter. The classifier
uses an unsupervised machine learning algorithm which involves the preprocessing and
clustering of data samples, and the labelling of clusters. The algorithm takes in as input
a set of feature vectors derived from network traffic, and performs binary classification
on each vector, which assigns the label legitimate or attack, to each feature vector. The
proposed classifier does not require labelled data samples.
The functional block diagram of the proposed classifier is presented in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Functional block diagram of the proposed classifier.
41
Chapter 3. Proposed Classifier 42
In what follows, a description of each block of figure 3.1, as well as the dataset, are
provided.
3.2 Dataset
In this research the NSL-KDD dataset [25] is used. It is widely used as a benchmark dataset
for anomaly-based NIDS. The use of this dataset allows for the comparison of results with
existing systems proposed in the literature. The NSL-KDD dataset was derived from the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]; both datasets are discussed in what follows.
3.2.1 KDD Cup 1999 dataset
In 1998, DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency) and the Lincoln labora-
tory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) executed an intrusion detection
system evaluation programme that involved the collection of network traffic data over a
simulated network environment of an air force base [91]. The environment consisted of
an intranet of the air force base and an external network representing the Internet. The
intranet consisted of several physical UNIX machines and a gateway to thousands of em-
ulated workstations that utilize a variety of network applications and services to generate
network traffic. This traffic consisted of typical user activities such as sending and receiv-
ing emails, browsing websites, transferring files using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP),
and using telnet to log into remote computers. The external network consisted of a sniffer
to capture network traffic, a gateway to hundreds of emulated workstations, and an addi-
tional gateway to thousands of emulated web servers [91]. Malicious or attack traffic was
automatically simulated, or simulated by actual users if the attack was too complex to be
automated. The generated legitimate traffic and the simulated attack traffic in the net-
work environment, were captured/recorded by the sniffer. Over a period of seven weeks,
the sniffer captured 4 gigabytes of compressed, raw network packets (TCPdump data).
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3.2.1.1 Attacks
The attacks that were simulated during the DARPA IDS evaluation programme all belong
to one of four broader categories of network attacks, as proposed by DARPA [91]:
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) — This form of attack occurs when an attacker overloads
or exhausts a system resource (such as available memory or bandwidth) through
service requests. This renders the system unable to accommodate new requests from
legitimate users. An example is the SYN flood (Neptune) attack which involves
the transmission of a large number of SYN packets to a host system. A SYN packet
initialises a TCP connection between the attacker and the server, preparing the server
for data transmission. The server replies with a SYN/ACK packet and waits for an
ACK packet from the attacker in order to complete the new connection. However,
the attacker does not reply with an ACK packet leaving the connection half open.
A server can only accommodate a finite number of half open connections, and once
that finite number is reached, new legitimate connections cannot be established.
• User to Root (U2R) — In this category of attack, an attacker is assumed to
already have user-level access to a target system in the network or intranet. This
user-level access is obtained through legitimate or illegitimate means, such as a
brute-force attack on user passwords. The attack consists of the attacker escalating
his/her access level to gain root access (administrator-level access), by exploiting
some vulnerability within the system.
• Remote to Local (R2L) — This occurs when an attacker remotely gains access to
a local system within a network or intranet, that he/she is not entitled to access, by
exploiting some vulnerability within the system. This is achieved by sending packets
to the local machine over a network from a remote location.
• Probing — This involves an attacker attempting to gather private information
about a network with the aim of finding a security flaw or vulnerability in networked
systems. This includes finding target hosts, and specific hosts with open ports, which
reveal network services that can be exploited. It is generally carried out as an initial
step, prior to executing an attack from one of the remaining categories.
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3.2.1.2 Features
Stolfo et al. [92] and Lee et al. [93, 94] specified an initial set of features obtained from
information extracted from the raw data. The initial set of features were constructed for
each connection record. A connection is any form of communication attempt between two
hosts, a source and a destination. Each connection record is therefore represented as a
vector consisting of feature values that describe a specific connection of interest. Certain
features associated with specific connections of interest, were extracted from packet headers
and payloads. Other features involve statistics calculated over multiple time frames and
multiple connections related to the connection of interest. An example includes the number
of connections to the same host or service as the current connection of interest. Stolfo et
al. [92] and Lee et al. [93, 94] divided the initial set of features into four categories.
Basic features of individual TCP connections.
These represent the general features of TCP connections that are derived from packet
headers, such as the amount of data transmitted during a connection, the duration of a
connection, the ports used during a connection, etc. These features are not specifically
derived for intrusion detection, but are commonly used for general network analysis [93].
Content features within a connection derived from the payload.
Content-based features are derived from the payloads of packets. They characterise the
actions of a user, such as, the number of failed login attempts, the number of files created,
the number of “root” accesses, etc. Content-based features allow for the identification of
R2L and U2R attacks. R2L and U2R attacks generally occur over one single connection
and are embedded in the packet payloads, unlike DoS and probe attacks which occur over
multiple connections.
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Traffic features computed using a two-second time window.
The motivation for these features is that attacks frequently exhibit patterns over different
time frames, which can be used to detect certain attacks. For example, DoS and certain
probe attacks involve the transmission of a large number of packets to a host in a very
short period of time. These features are derived from statistics over a two second time
frame, related to the connection of interest, such as, the number of connections to the
same host or service as the current connection of interest.
Traffic features computed using the last 100 connections.
Certain attacks involve the transmission of data over extended periods of time. These
attacks may in some cases be identified using features that are derived over multiple
connections related to a connection of interest. These features are derived from statistics
that are calculated over 100 connections related to a connection of interest, such as, the
number of connections to the same host or service as the current connection of interest.
Table 3.1 summarises the attack categories of those attacks that may be detected by each
feature category, as demonstrated in [92–94].
Table 3.1: Attack categories detectable by the four feature categories.
Feature categories Attack categories
Basic and traffic features DoS and fast probing attacks
Basic and connection-based traffic features Slow probing attacks
Basic and content-based features R2L and U2R attacks
Table 3.2 provides a list of all 41 features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24], along with a
description and the type of each feature. The 41 features consists of 32 numeric features
(16 with continuous values and 16 with discrete values), and 9 categorical features (6 with
two categories and 3 with several categories).
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Table 3.2: List of features contained in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset (from [5–7]).
# Feature Name Description Type
Basic features of individual TCP connections
1 duration length (number of seconds) of the connection Numeric (Continuous)
2 protocol type type of the protocol, e.g. TCP, UDP, etc. Categorical (3-cat.)
3 service network service on the destination, e.g., HTTP, telnet, etc. Categorical (11-cat.)
4 flag normal or error status of the connection Categorical (64-cat.)
5 src bytes number of data bytes from source to destination Numeric (Discrete)
6 dst bytes number of data bytes from destination to source Numeric (Discrete)
7 land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
8 wrong fragment number of “wrong” fragments Numeric (Discrete)
9 urgent number of urgent packets Numeric (Discrete)
Content features within a connection derived from the payload
10 hot number of “hot” indicators Numeric (Discrete)
11 num failed logins number of failed login attempts Numeric (Discrete)
12 logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
13 num compromised number of “compromised” conditions Numeric (Discrete)
14 root shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
15 su attempted 1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
16 num root number of “root” accesses Numeric (Discrete)
17 num file creations number of file creation operations Numeric (Discrete)
18 num shells number of shell prompts Numeric (Discrete)
19 num access files number of operations on access control files Numeric (Discrete)
20 num outbound cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp session Numeric (Discrete)
21 is host login 1 if the login belongs to the “host” list; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
22 is guest login 1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 otherwise Categorical (Binary)
Traffic features computed using a two-second time window
23 count number of connections to the same host as the current connection Numeric (Discrete)
24 srv count number of connections to the same service as the current connection Numeric (Discrete)
25 serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors in the count feature Numeric (Continuous)
26 srv serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors in the srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
27 rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors in the count feature Numeric (Continuous)
28 srv rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors in the srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
29 same srv rate % of connections to the same service in the count feature Numeric (Continuous)
30 diff srv rate % of connections to different services in the count feature Numeric (Continuous)
31 srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts in the srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
Traffic features computed using the last 100 connections
32 dst host count number of connections to the same host as the current connection Numeric (Discrete)
33 dst host srv count number of connections to the same service as the current connection Numeric (Discrete)
34 dst host same srv rate % of connections to the same service in the dst host count feature Numeric (Continuous)
35 dst host diff srv rate % of connections to different services in the dst host count feature Numeric (Continuous)
36 dst host same src port rate
% of connections whose source port is the same to that of the current
connection in the dst host count feature
Numeric (Continuous)
37 dst host srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts in the dst host srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
38 dst host serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors in the dst host count feature Numeric (Continuous)
39 dst host srv serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors in the dst host srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
40 dst host rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors in the dst host count feature Numeric (Continuous)
41 dst host srv rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors in the dst host srv count feature Numeric (Continuous)
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The KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] consists of training and testing subsets; specifically, the
dataset consists of,
• a training set with 5 million records,
• a 10% subset of the training set, randomly selected, with 500 000 records, and
• a test set with 2 million records.
A detailed overview of the composition of these subsets are not provided, as the NSL-KDD
dataset [25], which was derived from the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, was used in this research.
3.2.1.3 Shortcomings of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset
The KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] is a widely used dataset for evaluating the performance of
anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems [43, 45, 46, 48–50, 78]. However, the
dataset has several characteristics which detract from its fitness as a benchmark dataset
for performance evaluation. Tavallaee et al. [95] performed a detailed analysis on the KDD
Cup 1999 dataset in order to identify and address the shortcomings of the dataset for the
purpose of serving as a benchmark dataset. The study points out two main shortcomings
of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
The first is the presence of redundant records, where the full training and testing sets con-
tain approximately 80% and 75% duplicated records, respectively [95]. These duplicates
occur due to the nature of certain attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Probing
attacks [34]. While the existence of duplicates is representative of real network traffic,
their presence introduces a bias towards those attack classes when the dataset is applied
to machine learning algorithms. If a significantly large proportion of the dataset consists
of duplicates and all duplicates are classified correctly, this will result in a high classifica-
tion accuracy, whereas if they are classified incorrectly, this results in a low classification
accuracy. Both scenarios may be misleading as they may not indicate the classification or
detection capabilities of certain classifiers with regards to detecting less frequent attacks,
such as R2L and U2R attacks [34, 95].
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The second shortcoming is that the majority of the connection records are trivial to classify,
this implies that the results reported in certain articles would typically result in high
classification rates in certain classifiers [95]. This shortcoming detracts from the detection
of more sophisticated attacks, which reduces the ability of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]
to serve as a benchmark dataset for intrusion detection. In order to demonstrate the second
shortcoming, Tavallaee et al. [95] performed experiments using seven supervised machine
learning algorithms that were applied to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Experiments were
run using the WEKA software package [96] using the following algorithms:
• J48 decision tree [97],
• Naive Bayes (NB) [98],
• NBTree [99],
• random forest [100],
• random tree [101],
• multilayer perceptron [102], and
• support vector machines [103].
Tavallaee et al. [95] trained each of the seven supervised machine learning algorithms
three times using three different training sets. The three training sets were randomly
selected subsets of the full KDD training dataset, each consisting of 50 000 connection
records. This process produced 21 classifiers, which were applied to classify each of the
remaining connection records of the full KDD training and testing sets as either a legitimate
connection, or a specific attack (from one of the classes defined in section 3.2.2, in table
3.4). The results indicated that each of the 21 classifiers were able to correctly classify 98%
and 87% of all records for both the training and test sets, respectively. This demonstrates
that the majority of the attacks are elementary attacks, which are trivial to detect when
using the implementation in [95].
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3.2.2 NSL-KDD dataset
To address the shortcomings of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24], Tavallaee et al. [95]
proposed a new dataset known as the NSL-KDD dataset [25], which is a subset of the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The NSL-KDD dataset resolves the shortcomings of the KDD
Cup 1999 dataset by eliminating duplicated records and retaining only certain connection
records in order to obtain a distribution that consists of a larger proportion of sophisticated
attacks, making the dataset more challenging for intrusion detection tasks, and thus more
appropriate for use as a benchmark dataset for intrusion detection [95]. In this research,
the NSL-KDD dataset is utilized in all simulations.
The NSL-KDD dataset was created in two steps:
1. The initial step consisted of the removal of all duplicated records, retaining only one
copy of each distinct connection record. This reduced the full KDD training and
testing sets to around 20% and 25% of their original size, respectively.
2. Tavallaee et al. [95] grouped the connection records based on the number of classifiers
(as specified in section 3.2.1) that were able to correctly classify each record. The
groups were as follows, those records that were correctly classified by: 0-5 classifiers,
6-10 classifiers, 11-15 classifiers, 16-20 classifiers, and 21 classifiers, were grouped
together. To obtain the NSL-KDD dataset [25], Tavallaee et al. [95], randomly
selected a proportion of connection records from each group, where each proportion
consisted of a number of connection records that constitute an inversely proportional
percentage of connection records present in the KDD Cup 1999 training and test sets,
after duplicates were removed. For example, after the removal of duplicates, the KDD
Cup 1999 dataset [24] consisted of 0.04% of those connection records belonging to
group 0-5. Thus, 99.96% of those records belonging to group 0-5, were randomly
selected for the NSL-KDD dataset. Thus, the NSL-KDD dataset constitutes a larger
proportion of those attacks that are harder to correctly classify, as compared to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
The NSL-KDD dataset consists of two training sets and two test sets:
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• Training set 1. This training set was derived by applying steps 1 and 2, as set out
above, to the full KDD Cup 1999 training set. It has 125 973 connection records.
• Training set 2. This training set was created by randomly selecting 20% of the
connection records of NSL-KDD training set 1. It has 25 192 records.
• Test set 1. This test set was derived by applying steps 1 and 2, as set out above,
to the full KDD Cup 1999 test set. It has 22 544 connection records.
• Test set 2. This test set is a subset of NSL-KDD test set 1, created by removing
all connection records with a rank of 21. It has 11 850 records. The records of test
set 2 are considered more difficult to classify correctly than the records in test set 1.
Table 3.3 summarises the contents of the training and test sets of the NSL-KDD dataset [25],
detailing the number of connection records as well as the distribution of records that are as-
sociated with legitimate network traffic, and the four network attack categories (as defined
in section 3.2.1.1).
Table 3.3: Contents of the training and testing sets of the NSL-KDD Dataset.
Training set 1 Training set 2 Test set 1 Test set 2
DoS 45 927 36.46% 9 234 36.65% 7 475 33.16% 4 359 36.78%
Probe 11 656 9.25% 2 289 9.09% 2 421 10.74% 2 402 20.27%
R2L 995 0.79% 209 0.83% 2 870 12.73% 2 870 24.22%
U2R 52 0.04% 11 0.04% 67 0.30% 67 0.57%
Normal 67 343 53.46% 13 449 53.39% 9 711 43.08% 2 152 18.16%
Total 125 973 100% 25 192 100% 22 544 100% 11 850 100%
A comprehensive list of all the attacks in the NSL-KDD training and testing sets is provided
in table 3.4. Each attack is grouped into one of the four broader attack categories (as
specified in section 3.2.1.1), and the percentage of records within the dataset belonging to
each attack is provided. The information in table 3.4 was gathered from the KDD Cup
1999 dataset website [5], from an analysis of the class labels and from references [104, 105],
which provide a list of attacks. The interested reader can refer to [106] for a description
of each attack and the steps involved in their execution.
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Table 3.4: List of attacks contained in the NSL-KDD dataset, and percentage of con-
nection records belonging to each attack.
Training Set 1 Training Set 2 Test Set 1 Test Set 2
Attack
Category
back 0.76% back 0.78% back 1.59% back 3.03% DoS
land <0.1% land <0.1% land <0.1% land <0.1% DoS
neptune 32.72% neptune 32.88% neptune 20.66% neptune 13.32% DoS
pod 0.16% pod 0.15% pod 0.18% pod 0.35% DoS
smurf 2.10% smurf 2.10% smurf 2.95% smurf 5.29% DoS
teardrop 0.71% teardrop 0.77% teardrop <0.1% teardrop 0.10% DoS
ipsweep 2.86% ipsweep 2.82% ipsweep 0.63% ipsweep 1.19% Probe
nmap 1.19% nmap 1.19% nmap 0.32% nmap 0.62% Probe
portsweep 2.33% portsweep 2.33% portsweep 0.70% portsweep 1.32% Probe
satan 2.88% satan 2.74% satan 3.26% satan 6.14% Probe
ftp write <0.1% ftp write <0.1% ftp write <0.1% ftp write <0.1% R2L
guess passwd <0.1% guess passwd <0.1% guess passwd 5.46% guess passwd 10.39% R2L
imap <0.1% imap <0.1% imap <0.1% imap <0.1% R2L
multihop <0.1% multihop <0.1% multihop <0.1% multihop 0.15% R2L
phf <0.1% phf <0.1% phf <0.1% phf <0.1% R2L
spy <0.1% spy <0.1% — — — — R2L
warezclient 0.71% warezclient 0.72% — — — — R2L
warezmaster <0.1% warezmaster <0.1% warezmaster 4.19% warezmaster 7.97% R2L
buffer overflow <0.1% buffer overflow <0.1% buffer overflow <0.1% buffer overflow 0.17% U2R
loadmodule <0.1% loadmodule <0.1% loadmodule <0.1% loadmodule <0.1% U2R
perl <0.1% — — perl <0.1% perl <0.1% U2R
rootkit <0.1% rootkit <0.1% rootkit <0.1% rootkit 0.11% U2R
apache2 3.27% apache2 6.22% DoS
mailbomb 1.30% mailbomb 2.47% DoS
named <0.1% named 0.14% DoS
processtable 3.04% processtable 5.78% DoS
udpstorm <0.1% udpstorm <0.1% DoS
mscan 4.42% mscan 8.41% Probe
saint 1.42% saint 2.61% Probe
httptunnel 0.59% httptunnel 1.12% R2L
sendmail <0.1% sendmail 0.12% R2L
snmpgetattack 0.79% snmpgetattack 1.50% R2L
snmpguess 1.47% snmpguess 2.79% R2L
worm <0.1% worm <0.1% R2L
xlock <0.1% xlock <0.1% R2L
xsnoop <0.1% xsnoop <0.1% R2L
ps <0.1% ps 0.13% U2R
sqlattack <0.1% sqlattack <0.1% U2R
xterm <0.1% xterm 0.11% U2R
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Table 3.4 indicates that training set 1 has 22 attacks, whereas training set 2, the 20%
subset of training set 1, has 21 attacks, with the absence of perl records. Both test sets
have 37 attacks, in which 20 attacks are found in the training sets, and 17 are additional
attacks.
Each feature vector of all training and testing sets consists of the same 41 features as
defined in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24], as well as a class label for each record in
the dataset. Each record is labelled as either one specific attack, as set out in table 3.4,
or normal, which represents legitimate network traffic. Note that the class labels are
only used to evaluate performance after classification, and not used as a feature during
classification.
3.3 Data transformation
In general, data transformation involves converting the values of data samples into a form
that is suitable for machine learning tasks [23]. It involves the scaling of numeric feature
values to fall within a desired range (normalization), as well as the conversion of categorical
feature values into numeric values, as may be required by certain machine learning tasks
(encoding). Several articles have reviewed various methods for normalizing and encoding
the data of the features of the NSL-KDD dataset [25], and their impact on the classification
performance of several anomaly-based NIDS [107, 108]. This section provides an overview
of the procedure used in this research to transform the NSL-KDD dataset into a format
that is suitable for clustering feature values associated with each data sample.
3.3.1 Normalization
The NSL-KDD dataset [25] contains numeric features that are defined over ranges with
different extent. This disparity in magnitude may lead to the emergence of a bias towards
certain features, during for example, distance calculations in clustering algorithms. Nor-
malization is a technique that is employed to ensure that the features are defined over a
common range, with no bias towards certain features, as a result of disparity of scale [38].
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Several normalization techniques that can be used to normalize numerical features in-
clude [23, 107, 108]:




• statistical normalization (standardisation),
• ordinal normalization, and
• decimal scaling normalization.
Wang et al. [108] performed a comparison of the performance impact of several normal-
ization techniques as applied to network intrusion detection over the KDD Cup 1999
dataset [24]. Three supervised learning methods, namely, k-nearest neighbour (kNN),
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) were trained
and tested on subsets of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The training set consisted of only
legitimate network traffic to build “normal” models, and the testing set consisted of both
legitimate and attack traffic, in which attacks were detected as those samples that devi-
ated from the “normal” models. PCA was implemented as a classifier by projecting each
test sample onto the subspace found by the PCA algorithm applied to the training set,
that represents normal behaviour. The test sample is labelled as legitimate if the distance
between the test sample and its reconstruction onto the subspace is below a threshold.
Prior to applying machine learning, the numeric features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset
were normalized using one of the following normalization techniques: mean range, sta-
tistical, ordinal and frequency normalization. The categorical features were not included
in the experiment. The authors suggested that statistical and mean range normalization
should be used if distance-based computations are required, and in situations involving
large datasets, statistical normalization is recommended, as it provides the best overall
performance.
Chapter 3. Proposed Classifier 54
Statistical normalization was successfully applied in several anomaly-based NIDS that
involve distance-based calculations [43, 44]. Both Syarif et al. [44] and Portnoy et al. [43]
used clustering techniques to perform network intrusion detection. Both authors applied
statistical normalization on the numeric features of the NSL-KDD dataset [25] and KDD
Cup 1999 dataset [24], respectively. Chapter 2, section 2.3.1 describes these systems in
greater detail.
In this research the statistical normalization technique is applied to the numeric features
of the NSL-KDD dataset [25]. The technique rescales each numeric feature such that it
has a mean value of zero and a unity standard deviation when calculated over all samples




, i = 1 . . . N (3.1)
where x′i,f is the scaled value, N is the number of data samples and µf and σf are the
mean and standard deviation of the values of feature f , respectively. Both the mean and












(xi,f − µf )2 (3.3)
3.3.2 Encoding
This section describes the technique that was used to encode the categories of the cate-
gorical features present in the NSL-KDD dataset [25]. Encoding consists of the mapping
of categories to corresponding numerical values. Several encoding techniques have been
proposed in the literature. Table 3.5 lists several of the techniques that have been success-
fully applied in the context of anomaly-based network intrusion detection, together with
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classifiers used with each technique, and the normalization technique that may have been
applied to the encoded categories of the categorical features.





[26] Least Squares SVM (Chapter 2, section
2.4)
Maximize
[48] NADO (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2) None
[29] TASVM (Chapter 2, section 2.4) Maximize
[109] SVM Mean Range
Binary
[110] Extreme learning machines (ELM) None
[111] Decision tree, kNN, Multi-layer percep-
tron, regularized discriminant analysis,
Fisher linear discriminant, k-means, single
linkage clustering, quarter-sphere SVM, γ-
algorithm
Statistical
[112] Parzen-window estimators with Gaussian
kernels
None
Frequency [107] Random forest, Bayes net, naive Bayes
(NB), NB tree and decision trees.
None
[113, 114] Transductive Confidence Machines k-
Nearest Neighbour (TCM-kNN)
None
To illustrate each technique suppose that a categorical feature has Ncat possible categories.
Ordinal encoding
In ordinal encoding, each of the Ncat categories are mapped to a distinct integer in the set
0, 1, . . . , Ncat − 1. Amiri et al. [26] encode the categories of the categorical features of the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] as follows; the protocol type feature (for instance) consists of
three categories: TCP, UDP and ICMP ; authors assign integer values to these categories
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by setting the category TCP to 1, UDP to 2, and ICMP to 3. The transformed categor-
ical data as well as the numerical data of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, are subsequently
normalized using the maximize normalization technique.
The ordinal encoding technique is inappropriate as the clustering techniques of interest
use distances over the feature space. If ordinal encoding is used together with a distance
metric, an implicit measure of dissimilarity is assigned to categories that may not be
accurate or appropriate. The implication is that (for instance) categories mapped to 1
and 3 are more dissimilar than categories mapped to 1 and 2.
Binary encoding
In binary encoding, each of the Ncat categories are mapped to a distinct Ncat-bit number,
where a single bit is nonzero. Authors of [110–112] encode the categories of the categorical
features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] using binary encoding, where the categories of
the protocol type feature (for instance) are encoded as follows; TCP, UDP and ICMP are
encoded as (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 0), respectively.
The drawback of this encoding technique is that it increases the dimensionality of the
dataset. Essentially, one feature becomes Ncat features. Encoding the categories of the
categorical features of the NSL-KDD dataset [25] to binary numbers would drastically
increase the dimensionality of the dataset, which enlarges the search space for feature
selection.
Frequency encoding
In frequency encoding, each category is mapped to a real number between 0 and 1 that rep-
resents the fraction of occurrences of the category in the dataset. A category of categorical
feature f , is encoded as,
Cat′j,f =
∑N
i=1 1(xi,f = Catj,f )
N
, j = [1, 2, . . . , Ncat] (3.4)
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where Catj,f represents category j of feature f , Cat
′
j,f is the encoded value of category
j of feature f , N is the number of data samples, and Ncat is the number of categories in
feature f .
Li et al. [113, 114] encoded the categories of the categorical features of the KDD Cup 1999
dataset [24], using equation 3.4, to perform network intrusion detection.
Due to the disadvantages of the ordinal and binary encoding methods, in this research, the
frequency-based encoding method is used to encode the data of the non-binary categorical
features of the NSL-KDD dataset [25].
It is noteworthy that some anomaly-based NIDS proposed in the literature exclude the
binary-valued categorical features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24] and NSL-KDD
dataset [25]. This is not considered as an option in this research as it has been demon-
strated previously that several of the binary-valued categorical features have value in
distinguishing between the attack categories present in both datasets. In particular ref-
erences [7, 28, 29] suggest that the land feature is valuable for identifying DoS attacks
while references [26, 28] suggest that the root shell feature is valuable for identifying U2R
attacks. Li et al. [31] showed that, according to their ranking algorithm, the land feature
was the third most significant feature out of all 41 features of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
In this research, the binary-valued categorical features were encoded using the ordinal
encoding technique, where values were encoded as either a 0 or a 1. Further normalization
of the encoded binary-valued categorical features was not considered as the feature values
are within the same range as that of the encoded non-binary categorical features of the
NSL-KDD dataset [25]. This is the same approach as used in references [48, 107]
3.4 Clustering
This section describes each of the clustering algorithms that were used in this research. The
goal of clustering is to find hidden structures or regularities among the data samples in the
feature space considered. Clustering algorithms assign data samples in the feature space
to groups or clusters, such that data samples that are in a common region of the feature
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space belong to the same cluster. In applying clustering in the context of classification,
the assumption is that data samples belonging to the same cluster will belong to the
same class. Clustering may be done based on (among others), the distances between data
samples, the relative density of data samples, or according to distributional models such
as a Gaussian mixture model, all computed over the feature space considered [2, 63].
The clustering algorithms described in this section are all sensitive to the choice of initial
cluster centres, where different initial centres produce different results. In the implemen-
tation of the classifier, the clustering algorithm is repeatedly applied to the data, with a
different choice of initial representative points for each cluster on each iteration. A total
of CR repetitions is performed, and during each repetition, the clustering algorithm is
executed until it converges. Each of the CR clustering results obtained, are subsequently
labelled (refer to figure 3.1).
3.4.1 Centroid-based clustering
Centroid-based clustering involves the use of cluster centres or centroids to represent each
cluster [23]. A cluster centre is a feature vector which defines the centre of a cluster in
the feature space considered. A cluster centre may or may not correspond to an actual
data sample of the dataset. Data samples are assigned to the cluster centre that they are
closest to, based on some measure of proximity that is calculated over the feature space
considered. Typically the Euclidean distance is used as the proximity measure, however,
other measures that can be used include the Manhattan distance, Minkowski distance,
and Chebyshev distance [23].
3.4.1.1 K–means
K–means is a widely used centroid-based clustering technique for grouping data samples
together based on distances over the feature space, while maintaining a separation between
samples that are relatively distant from one another with regards to the feature space. The
name k–means was first introduced by James MacQueen in 1967 [115], but the algorithm
itself was derived from the work of Hugo Steinhaus in 1956 [116].
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The pseudocode for the k–means algorithm is provided in algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 K–means clustering algorithm
Function [C,L] = kmeans(X,K,Fs)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of feature vectors to be clustered
K, . The number of clusters
Fs, . A feature subset to perform clustering over
Outputs:
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}, . Set of feature vectors representing cluster centres
L = {l(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N}, . Set of cluster assignments for X
. Initialization
1: C← K random samples drawn uniformly from dataset X, without replacement
. Assign data samples in X to cluster centres in C
2: for (xi ∈ X) do
3: l(xi)← arg min
j
[Distance(xi, cj)] ; . where j = {1, . . . ,K}
4: end for
5: repeat
6: changed← false ;
7: for all (ci ∈ C) do
8: ci ← mean(x ∈ X | l(x) = i) ; . Recompute cluster centres
9: end for
. Reassign data samples to closest cluster centre
10: for all (xi ∈ X) do
11: minDist index← arg min
j
[Distance(xi, cj)] ; . where j = {1, . . . ,K}
12: if minDist index 6= l(xi) then
13: l(xi)← minDist index ;
14: changed← true ;
15: end if
16: end for
17: until changed = false
18: Return C,L
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The algorithm partitions the data into K clusters, where K is a user-specified parameter.
First, K random data samples are chosen from the dataset, as the initial cluster centres.
Each data sample is then assigned to the cluster centre that it is closest to based on the
squared Euclidean distance from the data sample to each cluster centre. The k–means
algorithm iteratively recalculates the K cluster centres as the mean of all the samples
belonging to the kth cluster, where the mean is computed over each feature in the feature
space. The data samples are subsequently reassigned to the new cluster centres, and the
process is repeated until the cluster centres remain unchanged.
The k–means algorithm is computationally efficient and scalable for application to rel-
atively large datasets. It often converges to a local optimum and is not guaranteed to
converge to a global optimum [23]. It is also able to find spherical or convex shaped
clusters [2]. The disadvantage of k–means clustering is that it is sensitive to outliers in
the dataset. Outliers affect the positioning of cluster centres in the feature space as they
possess large feature values that disproportionately affect the movement of cluster centres
in the feature space, during clustering [2, 23].
3.4.1.2 K–medoids
The k–medoids algorithm is a centroid-based clustering algorithm and is similar to the
k–means algorithm. The difference lies in the recalculation of cluster centres during each
iteration [2, 23, 63]. K–medoids selects cluster centres as those data samples belonging to
a cluster, that possesses the minimum summed distance to all remaining samples belonging
to the same cluster. The samples that are selected as cluster centres are known as medoids.
The k–means algorithm, however, recalculates cluster centres as the mean of all the data
samples assigned to the same cluster centre. The pseudocode for the k–medoids clustering
algorithm is provided in algorithm 3.2.
The algorithm first initializes K medoids and subsequently iterates through several assign-
ment and recalculation steps until convergence. The initial cluster medoids (centres) are
selected as K random samples from the dataset. The remaining data samples are subse-
quently assigned to the cluster medoids to which they are closest to based on the squared
Euclidean distance computed over the feature space. New cluster medoids are found by
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Algorithm 3.2 K–medoids clustering algorithm
Function [C,L] = kmedoids(X,K)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of feature vectors to be clustered
K, . The number of clusters
Outputs:
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}, . Set of feature vectors representing cluster centres/medoids
L = {l(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N} . Set of cluster assignments for X
1: C← K random samples drawn uniformly from dataset X, without replacement ;
2: repeat
3: changed← false ;
4: for all (xi ∈ X) do . Assign data samples to the closest medoid
5: l(xi)← arg min
j
[Distance(xi, cj)] ; . where j = {1, . . . ,K}
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to K do
8: Hi ← (x ∈ X | l(x) = i) ; . Data samples belonging to cluster i
9: for all (h ∈ Hi) do
10: sum dist← 0 ;
11: for all (x ∈ Hi) do . x 6= h
12: sum dist← sum dist+ dist(x,h) ;
13: end for
14: sum(h)← sum dist ;
15: end for
16: index← arg min
h∈Hi
[sum(h)] ; . Data sample with the smallest summed
17: ctmp ← Hi(index) ; . distance to all samples in cluster i
18: if (ctmp 6= ci) then . If the candidate medoid ctmp, is different from the
19: ci ← ctmp ; . the previous medoid ci, then the candidate medoid
20: changed← true ; . becomes the new cluster medoid
21: end if
22: end for
23: until changed = false
24: Return C,L
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computing the sum of the distances from each sample belonging to a cluster to each
remaining sample belonging to the same cluster. The sample that possesses the minimum
summed distance to all remaining samples belonging to the same cluster, is selected as the
new cluster medoid. The process is repeated until the cluster medoids do not change after
an iteration.
The disadvantage of the k–medoids clustering algorithm is that it has a greater average
computational complexity than the k–means clustering algorithm during cluster centre or
medoid reselection [2, 23, 63]. The k–medoids algorithm requires the pairwise squared
Euclidean distances between all data samples belonging to a cluster to be computed on
each iteration. The advantage is that it is more resilient to outliers than k–means. In the
k–means clustering algorithm, outliers disproportionately affects the location of cluster
centres in the feature space, during clustering, given that cluster centres are computed
as the mean of all data samples belonging to the same cluster. The location of cluster
centres or medoids with regards to the feature space, of the k–medoids algorithm, are
not as severely influenced by outliers. The algorithm will reject the use of an outlier as a
medoid, as an outlier lies in a region of the feature space that is distant from the remaining
samples with regards to the feature space. This will result in a large summed distance
between an outlier and all remaining samples belonging to the same cluster as the outlier.
3.4.1.3 K–means with distance-based outlier detection
Outlier detection is a technique that is used to find samples that are significantly differ-
ent from the majority of the samples within a dataset, for instance based on proximity
measures such as distance or density in the feature space. These samples are known as
outliers [23]. In anomaly-based network intrusion detection, anomalies are described as
traffic patterns that are vastly different from the traffic patterns of what is assumed to
be legitimate network activity, with regards to the statistics of features and feature values
computed over the feature space. These anomalies may be the result of malicious activity
and may indicate that an intrusion has occurred on the network. Anomalies can be con-
sidered as outliers in network traffic, and thus identifying outliers is of interest [2]. There
exists a number of ways in which outlier detection may be incorporated in anomaly-based
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NIDS. Outlier detection can be combined with clustering algorithms, which may improve
the performance of the clustering algorithm [44]. For example, the k–means clustering al-
gorithm is known to be sensitive to outliers, in the sense that they may disproportionately
shift the location of cluster centres in the feature space. By removing outliers prior to
clustering, this effect no longer occurs.
The two widely used proximity-based outlier detection techniques are density-based and
distance-based methods [23]. Density-based detection methods estimate the density of data
samples surrounding a particular data sample, and the density of data samples surrounding
its neighbours. An outlier is identified as a data sample with a relatively lower density
of surrounding data samples than that of the density of data samples surrounding its
neighbours. Distance-based detection methods identify outliers as those data samples
whose set of neighbours, defined by a given radius, are distant from it, where the radius is
defined based on a distance measure computed over the feature space [23]. For instance,
Ramaswamy et al. [117] defines outliers as the Nout data samples with the largest distance
to their kth nearest neighbour.
In what follows, the algorithm for detecting outliers is provided, followed by the algorithm
in which it is combined with clustering. The pseudocode for identifying outliers using
Ramaswamy’s kth nearest neighbour distance-based outlier detection approach is provided
in algorithm 3.3, further details can be found in [118]. In order to avoid confusion with
previous algorithms, where the number of clusters is represented by the symbol K; the
symbol Nn is used in algorithm 3.3 to represent k in the k
th nearest neighbour approach,
where Nn represents the number of nearest neighbours to consider.
The technique implemented in this research involves the combination of outlier detection
with clustering, and was derived from [69], where the difference lies in the manner in
which outliers are identified. The implementation in this research utilizes algorithm 3.3 to
identify outliers, whereas the implementation in [69] utilizes distances to cluster centres
to identify outliers.
Hautamaki et al. [69] proposed an Outlier Removal Clustering (ORC) technique that is
applied to several synthetic datasets. The algorithm clusters the dataset until convergence,
removes outliers, and re-clusters the reduced dataset. The process is subsequently repeated
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Algorithm 3.3 Distance-based outlier detection algorithm
Function [Xo] = DBOD(X, Nn, rout)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of feature vectors
Nn, . Number of nearest neighbours that defines the neighbourhood of a sample
rout . The percentage of data samples to identify as outliers
Output:
Xo = {Xo1 ,Xo2 , . . . ,XoNout} . Set of feature vectors identified as outliers
1: Nout ← |X| × rout ; . Number of data samples to identify as outliers
. Compute square matrix consisting of the distances between all data samples in X
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: for j = 1 to N do
4: P Dists(i, j)← Distance(xi,xj) ; . j 6= i
5: end for
6: end for
. Sort the columns of P Dist in ascending order
7: Sorted PDists← Sort(P Dists, ascending) ;
. Extract N thn -nearest neighbour distances. Select the (N
th
n + 1) row of Sorted PDist
. The first row represents a samples distance to itself (i.e. 0)
8: Nthn NN Dists← Sorted PDist(Nn + 1) ; . Vector of distances from each sample
. to its’ N thn nearest neighbour
. Sort the vector Nthn NN Dists in descending order, and store
. the sorted indices of all samples
. (i.e. Nthn NN Dists(Sorted N
th
n NN Indices(j))← Sorted Nthn NN Dists(j))
9: [Sorted Nthn NN Dists, Sorted N
th
n NN Indices]
← Sort(Nthn NN Dists, descending) ;
. Select the top Nout samples from Sorted N
th
n NN Indices
10: for j = 1 to Nout do
11: Xo(j)← X(Sorted Nthn NN Indices(j)) ;
12: end for
13: Return Xo
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for a user specified number of iterations. Initially the entire dataset is clustered using the k–
means clustering algorithm until convergence. Each data sample is subsequently assigned
an outlier score, which is computed as a data sample’s distance to the cluster centre to
which it is assigned to. Each score is normalized by the largest outlier score amongst all
data samples, which scales all outlier scores to within the range [0,1]. The samples with
scores that are larger than a threshold are removed from the dataset. The reduced dataset
is re-clustered with the initial centres set as the final cluster centres obtained from the
previous iteration.
The pseudocode used for the combination of the distance-based outlier detection approach
provided in algorithm 3.3, and the k–means clustering algorithm provided in algorithm
3.1, is provided in algorithm 3.4.
Algorithm 3.4 K–means clustering with DBOD algorithm
Function [C′, L′] = kDBOD(X,K,Nn, rout)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of feature vectors to be clustered
K, . The number of clusters
Nn . Number of nearest neighbours that defines the neighbourhood of a sample
rout . The percentage of data samples in each cluster to identify as outliers
Outputs:
C′ = {c1′, c2′, . . . , cK′}, . Set of feature vectors representing cluster centres
L′ = {l′(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N}, . Set of cluster assignments for data samples in X
1: (C,L)← kmeans(X, K, Fs) ; . Algorithm 3.1 on entire dataset
2: for i = 1 to K do . Remove outliers from each cluster
3: Hi ← (x ∈ X | l(x) = i) ; . Data samples belonging to cluster i
4: if (|Hi| ≤ Nn) then . If a cluster consists of fewer samples than
5: continue ; . the number of neighbours Nn to consider,
6: end if . then leave cluster as is
7: Hio ← DBOD(Hi, Nn, rout) ; . Algorithm 3.3
8: Xo(|Xo|+ 1, . . . , |Xo|+ |Hio |)← Hio ; . Collection of outliers from all clusters
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9: end for
. Remove all data samples in X identified as outliers
10: for all (xi ∈ X) do
11: X′ ← xi ∈ X, where xi /∈ Xo ;
12: end for
13: (C′,L′)← kmeans(X′, K, Fs) ; . Cluster data samples in X′ using algorithm 3.1
. with C as initial centres
. Assign each outlier to the cluster centre in C′ that it is closest to
14: for all (xi ∈ Xo) do
15: l′(xi)← arg min
j
[Distance(xi, cj
′)] ; . j = {1, . . . ,K}
16: end for
17: Return (C′,L′)
The algorithm clusters the dataset until convergence, removes a percentage rout of outliers
from each cluster, and re-clusters the remaining data samples. Initially, k–means clustering
is applied to the entire dataset until convergence, obtaining a set of cluster centres C and
cluster assignments L for each sample in the dataset. Outliers are subsequently identified
amongst those samples that belong to the same cluster based on the N thn nearest neighbour
algorithm (algorithm 3.3) proposed by Ramaswamy et al. [117]. All data samples that were
identified as outliers Xo are removed from the dataset. K–means clustering is applied
to the remaining data samples X′ using the cluster centres obtained from the previous
clustering result C, as the initial cluster centres. This produces new cluster centres C′
and cluster assignments L′. Cluster assignments L′ is updated by assigning each outlier
in Xo to the cluster centre in C
′ that it is closest to, based on the squared Euclidean
distance computed over the feature space. The algorithm subsequently returns the final
cluster centres and cluster assignments C′ and L′, respectively.
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3.4.2 Distribution-based clustering
Distribution-based clustering is carried out by fitting a parametric distribution to the data
samples. A distribution has multiple components, an example is the Gaussian mixture
model. The posterior probabilities of components conditioned on a specific data sample, is
used as a metric to assign data samples to a component. Those data samples that belong
to the same component constitute a cluster [119].
Distribution-based clustering has been demonstrated as being able to accurately capture
the correlation and dependence between features. However, a possible problem that may
arise when representing data samples using a multi-component parametric distribution,
is that of over-fitting [119]. Over-fitting occurs when the number of components are
excessive, and the distribution model captures variations of individual samples / noise,
in addition to trends in the dataset itself. This problem may be solved by specifying
a conservative number of components K to fit the data to. This number K may be
calculated by incorporating model complexity into the performance metric during fitting.
Distribution-based techniques typically relies on the assumption that data samples can be
accurately represented using the selected distribution.
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
A single Gaussian component may not always be sufficient to model real datasets, as
real datasets may be multi-modal, where in some cases a mixture of multiple Gaussian
components would fit the dataset more effectively [119]. A Gaussian mixture model is a





where p(x) represents the marginal probability of data sample x, N (x|µk,Σk) represents a
Gaussian component of the mixture model (that is, the multivariate Gaussian probability
density function), with mean µk and covariance matrix Σk. The parameter πk represents
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the mixing coefficients of the kth Gaussian component, and K is the number of Gaussian
components used to fit the dataset [119].
For an NF -dimensional vector x the multivariate Gaussian probability density function is
defined as [119],















where µ is an NF -dimensional mean vector, Σ is an NF ×NF covariance matrix, and |Σ|
is the determinant of Σ.
Maximum likelihood
The parameters of the GMM may be estimated by searching for values that maximize the
likelihood of the observed data, conditioned on the parameters of interest, thereby fitting
the distribution to the data samples. The maximum likelihood is a way of estimating the
parameters of a statistical model (such as the Gaussian distribution model) that maximizes












A problem associated with applying the maximum likelihood framework to Gaussian mix-
ture models is the potential for certain components to degenerate into singularities [119].
Suppose the covariance matrix Σk is given by Σk = σ
2
kI, where I is the identity matrix. If
the mean of the jth component is exactly equal to one of the data samples in the dataset
such that µj = xn, then this sample will contribute a term to the likelihood function,
proportional to,
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In the limit as σj tends to zero, the likelihood contribution by component k will tend to
infinity, and the log-likelihood function will also tend to infinity [119]. These singularities
are characteristic of over-fitting of the data, thus the models will not fit the data effectively.
3.4.2.1 Expectation-Maximization (EM) clustering
A method that may be used to find maximum likelihood parameter estimates in the case of
models with latent variables (see reference [119] for an overview of latent variable models) is
the expectation-maximization algorithm. Thus, the expectation-maximization algorithm
can be used to estimate the parameters π = {π1, π2, . . . , πK},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µK}, and
Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,ΣK} that produces a Gaussian mixture model that effectively fits the
data.
Let a GMM be represented as a model with latent variables. In sampling from the GMM,
first draw a component {1, 2, . . . ,K} according to the prior probabilities {π1, π2, . . . , πK}.
Assign a latent (unobserved) variable Ẑ = {z1, z2, . . . , zK}. If component b was drawn,
zb = 1 and za = 0, for all a 6= b, a = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
A latent variable zn,k(n = 1, 2, . . . , N, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) is assigned to each observation
(data sample) of the dataset, which corresponds to the component from which that data
sample originated.
Let Ẑi = {zi,1, zi,2, . . . , zi,K} denote the latent variable for data sample i. The parameters
π = {π1, π2, . . . , πK},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µK}, and Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,ΣK} are estimated
using the posterior probability of components, conditioned on data samples x. It is shown
in [119] that the posterior distribution can be calculated as:




The mean µk of the Gaussian components is computed by setting the derivative of equation
3.7 with respect to µk of the Gaussian components to zero [119]. µk is then derived as:







where N represents the total number of data samples in the dataset, xn represents a





Similarly, the covariance matrix Σk of the Gaussian components is computed by setting
the derivative of equation 3.7 with respect to Σk of the Gaussian components to zero [119].






γ(zn,k)(xn − µk)(xn − µk)T (3.12)
The mixing coefficients πk are obtained by maximizing ln p(X|π,µ,Σ) with respect to
πk [119].
The mixing coefficients πk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) is required to sum to one, in order to satisfy






Further details regarding these derivations can be found in [119]. The expectation max-
imization algorithm as applied to Gaussian mixture models to perform clustering is pro-
vided in algorithm 3.5.
The EM algorithm is divided into two successive steps, the Expectation (E-step) and
Maximization (M-step), which are performed iteratively until convergence. Initial values
are first chosen for π = {π1, π2, . . . , πk},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk}, and Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk}.
For the component means µ, K random data samples are chosen from the dataset.
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Algorithm 3.5 Expectation-Maximization clustering with GMMs
Function [L] = EM(X,K, Tlog)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of feature vectors
K, . Number of Gaussian components
Tlog . Threshold for log likelihood
Outputs:
L = {l(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N} . Set of cluster assignments for X
. Initialization
1: π = {π1, π2, . . . , πk},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk}, and Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk} ;
2: log likelihood← 0 ;
3: convergence← false ;
4: repeat
. E-Step
5: Compute γ(zn,k) ≡ p(k|X) ; . Posterior probabilities (equation 3.9)
. M-Step
. Using equations (3.10), (3.12), and (3.13)
6: Recompute π = {π1, π2, . . . , πk},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk}, and Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk}
. Log-likelihood
7: Compute new log likelihood← ln p(X|π,µ,Σ) ; . Using equation 3.7
. Convergence test
8: if (|new log likelihood− log likelihood| < Tlog) then
9: convergence← true ;
10: else
11: log likelihood← new log likelihood ;
12: end if
13: until (convergence = true)
14: Recompute γ(zn,k) ≡ p(k|x) ; . Posterior probabilities (equation 3.9)
. Cluster Assignments
15: for all (x ∈ X) do
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The mixing coefficients are uniform 1K , and the covariance matrices for all components are
diagonal, where element j on the diagonal is the variance of the data samples in X along
feature j. The E-step computes the posterior probabilities (responsibilities) for which
the component k takes for fitting the data sample x, defined by π = {π1, π2, . . . , πk},µ
= {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk}, and Σ = {Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk}. The M-step uses the posterior proba-
bilities to calculate new values for π = {π1, π2, . . . , πk},µ = {µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk}, and Σ =
{Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk}. E and M steps are iteratively carried out until convergence. The al-
gorithm converges when the change in the log-likelihood is below a threshold [119]. Data
samples are subsequently assigned to components based on the posterior probability that
a sample belongs to a given component k.
3.5 Cluster labelling
Cluster labelling is the task of assigning class labels to each cluster. Data samples belonging
to each cluster are subsequently assigned the class label of the cluster. In this research,
binary classification is carried out, where clusters are labelled as legitimate or attack.
Cluster labelling is typically carried out in unsupervised network anomaly detection under
the following assumptions [2, 43]:
1. The amount of legitimate network traffic outnumbers the amount of malicious net-
work traffic in the dataset considered.
2. In the feature space considered, malicious network traffic is found in a different region
of the feature space as that of legitimate network traffic.
3. Certain groups of malicious network traffic have a higher similarity than groups of
legitimate network traffic.
An important note is that certain Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are volumetric in nature.
If network traffic data is collected over a short period of time, then it is possible that the
network traffic produced by a DoS attack may constitute a majority of the network traffic
collected over this time period. In this case, the first assumption does not hold. The
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NSL-KDD dataset [25] was created from network traffic collected over a significantly long
period of time, resulting in legitimate network traffic constituting the majority of the
dataset. Thus, the first assumption holds.
References [43, 45, 48, 120–124] perform cluster labelling after the application of the k–
means, the single-linkage, or a variant of the k–means clustering algorithm, based on the
assumptions mentioned previously.
A number of authors label a fraction of the largest clusters as legitimate. The largest
cluster is defined as the cluster with the largest number of data samples belonging to
the cluster. Clusters are ranked according to the number of data samples belonging to
each cluster. A fraction of the top ranking clusters are labelled as legitimate, while the
remaining clusters are subsequently labelled as attacks [43, 48, 120, 122]. A variant of this
technique involves the use of a threshold, where a cluster is assigned the label legitimate
if the number of data samples associated with a cluster exceeds the threshold. Han et
al. [121] and Guan et al [123] label clusters with more than T data samples as legitimate,
while clusters with less than T data samples are labelled as attacks. Wang [45] also use
a threshold, but instead labels clusters consisting of less than T data samples as attacks,
while the remaining clusters are labelled as legitimate. The threshold is calculated as a
percentage of the data samples of the entire dataset. Zhong et al. [124] label a percentage
of the data samples of the entire dataset that are closest to the centre of the largest cluster,
as legitimate.
The labelling scheme implemented in this research is based on the assumptions mentioned
previously and follows a similar labelling scheme to [43, 48, 120, 122]. The Nr largest
clusters are labelled as legitimate, while the remaining clusters are labelled as attacks. The
value of Nr is varied from 1 to K−1, where K is the number of clusters, to obtain different
operating characteristics, each corresponding to a certain false positive and true positive
percentage.
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3.6 Experimental results
In this section, the experimental results obtained by applying the proposed classifier to
the NSL-KDD dataset [25] are presented, compared and discussed. The purpose of the
experimental work was to evaluate the classification performance attained by
• applying the four clustering algorithms presented in sections 3.4.1.1 to 3.4.2.1, to the
proposed classifier over the full feature set, and
• to evaluate the classification performance attained by applying the four clustering
algorithms to the proposed classifier over different feature subsets obtained from the
literature [31, 35].
The false positive and true positive percentages were used as measures of classification
performance in each case.
3.6.1 Experimental setup
This section describes the setup of the proposed classifier, as used to carry out the ex-
perimental work. The parameters for each block of the proposed classifier’s functional
block diagram (figure 3.1), which includes the four clustering algorithms, are provided.
Each of the feature subsets used for classification, as well as the classification performance
measures are presented.
3.6.1.1 Classifier parameters
The parameters of the proposed classifier are presented in table 3.6.
3.6.1.2 Feature subsets
The list of feature sets that were selected for the experimental work of this chapter are
presented in table 3.7. The table presents the name assigned to each feature subset, the
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Table 3.6: Experimental setup of the proposed classifier for the comparison of clustering
algorithms.
Dataset (Feature vectors)
Dataset selected NSL-KDD training set 2
Section 3.2.2. Table 3.3 provides the
dataset distribution.
Data transformation
Normalization of numeric features Statistical normalization Section 3.3.1
Encoding of non-binary categorical features Frequency encoding Section 3.3.2
Encoding of binary categorical features Ordinal encoding Section 3.3.2
Clustering
Clustering algorithm 1: k–means Section 3.4.1.1
Initialization
Initial cluster centres - K randomly selected
data samples
—
Distance metric Euclidean distance —
Number of clusters (K) 2 - 10 —
Number of repetitions with different
cluster centres (CR)
100 —
Clustering algorithm 2: k–medoids Section 3.4.1.2
Initialization
Initial cluster centres - K randomly selected
data samples
—
Distance metric Euclidean distance —
Number of clusters (K) 2 - 10 —
Number of repetitions with different
cluster centres (CR)
100 —
Clustering algorithm 3: k–means with distance-based outlier detection Section 3.4.1.3
Initialization
Initial cluster centres - K randomly selected
data samples
—
Distance metric Euclidean distance —
Number of clusters (K) 2 - 10 —
Number of repetitions with different
cluster centres (CR)
100 —
Number of nearest neighbours
considered (Nn)
10 —
Percentage of outliers to remove from
each cluster (rout)
10% —
Clustering algorithm 4: Expectation Maximization (EM) clustering Section 3.4.2.1
Initialization
Component means - K randomly selected
data samples,
Mixing coefficients - uniform (1/K),
Covariance matrices - diagonal; element j on the
diagonal is the variance of the data
samples in the dataset along feature j
—
Distance metric Euclidean distance —
Number of components (K) 2 - 10 —
Number of repetitions with different
cluster centres (CR)
100 —
Regularization value 0.005 —
Cluster labelling
Labels Binary (intrusion / legitimate) Section 3.5
Labelling algorithm
Largest Nr clusters labelled as legitimate,
remaining clusters labelled as intrusions
—
Number of legitimate clusters (Nr) 1 to K-1 —
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features present in each subset, and the method that was used to derive the feature subset1.
The feature numbers presented in table 3.7 corresponds to the full list of 41 features as
presented in table 3.2.
Note that feature 20, the number of outbound commands, was excluded from all feature
subsets during experimentation. This was due to the fact that the feature had a value
of zero among all data samples within the NSL-KDD dataset [25]. This implies that
the feature is irrelevant (i.e. it does not provide significant information for detecting
intrusions).
In addition to the full, original feature set (FS1), a total of 10 subsets (FS2 – FS11)
of the full feature set were used in this research. It is reported in the literature that,
of the 10 feature subsets, 4 feature subsets (FS2 – FS5) were derived using wrapper-
based feature selection techniques [31] applied to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [24]. The
remaining 6 feature subsets (FS6 – FS11) were derived using filter-based feature selection
techniques [35] applied to the KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD datasets [25]. All 10 feature
subsets were used directly in the experimental work. A detailed summary of the relevant
filter and wrapper-based feature selection techniques is provided in chapter 2, section 2.4.
Table 3.7: Feature set descriptions of those feature subsets found in the literature.
Name # Features Feature List Method Method Type Reference
FS1 40 All, excl. feature ’20’ Full feature set, excluding feature ’20’ – –
FS2 10 8,10,14,31,32,33,35,36,37,40 Feature Removal Method (FRM) Wrapper [31]
FS3 10 6,7,23,24,25,29,30,31,32,38 Sole Feature Method (SFM) Wrapper [31]




Gradual FRM Wrapper [31]
FS6 4 3,5,6,39 Best of articles [7, 26–29] Filter [35]
FS7 10 3,4,5,6,14,16,27,28,37,39 Best of articles [7, 26–29] Filter [35]
FS8 10 2,3,4,5,6,8,23,30,34,36 Degree of Correlation + Greedy Stepwise Filter [35]
FS9 10 2,3,5,6,23,24,33,34,35,36 Information Gain + Ranker Filter [35]
FS10 4 2,3,5,6 Degree of Correlation + Greedy Stepwise Filter [35]
FS11 4 3,5,23,24 Information Gain + Ranker Filter [35]
1The feature subsets considered in this chapter do not include those derived using the proposed feature
selection algorithm; results for these feature subsets are presented in chapter 4
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3.6.1.3 Performance metrics
The two-class or binary classification of a data sample leads to four possible classification
outcomes, depending on whether the data sample was classified correctly or incorrectly.
The four classification outcomes for a data sample are referred to as True Positive (TP),
True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) [2].
• True Positive (TP) - A data sample representing an attack is correctly classified as
an attack.
• True Negative (TN) - A data sample representing legitimate network traffic is cor-
rectly classified as legitimate or normal.
• False Positive (FP) - A data sample representing legitimate network traffic is incor-
rectly classified as an attack.
• False Negative (FN) - A data sample representing an attack is incorrectly classified
as legitimate or normal.
The four possible classification outcomes are illustrated in table 3.8 [44].






In this research, the percentage of true positives and false positives are used to evaluate
the performance of the proposed classifier. The true positive percentage is a measure of a
classifier’s ability to correctly identify data samples representing attacks. It is defined as
the percentage of the total number of attack samples in the dataset that were correctly
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The false positive percentage is a measure of a classifier’s tendency to misidentify legitimate
data samples as attack data samples. It is defined as the percentage of the total number
of legitimate data samples in the dataset that were incorrectly classified as attack data




Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves provide a visual representation of the
trade-off between the true positive and false positive percentages of a classifier, which is
brought about by varying the detection threshold2 of the classifier. ROC curves are useful
for analysing the behaviour of a classifier under different operating conditions, and for
comparing the performance of multiple classifiers. Figure 3.2 is an example of a ROC
curve, where the x-axis and y-axis of the graph represents the FP and TP percentages,
respectively. Improved classification performance corresponds to curves that lie towards
the top left corner of the graph. A curve that lies on top of, or to the left of another curve
is indicative of superior performance over the range of TP percentages or FP percentages,
respectively. The line y = x corresponds to a classifier that randomly assigns one of the
two classes to each data sample with equal probability.
Figure 3.2: Examples of ROC curves (from [2]).
2The detection threshold is the number of clusters labelled as legitimate (Nr), where Nr is varied in
the experimental work
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3.6.1.3.a Construction of ROC curves of the proposed classifier
This section provides a detailed description of the method used to construct the ROC
curves of the proposed classifier. In the classifier configuration presented in this chapter,
one pair of average FP and TP percentages is obtained for each pair of parameter values
K and Nr of the clustering algorithm, where K is the number of clusters and Nr is the
number of largest clusters to label as legitimate (and where the average is calculated
over the CR repetitions of the clustering algorithm with randomly selected initial cluster
centres). A ROC curve is constructed for each value of K; i.e., each ROC curve represents
clustering with a fixed number of clusters. The points on the curve correspond to different
values of Nr; in this approach, the number of clusters Nr to label as legitimate controls
the threshold of the classifier.
To illustrate the construction of the ROC curve, consider the TP and FP percentages
obtained during k–means clustering over the transformed NSL-KDD dataset [25], with a
fixed value of K = 5, and for Nr = 1, 2, . . . 4, as indicated in table 3.9.
Table 3.9: TP and FP percentages obtained during k–means clustering with K = 5.
Clusters labelled as legitimate (Nr) TP percentage FP percentage
1 Largest cluster 88.29 19.61
2 Largest clusters 39.47 15.90
3 Largest clusters 17.55 9.35
4 Largest clusters 5.40 3.37
These values were used to construct the ROC curve indicated in figure 3.3, where the
corresponding value of Nr is indicated next to each point of the ROC curve. The point
on the ROC curve most distant from the origin typically represents the labelling scheme
where only the largest cluster is labelled as legitimate, with subsequent points closer to
the origin corresponding to successively larger values of Nr
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Figure 3.3: The plot points for a typical ROC curve obtained using the cluster labelling
scheme described in section 3.5, and the TP and FP percentages.
In order to ease the comparison between multiple classifiers, where each classifier is asso-
ciated with multiple ROC curves, the concept of a composite ROC curve is introduced.
A single composite ROC curve is associated with each classifier, and represents the best
performance that can be obtained over the multiple ROC curves of the classifier. The
composite ROC curve is constructed by first sorting all the FP and TP percentage pairs
obtained over the full range of K = 2, . . . , 10 and Nr = 1, . . . ,K − 1 for the classifier
according to increasing FP percentages. The point with the lowest FP percentage is as-
signed to the composite ROC curve. Points with successively higher FP percentages are
iteratively added to the composite ROC curve only if the TP percentage of the corre-
sponding point is larger than or equal to the TP percentage of the previously added point
of the composite ROC curve. In this manner, points with higher FP percentages are only
considered if it affords a higher TP percentage. This process is illustrated in figure 3.4,
where the composite ROC curve is illustrated with the blue dashed line.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the TP and FP percentages obtained during k–means clustering over
the transformed NSL-KDD dataset [25], with K = 2, . . . , 10. The blue solid lines on the
figure represent the ROC curves for each corresponding value of K = 2, . . . , 10, where
each point represents a pair of TP and FP percentages that were obtained for each value
of Nr = 1, . . . ,K − 1. The blue dashed line represents the composite ROC curve, which
consists of the best TP and FP percentages.
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the construction of a composite ROC curve.
3.6.2 Results and analysis
In this section, the performance results of the proposed classifier are presented and dis-
cussed. The results are divided into subsections; the first subsection investigates the impact
of the number of clusters on classification performance. The next subsection compares the
classification performance of the clustering algorithms, and the final subsection compares
the classification performance that was attained by each clustering algorithm when applied
over the full feature set and several other feature subsets. All results are presented as ROC
curves or composite ROC curves.
3.6.2.1 Impact of the number of clusters K
The performance impact of varying the number of clusters K was investigated by applying
the proposed classifier to the full feature set (FS1). Each of the four clustering algorithms
were applied over the range of values K ∈ {2, . . . , 10}, where each distinct value of K
corresponds to a single ROC curve. The ROC curves corresponding to each of the four
clustering algorithms are presented in figures 3.5a to 3.5d.
The figures reveal that there is no single value for K that provides both a superior TP
and FP percentage than the remaining values of K, for each of the clustering algorithms.
Chapter 3. Proposed Classifier 82
False Positive Percentage






















































































































(c) K–means with DBOD
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Figure 3.5: Performance of all four clustering algorithms over feature set FS1, with K
varied between 2 and 10.
This implies that the choice of a suitable value of K is dependant on the desired classifi-
cation performance. For instance, if one seeks to maximize the TP percentage, a value of
K = 6 for the k–means, k–means with DBOD and the EM clustering algorithms would
produce the maximum TP percentages, which are 90%, 90% and 86%, respectively, with
corresponding FP percentages of 28%, 28% and 38%, respectively. A value of K = 10 for
the k–medoids clustering algorithm would produce the maximum TP percentage at 95%,
with a corresponding FP percentage of 24%. However, if one seeks to minimize the FP
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percentage, a value of K = 2 would produce the minimum FP percentages over all clus-
tering algorithms at less than 2% for the k–means, k–means with DBOD and k–medoids
algorithms, with corresponding TP percentages of approximately 51%, 55% and 53%, re-
spectively. The EM clustering algorithm attains a minimum FP percentage of 20% with
a corresponding TP percentage of 35% at K = 2.
A noticeable trend is that the FP percentages increase as the number of clusters K in-
creases. This is accompanied by an increase in the TP percentage when all clusters except
the largest, are labelled as attacks, up to a maximum value of K for each clustering algo-
rithm. The k–medoids algorithm attains its maximum TP percentage at K = 10. While
the TP percentages for the k–means algorithm, the k–means algorithm in combination
with the DBOD technique, and the EM clustering algorithm, reduces at K > 6. An in-
crease in FP percentages implies that an increasing number of legitimate data samples
are grouped into smaller clusters pertaining to attack clusters, while a decrease in TP
percentages implies that a greater number of attack data samples are grouped into the
largest cluster.
3.6.2.2 Comparison of clustering algorithms
A comparison between all four clustering algorithms over each feature subset in table 3.7 is
presented in this subsection. Figures 3.6a to 3.6k contain the composite ROC curves which
were obtained by applying the classifier to each feature subset, with K ∈ {2, . . . , 10}. Each
composite ROC curve corresponds to a different clustering algorithm.
Figure 3.6 reveals that there is no individual clustering algorithm, from the four consid-
ered in this research, that outperforms the remaining algorithms over all feature subsets
considered. The performance of each clustering algorithm varies depending on the feature
subset used. For instance, feature subset FS9 (figure 3.6i) enables the k–means cluster-
ing algorithm to attain a TP percentage of approximately 66%, with a corresponding FP
percentage of 14%, while at the same FP percentage (14%) the k–medoids clustering al-
gorithm applied over FS9, only attains a TP percentage of 23%. However, when applying
the classifier over feature set FS1 (figure 3.6a), it is observed that at a FP percentage
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of 6%, the k–medoids clustering algorithm attains a 9% increase in TP percentage when
compared to the k–means clustering algorithm, at the same FP percentage.
The k–means, k–medoids and k–means with DBOD algorithms provide similar perfor-
mance over the majority of feature subsets (FS1, FS3, FS4, FS5, FS7, FS8, FS11), and
this performance is in general superior to that of the EM clustering algorithm.
It was observed that the EM clustering algorithm was found to produce comparable clas-
sification results over FS2, FS3, FS7 and FS11. In the case of FS3 (figure 3.6c), for FP
percentages greater than 12%, the EM clustering algorithm produces up to a 10% improve-
ment in TP percentages when compared to the remaining three clustering algorithms.
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Figure 3.6: Performance of all four clustering algorithms over each feature subset
The performance of the EM algorithm was found to be more sensitive to the number of
clusters K (see also figure 3.5d), with the algorithm producing empty clusters over FS6
for K > 7 and FS10 for K > 5. Table 3.10 provides the contents of each cluster found
by the EM clustering algorithm when applied over feature subset FS10, with K = 5. The
contents of each cluster is presented as the number of data samples belonging to a cluster,
that correspond to each of the four broad classes of network attacks described in section
3.2.1.1, or correspond to the “normal” class, which represents legitimate network traffic.
Table 3.10: Cluster contents obtained by applying the EM clustering algorithm over
FS10 with K = 5
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
DoS 755 0 0 8 479 0
Probe 1 142 0 1 1 145 1
R2L 0 7 13 189 0
U2R 1 0 0 10 0
Normal 2 768 33 49 10 342 257
Total 4 666 40 63 20 165 258
Table 3.10 demonstrates that at K = 5 over feature subset FS10, the EM clustering
algorithm groups approximately 80% of all data samples in the dataset into one cluster,
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as shown in cluster 4, which consists of 84% of all attack data samples, and 77% of all
legitimate data samples in the entire dataset. This implies that 84% of the attack samples
are incorrectly classified as legitimate data samples for Nr = 1, which severely decreases
the TP percentage, as demonstrated in figure 3.6j. The FP percentage remains at 23% in
figure 3.6j as a majority of the legitimate data samples are grouped into the largest cluster,
and thus correctly classified as legitimate data samples. It is also observed that clusters 2,
3 and 5 consists of a small number of data samples. When K > 5, these clusters become
empty, as the algorithm is only able to fit the data to a finite number of clusters, when
EM clustering is performed over the features present in subset FS10.
3.6.2.3 Comparison of feature subsets
A comparison of the performance obtained by applying each individual clustering algo-
rithm over all 11 feature subsets is presented in this section. The classification results for
each clustering algorithm is presented in figures 3.7 to 3.10. Each figure contains 11 com-
posite ROC curves, where each composite ROC curve corresponds to a different feature
subset.
3.6.2.3.a K–means
Figure 3.7 provides the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed clas-
sifier to the dataset using the k–means clustering algorithm over each of the 11 feature
subsets. The figure reveals that the performance of the k–means clustering algorithm
varies significantly when applied over the different feature subsets.
The feature subsets can be divided into three groups based on the classification perfor-
mance produced by each feature subset (as indicated by the red ellipses in figure 3.7). The
first group consists of feature subsets FS1, FS5, FS7 and FS8; these subsets produce a
superior classification performance with higher TP and lower FP percentages, as compared
to the remaining feature subsets. FS7 produces TP percentages between 79% and 87%,
with corresponding FP percentages between 5% and 10%. FS8 produces TP percentages
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Figure 3.7: A comparison of the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the pro-
posed classifier to the dataset using the k–means clustering algorithm applied over each
feature subset.
of almost 100% with corresponding FP percentages within the range 28% and 34%, which
is the highest FP percentage produced by those feature subsets belonging to the first group.
FS7 produces superior classification performance amongst all feature subsets applied over
the k–means clustering algorithm, where points that lie towards the upper left corner of
the graph are indicative of better performance.
The second group consists of feature subsets FS3, FS4, FS6, FS9 and FS11, where FS4 and
FS6 produce FP percentages of almost 0%, but with a TP percentage of approximately
57%. FS9 produces a TP percentage of almost 100%, similar to the performance produced
by FS8, however, with a higher corresponding FP percentage of approximately 40%.
The third group consists of feature subsets FS2 and FS10, which produce inferior classifi-
cation performances to all remaining feature subsets.
It is observed that the k–means clustering algorithm when applied over feature subsets
FS5, FS7 and FS8 outperforms the same clustering algorithm when applied over the full
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feature set FS1. An interesting observation is that feature subset FS5 was produced by
a wrapper-based feature selection method, while both feature subsets FS7 and FS8 were
produced by filter-based feature selection methods.
3.6.2.3.b K–medoids
Figure 3.8 provides the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed classi-
fier to the dataset using the k–medoids clustering algorithm over each of the 11 feature
subsets. The figure reveals that the performance of the k–medoids clustering algorithm
varies significantly when applied over the different feature subsets.
The feature subsets can be divided into similar groups, as with the k–means clustering
algorithm, based on the classification performance produced by each feature subset (as
indicated by the red ellipses in figure 3.8). The exception is feature subset FS9 which lies
in two of the three groups.
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Figure 3.8: A comparison of the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the pro-
posed classifier to the dataset using the k–medoids clustering algorithm applied over each
feature subset.
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The first group consists of feature subsets FS1, FS5, FS7 and FS8; these subsets produce
a superior classification performance with higher TP and lower FP percentages, as com-
pared to the remaining feature subsets. FS7 produces TP percentages between 81% and
88%, with corresponding FP percentages between 5% and 7%. FS8 produces the highest
TP percentage of 97% amongst all remaining feature subsets, with a corresponding FP
percentage of 25%. FS7 produces superior classification performance amongst all feature
subsets applied over the k–medoids clustering algorithm, where points that lie towards the
upper left corner of the graph are indicative of better performance.
The second group consists of feature subsets FS3, FS4, FS6, FS9 and FS11, where FS3,
FS4 and FS6 produce FP percentages of less than 2%, but with TP percentages between
57% and 64%. The performance of FS9 severely reduces in comparison to that obtained
using the k–means clustering algorithm, at lower FP percentages, however, at higher FP
percentages, specifically at 39%, FS9 produces a TP percentage of 97%, similar to the
performance produced by FS8, however, with a higher corresponding FP percentage.
The third group consists of feature subsets FS2, FS9 and FS10. FS9 is included in the
third group as well, as it produces similar inferior classification performances to FS2 and
FS10, at FP percentages less than 30%. The inferior classification performance of both FS2
and FS10, which both exhibit significantly high FP percentages (up to 75%), with low TP
percentages (up to 52%) is a result of the k–medoids algorithm grouping a large number
of both legitimate and attack data samples into a single cluster. Table 3.11 provides the
contents of each cluster found by applying the k–medoids algorithm over feature subset
FS2, with K = 5. The TP and FP percentages for this particular clustering result is
approximately 33% and 47% respectively, which lies in close proximity to the composite
ROC curve provided in figure 3.8. The contents of each cluster is presented as the number
of data samples belonging to a cluster, that correspond to each of the four broad classes
of network attacks described in section 3.2.1.1, or correspond to the “normal” class, which
represents legitimate network traffic.
Table 3.11 reveals that the largest cluster consists of a large number of both legitimate
data samples, and DoS data samples, which constitutes 64% of all the attack data samples
present in the dataset. This accounts for the low TP percentages observed in figure 3.8
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for feature subset FS2. The high FP percentages is attributed to the fact that 43% of all
legitimate data samples are grouped into the second largest cluster, thus for Nr = 1, these
data samples are all misclassified as attacks.
It is observed that the k–medoids clustering algorithm when applied over feature subsets
FS5, FS7 and FS8 outperforms the same clustering algorithm when applied over the full
feature set FS1.
Table 3.11: Cluster contents obtained by applying the k–medoids clustering algorithm
over FS2 with K = 5
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
DoS 9 139 1 397 7 502 187
Probe 810 80 1 187 212 0
R2L 5 126 11 67 0
U2R 1 7 0 3 0
Normal 97 5 737 617 6 998 0
Total 922 6 089 3 212 14 782 187
3.6.2.3.c K–means clustering with distance-based outlier detection
Figures 3.9a and 3.9b present the composite ROC curves that were obtained by applying
the proposed classifier to the dataset using the k–means clustering algorithm and the
k–means clustering algorithm in combination with the distance-based outlier detection
algorithm, over each of the 11 feature subsets, respectively.
The figures reveal that both algorithms produce similar results over the majority of feature
subsets. The distance-based outlier detection method with k–means clustering (shown
in figure 3.9b) typically produces marginal changes in both the TP and FP percentages
obtained over a number of feature subsets. Table 3.12 provides the TP and FP percentages
that correspond to the composite ROC curves presented in figures 3.9a and 3.9b, which
were produced by applying both the k–means and k–means with distance-based outlier
detection algorithms over feature set FS1. The table also includes the change in TP and
FP percentages between both composite ROC curves.
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(b) K–means with DBOD
Figure 3.9: (a) Composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed classifier
using k–means clustering over all 11 feature subsets, (b) Composite ROC curves obtained
by applying the proposed classifier using k–means clustering in combination with DBOD
over all 11 feature subsets
Chapter 3. Proposed Classifier 93
Table 3.12: TP and FP percentages of the composite ROC curves produced over FS1,





to k–means with DBOD
TP (%) FP (%) TP (%) FP (%) ∆ TP (%) ∆ FP (%)
1.01 0.26 0.81 0.25 -0.20 -0.01
1.20 0.33 1.46 0.48 0.26 0.15
2.48 0.53 2.14 0.53 -0.34 0.00
3.82 0.86 3.39 0.89 -0.43 0.04
4.93 1.00 5.24 1.41 0.31 0.40
54.51 1.71 51.87 2.06 -2.64 0.34
72.79 6.77 72.49 5.72 -0.30 -1.05
82.40 15.21 82.75 15.88 0.35 0.67
88.48 18.44 89.32 20.53 0.83 2.09
89.51 27.42 89.80 28.12 0.28 0.70
Table 3.12 illustrates the marginal changes in TP and FP percentages over feature subset
FS1. This trend is similar amongst several of the remaining feature subsets. However,
feature subset FS9 exhibits a significant difference in both TP and FP percentages. In
figure 3.9b, FS9 exhibits a drastic increase in FP percentage from 13% to 34% with only a
1% increase in TP percentage. However, in figure 3.9a, FS9 does not exhibit this drastic
increase at an FP percentage of 13%. This can also be seen in figure 3.6i. An increase in FP
percentage, implies that a clustering algorithm divides a larger number of legitimate data
samples amongst smaller clusters pertaining to attack clusters, thus these are misclassified
as attack data samples.
Owing to the similarity between the classification performance obtained by the k–means
clustering algorithm and the k–means with DBOD algorithm, the same observation can be
made as with the k–means clustering algorithm, where feature subsets FS5, FS7 and FS8
provide improved classification performance over all remaining feature subsets including
the full feature set FS1.
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3.6.2.3.d Expectation Maximization using GMMs
Figure 3.10 provides the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed clas-
sifier to the dataset using the EM clustering algorithm with GMMs over each of the 11
feature subsets. The figure reveals that the performance of the algorithm varies signifi-
cantly when applied over the different feature subsets.
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Figure 3.10: A comparison of the composite ROC curves obtained by applying the pro-
posed classifier to the dataset using the expectation maximization clustering algorithm with
Gaussian mixture models, applied over each feature subset.
The feature subsets can be divided into three groups, based on the classification perfor-
mance produced by each feature subset (as indicated by the red ellipses in figure 3.10).
The first group consists of feature subsets FS3, FS7 and FS11 which provide superior
classification performance over all remaining feature subsets. Feature subset FS7 provides
the best performance over all feature subsets with TP percentages between 87% and 89%,
which is an improvement of 11% when compared to the performance of feature subsets
FS3 and FS11, at FP percentages between 10% and 12%.
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The second group consists of only feature subset FS6, as this is the only feature subset to
produce FP percentages that are less than 4%, at a reasonable TP percentage of 60%.
The third group consists of all remaining feature subsets, FS1, FS2, FS4, FS5, FS8, FS9
and FS10. These feature subsets, in general, provide inferior classification performance
when compared to all other feature subsets. Exceptions in this group include feature
subsets FS1, FS4 and FS5, which produce relatively high TP percentages of 84%, 77%
and 78%, respectively, but in most cases the classification performance of these subsets is
inferior.
The EM clustering algorithm tends to be sensitive to the features that are present in each
feature subset. For instance, the three groups of feature subsets presented in figure 3.10, are
dissimilar to the groups presented in figures 3.7 and 3.8. There is also no direct correlation
between the dimensionality of a feature subset and the classification performance that the
EM clustering algorithm produces over the subset. For example, feature subsets FS6, FS10
and FS11 consists of four features, but it is observed that the classification performance
produced by each feature subset greatly differs. In figure 3.10, it is observed that FS6,
FS10 and FS11 produce an FP percentage of 24%, however, FS11, FS6 and FS10 produce
corresponding TP percentages of 16%, 60% and 81%, respectively.
Additionally, feature subset FS10 produces empty clusters when K > 5. An interesting
observation is that FS6 and FS10 contain three of the same feature, and FS6, FS10 and
FS11 contain two of the same features. This demonstrates that the EM clustering algo-
rithm is sensitive to the actual features and feature values present in the dataset, rather
than the dimensionality of the feature subset.
An important note is that the EM clustering algorithm, when applied over feature subsets
FS3, FS4, FS5, FS6, FS7 and FS11 outperforms the same clustering algorithm when
applied over the full feature set FS1.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter an unsupervised classifier for anomaly-based network intrusion detection
was presented. A functional block diagram of the proposed classifier was provided and a
detailed description of each block was carried out. These descriptions include the dataset
considered, the data transformation methods utilized, the clustering algorithms considered,
and the cluster labelling scheme used in this research. The proposed classifier was used
to carry out three experiments, that is, the investigation of the impact of the number
of clusters K, a comparison of the performance of the four clustering algorithms, and a
comparison of the performance attained by the four clustering algorithms when applied to
various feature subsets found in the literature.
The experimental results revealed that the number of clusters K has a significant impact
on the classification performance attained by each clustering algorithm. A typical trend is
that the FP percentages of each clustering algorithm increases as the value of K increases,
while the TP percentage increases up to a maximum for a specific value of K, and decreases
for subsequent values of K. The k–means, k–means with distance-based outlier detection
and EM clustering algorithms all reach a maximum TP percentage at K = 6, with lower
TP percentages at K > 6. The k–medoids clustering algorithm reaches a maximum TP
percentage at K = 10.
The comparison of the clustering algorithms revealed that one single clustering algorithm,
for example k–means, does not outperform all other clustering algorithms for all feature
subsets. This is evident when applying the clustering algorithms over feature subsets FS9
and FS1, where the former enables the k–means algorithm to outperform all others, while
the latter enables the k–medoids algorithm to outperform all others. It was also discovered
that the EM clustering algorithm can be sensitive to the number of clusters depending
on the feature subsets used, as was evident with the application of the EM clustering
algorithm over feature subsets FS6 and FS10.
The comparison of the feature subsets revealed that the classification performance of the
clustering algorithms varies significantly over different feature subsets. In all clustering
algorithms, the feature subsets were grouped together based on classification performance,
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where certain feature subsets enabled the clustering algorithms to produce higher TP
percentages at lower corresponding FP percentages. Amongst the k–means, k–medoids
and k–means with distance-based outlier detection clustering algorithms, feature subsets
FS5, FS7 and FS8 provided superior classification performance over all remaining feature
subsets. For the EM clustering algorithm, feature subsets FS3, FS7 and FS11 provided
superior performance. All these feature subsets provide classification performances that
are superior to that produced by the full feature set (FS1), this further motivates the
need for feature selection. An important observation is that there is no direct correlation
between the dimensionality of a feature subset and the classification performance produced
by the feature subset, when applied to the clustering algorithms of the proposed classifier.
This is evident in the fact that FS6, FS10 and FS11 all contain four features, however, the
TP and FP percentages produced by these feature subsets over all clustering algorithms,
varies significantly.
Chapter 4
A Cluster Validity-based Feature
Selection Algorithm
4.1 Introduction
The proposed unsupervised feature selection algorithm is presented in this chapter. The
algorithm is a wrapper-based technique that makes use of the k–means clustering algo-
rithm. It uses normalized Cluster Validity Indices (CVIs) as an objective function to be
minimized over the search space of candidate feature subsets via a genetic algorithm. The
concept behind the proposed feature selection algorithm is that better1 cluster validity in-
dices, as individually computed after clustering of a dataset over a generation of candidate
feature subsets, are indicative of more relevant candidate feature subsets. In other words,
a fit candidate feature subset is expected to produce an improved clustering result, with
clusters that are more compact and with greater separation between clusters. In turn,
these candidate feature subsets translate into improved classifier performance.
The advantage of this proposed approach to feature selection is that the algorithm is not
dependent on labelled data. This is due to the fact that the learning algorithm used
in the proposed wrapper-based feature selection algorithm is unsupervised, and that the
computation of cluster validity indices does not involve the use of labelled data. To the
1The term “better” is used in this context, as for some CVIs such as the DB index [125], smaller values
are associated with improved clustering results, while the opposite holds for other CVIs
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best of the author’s knowledge, the use of CVIs to construct an unsupervised feature
selection algorithm is novel in the context of anomaly-based network intrusion detection.
The proposed wrapper-based feature selection algorithm has been successfully used in
application areas other than network intrusion detection [126] (refer to [83] for a summary
of this technique, and related unsupervised feature selection algorithms). In [126], the
proposed algorithm was applied as a precursor to the recognition of handwritten text using
a supervised algorithm for classification. It was demonstrated that the proposed algorithm
produced smaller feature subsets that resulted in classification performance comparable to
that obtained using the full feature set, but with reduced execution time.
Figure 4.1 contains the functional block diagram of the proposed feature selection algo-
rithm implemented in this research. Each block of this diagram is summarised in what
follows, with the exception of the dataset description and the data transformation block.
The description of the NSL-KDD dataset [25] can be found in section 3.2.2, and the de-
scription of the data transformation block can be found in section 3.3.
Figure 4.1: Functional block diagram of the proposed feature selection algorithm.
4.2 Clustering
The k–means clustering algorithm (algorithm 3.1) is applied to the transformed dataset
over each candidate feature subset in the current generation produced by the genetic
algorithm. Owing to the fact that the k–means algorithm is sensitive to the choice in
initial cluster centres, the proposed implementation repeats k–means clustering CR times
for each candidate feature subset, with initial cluster centres selected randomly from the
samples of the dataset at the start of each execution.
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A full summary of the k–means clustering algorithm is provided in section 3.4.1.1. The
pseudocode for the k–means clustering algorithm, as implemented in the proposed feature
selection algorithm, is provided in algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 K–means for each candidate feature subset over CR repetitions
Function [C,L] = repeated kmeans(X,K,Fs, CR)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of N feature vectors, corresponding
. to the N dataset samples
K, . The number of clusters
Fs = {Fs(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M}, . Set of M candidate feature subsets in current
. generation returned by GA
CR . Number of repetitions of k–means with random initial cluster centres
Outputs:
C = {C(d, z)|d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ; z = 1, 2, . . . , CR}, where
C(d, z) = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}, . The K cluster centres for each clustering result
L = {L(d, z)|d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ; z = 1, 2, . . . , CR}, where
L(d, z) = {l(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N} . Cluster assignments for all data samples
. for each clustering result
. Cluster CR times for each candidate feature subset
1: for d = 1 to M do
2: for z = 1 to CR do




The input of the algorithm includes the transformed dataset X, the number of clusters
K, and the number of repetitions CR of the k–means clustering algorithm to perform, as
in algorithm 3.1. An additional input to the algorithm is the population of M candidate
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feature subsets Fs(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , that is produced by the GA, over which clustering
is to be applied. The algorithm subsequently performs k–means clustering CR times over
each feature subset Fs(d), each with a randomly selected set of initial cluster centres. This
produces a total of M × CR clustering results, represented by cluster centres C(d, z) and
sample assignments L(d, z), where d = 1, 2, . . . ,M, and z = 1, 2, . . . , CR.
It should be noted that the value of the number of clusters K remained fixed during
feature selection. Feature selection was repeated with different values of K to obtain
different feature subsets, which are compared in section 4.6.2.2.
4.3 Relative cluster validity indices
Cluster Validity Indices (CVIs) were used as a measure of clustering quality after applying
the k–means clustering algorithm to the transformed dataset over each candidate subset of
features. Relative CVI scores are computed as a function of the degree of compactness and
separation of the resultant clusters in the feature space, as defined in what follows [62].
• Compactness requires that the samples belonging to a cluster be as close to each
other as possible with regards to distances in the feature space.
• Separation requires that distinct clusters be as far apart as possible. Three measures
that may be used to compute the separation between two clusters are [62]:
1. Single linkage, which involves the distance between the two closest samples of
two clusters.
2. Complete linkage, which involves the distance between the two furthest samples
of two clusters.
3. Comparison of centroids, which involves the distance between the cluster cen-
tres.
Several relative cluster validity indices that may be calculated for a specific clustering result
include the Davies-Bouldin (DB) [125], Dunn [127], Silhouette [128], S Dbw [129] and
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Calinski-Harabasz (CH) indices [130]. These indices differ in the selection of compactness
and separation measures, as well as the manner in which these measures are combined to
obtain the value of the CVI.
A previous feature selection algorithm for text classification [126], that is similar to the
proposed algorithm, made use of the DB index due to its linear time complexity and the
fact that it is unbiased with respect to the number of clusters used [83]. In this research a
normalized version of the DB index is utilized as the relative CVI in the feature selection
algorithm.
The DB index was first introduced by Davies and Bouldin in 1979 [125]. To define the
DB index, suppose a given clustering result consists of K clusters H1,H2, . . . ,HK and
corresponding cluster centres c1, c2, . . . , cK, where Hk represents the set of data samples
belonging to cluster k. The DB index is defined as a function of a similarity measure Ri,j
between pairs of clusters Hi and Hj, where i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,K with i 6= j. The measure of
similarity Ri,j , is defined as a function of compactness gi and separation di,j scores.
The compactness gi of a cluster Hi is defined as the average Euclidean distance between







where d(x, ci) denotes the Euclidean distance between sample x and its corresponding
cluster centre ci, and |Hi| is the number of samples in cluster Hi. The separation between
clusters Hi and Hj is defined as the pairwise Euclidean distance between cluster centres,
di,j = d(ci, cj). (4.2)
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A small value of Ri,j indicates that clusters are compact and well-separated, which indi-
cates that clusters Hi and Hj are highly dissimilar. It is proved in [125] that the similarity
measure Ri,j of equation 4.3 satisfies the following conditions for a real-valued function to
be both a distance function and a dispersion function [125]:
1. Ri,j ≥ 0
2. Ri,j = Rj,i
3. Ri,j = 0, iff gi = gj = 0
4. if gj > gk and di,j = di,k then Ri,j > Ri,k
5. if gj = gk and di,j < di,k then Ri,j > Ri,k
Let Ri,j(d, z) denote the similarity measure obtained from the evaluation of equation 4.3
using cluster centres C(d, z) and sample assignments L(d, z), where d refers to the dth
candidate feature subset Fs(d), where d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , in the population of M candidate
feature subsets produced by the GA, and z refers to the zth clustering result of the k–
means clustering algorithm, where z = 1, 2, . . . , CR (refer to algorithm 4.1). The DB index







where K represents the number of clusters. In equation 4.4, Ri(d, z) is the maximum value
of Ri,j(d, z) over clusters Hj,where j = 1, 2, . . . ,K; that is,
Ri(d, z) = max
j=1,...,K,j 6=i
Ri,j(d, z), i = 1, . . . ,K. (4.5)
DB(d, z) may therefore be interpreted as the average of the similarity scores between each
cluster and the cluster most similar to it. Note that the DB index is defined in such a
manner that smaller numerical values of the DB index corresponds to better clustering
quality [129].
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The DB index, as defined in equation 4.4, tends to be biased towards lower dimensional
feature subsets if the index is used as a measure for comparing clustering quality over
feature subsets with different dimensions [83, 126]. This is owing to the fact that the
Euclidean distance between two points becomes smaller when the number of dimensions
over which the calculation is performed is reduced; since smaller DB index values indicate
better clustering quality, the index will favour lower dimensional feature subsets.
Handl et al. [83] investigated two possible approaches to overcoming the bias of the index
by using the feature cardinality (the number of features in the subset) as an additional
objective function for the genetic algorithm, thereby reformulating the problem as one
of multi-objective optimization. The first approach that was investigated consisted of the
minimization of the DB index value as the first objective, while simultaneously maximizing
the number of features as the second objective. The motivation for this approach is that
the additional objective of maximizing the number of features counteracts the bias of the
DB index value towards lower dimensional feature subsets. The second approach consisted
of the minimization of the DB index value that is normalized by the feature cardinality as
the first objective, while simultaneously minimizing the number of features as the second





where |Fs(d)| represents the cardinality of the candidate feature subset Fs(d) that was
used during clustering. The motivation for this approach stems from the observation
in [83, 126] that the normalized DB index tends to be biased towards feature subsets with
higher dimensionality. By including the minimization of the number of features as a second
objective, this bias is counteracted.
Single-objective optimization, using the NDB index of equation 4.6, as well as multi-
objective optimization using the NDB index (equation 4.6) and the number of features,
were separately considered in this research. Specifically, for the single-objective optimiza-
tion, the objective function is defined as the average of the NDB index values obtained
over the CR repetitions of the k–means algorithm, which is defined as







where d represents the index of feature subset Fs(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , in the population
of M candidate feature subsets. For the multi-objective optimization, the first objective
function is the average of the NDB index values obtained over the CR repetitions of the
k–means clustering algorithm (equation 4.7), and the second objective function is the
number of features in the candidate feature subset.
The pseudocode for the computation of the average NDB index value (equation 4.7), as
implemented in the proposed feature selection algorithm, is provided in algorithm 4.2.
The algorithm iterates over each of the CR clustering results obtained over each candidate
feature subset and calculates the NDB index for each clustering result. The average of the
index, as associated with each candidate feature subset is calculated over the CR clustering
results.
Algorithm 4.2 CVI computation for each candidate feature subset over CR repetitions
Function [NDBavg] = Avg CV I(X,K,C,L, CR)
Inputs:
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, . A set of N feature vectors, corresponding
. to the N dataset samples
K, . The number of clusters
C = {C(d, z)|d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ; z = 1, 2, . . . , CR}, where
C(d, z) = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}, . The K cluster centres for each clustering result
L = {L(d, z)|d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ; z = 1, 2, . . . , CR}, where
L(d, z) = {l(xa)|a = 1, 2, . . . , N} . Cluster assignments for all data samples
. for each clustering result over each candidate feature subset
CR . Number of repetitions of k-means with random initial cluster centres
Output:
NDBavg, . Average NDB index value for each candidate feature
. subset over all CR clustering results
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. Compute average NDB index over CR clustering results for
. each candidate feature subset
1: for d = 1 to M do
2: for z = 1 to CR do
3: NDB(d, z)← Compute NDB Index V alue(C(d, z),L(d, z)) ; . Equation 4.6
4: end for




Genetic algorithms are heuristic search algorithms that are based on principles of evo-
lution and natural selection [2]. These algorithms are commonly used in optimization
problems, where a search is performed over a space of candidate solutions for a solution
that is considered to be optimal according to a specified measure. Genetic algorithms
are considered in this research as they are robust and can be applied to a wide range of
problem areas [131, 132]. GAs also explore a relatively large region of the solution space
and are insensitive to reasonable amounts of noise, where noise is created from the vari-
ance of fitness values, noisy selection methods and the variance of genetic operations [133].
However, GAs can become computationally expensive as the size of the dataset and its
number of dimensions increase [131].
GAs operate by converting problems into a framework that uses a data structure referred to
as a chromosome, which represents a candidate solution to the problem [2]. Chromosomes,
or individuals, are represented as character strings in the GA (this is analogous to the
chromosomes found in DNA). Chromosomes are evolved through multiple generations
through operations such as selection, crossover and mutation, which facilitate the
traversal of the feature space.
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The objective function is used to measure how well a chromosome solves the problem (that
is, it measures the fitness of each chromosome). Chromosomes that provide good (or “fit”)
solutions to the problem are selected and crossed with one another, in an attempt to find
more fit chromosomes. Mutation involves changes to random characters of the character
string, and is used to maintain diversity from one generation to the next. It forces the
genetic algorithm to explore more distant regions of the search space, allowing the GA to
potentially find solutions that are external to the area surrounding a local optimum [131].
This approach towards optimization is inspired by Charles Darwin’s theory of ‘survival
of the fittest’, where only the ‘fittest’ individuals are selected for crossover and mutation
while the ‘unfit’ ones are removed from the system, thereby improving the average fitness
of all candidate solutions over successive generations [131]. The final output of the GA is
the chromosome with the best fitness score from those chromosomes produced in the last
generation of the GA, as returned by the objective (or fitness) function [131].
In this research, each chromosome represents a candidate feature subset of the feature
space considered, which is a candidate solution to the problem of optimising the CVI.
A chromosome in the GA of the feature selection algorithm proposed in this research is
encoded as a bit string, where each bit represents one of the original 41 candidate features
of the dataset. A value of 1 indicates that the corresponding feature is present in the
feature subset, whereas a value of 0 indicates that the corresponding feature is not present
in the feature subset.
Two types of genetic algorithms were applied in this research. The first corresponds to
the single-objective optimization problem, which produces a candidate feature subset to
minimize the NDB index. The second type corresponds to the multi-objective optimization
problem, which involves the minimization of the NDB index, and the minimization of the
number of features in the candidate feature subset.
4.4.1 Single-objective genetic algorithm
The single-objective genetic algorithm implementation attempts to minimize the NDB
index as an objective function over the space of all possible candidate feature subsets.
Specifically, the average value of the NDB index, as computed over multiple CR clustering
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results over a feature subset (equation 4.7), is used as the objective function. The pseu-
docode for the single-objective genetic algorithm, as applied in this research, is provided
in algorithm 4.3.







(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Current generation (i.e. generation t) of M
. candidate feature subsets
NDBavg
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Average NDB index value corresponding to
. candidate feature subsets in Fs
(t)(d)
t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Ng . Current generation number
Output:
Fs
(t+1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Next generation of M candidate feature subsets
Constants:
M , . Number of candidate feature subsets in each generation
NF , . Dimensionality of full, initial feature set
re, . Percentage of top (elite) candidates to select in generation t,
. for appearance in generation t+ 1
rc, . Percentage of candidates to produce from crossover,
. for appearance in generation t+ 1
pm, . Mutation probability for a feature
Ng . Maximum number of generations
1: if t = 0 then . If this is the first generation
2: for d = 1 to M do . Produce initial generation of candidate feature subsets
. Uniformly draw candidate feature subsets from a collection
. of all candidate feature subsets
3: Fs
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6: else if t = Ng then . If this is the final generation
7: dmax ← arg min
d
(NDBavg
(Ng)(d)) ; . Find the fittest candidate feature subset in
8: . the current generation and return this candidate
9: Fs




12: Ne ← ceil(M × re) ; . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via elitism in current generation
13: Nc ← round((M −Ne)× rc) ; . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via crossover in current generation
14: Nm ← (M −Ne −Nc) ; . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via mutation in current generation
. Sort average NDB index values in ascending order, and calculate ranking of each
. candidate in sorted list
. (i.e. NDBavg(Rank(d))← Sorted NDBavg(d), for d = 1, 2, . . . ,M)
15: [Sorted NDBavg,Rank]← sort(NDBavg, ascending) ;
. Selection (Algorithm 4.4)
16: [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut]← GA Selection(Fs(t), Ne, Nc, Nm, NF ,Rank) ;
. Elitism
. Top ranked Ne candidates in generation t appears unchanged in next generation
17: [Felite]← Fsel,elite ;
. Scattered Crossover (Algorithm 4.5)
. Produce Nc candidates for next generation through crossover
18: [Fcross]← GA Crossover(Fsel,cross, Nc, NF ) ;
. Uniform Mutation (Algorithm 4.6)
. Produce Nm candidates for next generation through mutation
19: [Fmut]← GA Mutation(Fsel,mut, Nm, NF , pm) ;
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. Create next generation (i.e. generation t+ 1)
20: Fs
(t+1)(1, . . . , Ne)← Felite ;
21: Fs
(t+1)(Ne + 1, . . . , Ne +Nc)← Fcross ;
22: Fs
(t+1)(Ne +Nc + 1, . . . , Ne +Nc +Nm)← Fmut ;
23: Return Fs
(t+1)
The genetic algorithm first determines whether the first generation Fs
(1) is to be con-
structed (t = 0), or whether the best candidate is to be selected from the final generation
Fs
(Ng) (corresponding to t = Ng). In the former case, the GA constructs an initial pop-
ulation Fs
(1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , of M candidate feature subsets, where each candidate
is randomly and uniformly selected from all possible candidate feature subsets. The algo-
rithm subsequently returns this set of candidates. In the latter case, the GA selects and
returns the candidate feature subset from the final generation Fs(d) with the best NDB
index value as the fittest candidate found during optimization. If neither the first case
(t = 0) nor the last case (t = Ng) applies, the GA performs the steps of selection, elitism,
crossover and mutation to produce the next generation Fs
(t+1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
The selection step consists of the selection of those candidates in the current generation
to be directly included in the next generation (elitism), those to undergo crossover, and
those to undergo mutation (Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross and Fsel,mut, respectively). New candi-
date feature subsets are subsequently produced through elitism, crossover and mutation
(Felite, Fcross and Fmut, respectively). These candidates constitute the next generation,
which is returned. The selection, elitism, crossover and mutation operations are discussed
in what follows.
Selection
As an initial step to selection, the GA calculates the number of candidate feature subsets
in the next generation to be derived using elitism (Ne), crossover (Nc) and mutation
(Nm) in the current generation. This is illustrated via an example. Consider a generation
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consisting of 20 (M) candidate feature subsets, with the number of candidates in the next
generation to be derived using elitism (Ne), set to 10% (re) of M , and the number of
candidates in the next generation to be derived using crossover (Nc), set to 80% (rc) of all
remaining candidates, excluding the number of candidates required to be produced from
elitism (Ne). Figure 4.2 illustrates the computations.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the computation of the number of candidates in the next
generation to be derived from elitism (Ne), crossover (Nc) and mutation (Nm).
The candidates for crossover and candidates for mutation are selected using the stochastic
uniform selection method. The selected candidates are subsequently shuffled (i.e. ran-
domly permuted) to randomize the order in which candidates are used in the crossover
and mutation operations. The pseudocode for the selection of candidate feature subsets
is provided in algorithm 4.4.
The algorithm proceeds by selecting Ne candidates in the current generation for elitism
(Fsel,elite), 2Nc candidates for crossover (Fsel,cross) and Nm candidates for mutation
(Fsel,mut). The candidates selected for elitism constitute the top Ne ranked candidates in
Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , according to the average NDB index value.
Stochastic uniform selection proceeds in three steps. Firstly, each candidate is assigned
an expectation score e(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M based on their rank. Expectation scores are
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Algorithm 4.4 Single-objective GA selection algorithm
Function [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut] = GA Selection(Fs
(t), Ne, Nc, Nm, NF , Rank)
Inputs:
Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Current generation (i.e. generation t) of M
. candidate feature subsets
Ne, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via elitism in current generation
Nc, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via crossover in current generation
Nm, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via mutation in current generation
NF , . Dimensionality of full, initial feature set
Rank . Ranking of each candidate feature subset in Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
. based on average DB index value
Outputs:
Fsel,elite(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Ne . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for elitism
Fsel,cross(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , 2Nc . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for crossover
Fsel,mut(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nm . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for mutation
1: Fsel,elite ← Fs(t)(Rank(1, . . . , Ne)) . Select Ne top ranked candidates
. from Fs
(t) for elitism
. Stochastic uniform selection algorithm, consisting of three steps:
. computation of candidate expectation scores, computation of candidate segments,
. and iterative selection
. Computation of candidate expectation scores e(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M :
. Expectation scores are inversely proportional to candidate’s rank









6: for d = 1 to M do
7: e(d)′ ← e(d)etotal ; . Normalize each expectation score such that the sum equals unity,
. and each score value lies within [0,1]
8: end for
. Computation of candidate segments s(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M :
. Numeric interval associated with each candidate, where the length of the interval
. is proportional to its likelihood of being selected
9: s(1)← [0, e(1)′) ;









. Iterative selection: construct uniformly spaced (by ∆s) sample points
. over [0,1], and select candidates based on the corresponding
. segment/interval in which each sample point falls
13: ∆s ← 12Nc+Nm ;
14: rand start← Random number drawn uniformly over [0, ∆s] ;
15: for d = 1 to (2Nc +Nm) do
16: sample point← rand start+ ((d− 1)×∆s) ;
17: Fsel(d)← Fs(t)(q) ; . where sample point ∈ s(q)
18: end for
19: Fsel ← Random permutation(Fsel) ;
. Select 2Nc candidates for crossover from current generation
20: Fsel,cross ← Fsel(1, . . . , 2Nc) ;
. Select Nm candidates for mutation from current generation
21: Fsel,mut ← Fsel(2Nc + 1, . . . , 2Nc +Nm) ;
22: Return [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut]






where Rank is the ranking of the Fs(d) candidates according to the average NDB index.
Higher ranked candidates will have a larger expectation score implying that they are more
likely to be selected. In the second step, each candidate feature subset in Fs(d) is assigned
a subinterval s(d) of [0,1], where the length of the subinterval is proportional to its expec-







s(1) = [0, e(1)). In the third step of the stochastic uniform selection algorithm, candi-
dates are selected iteratively by constructing 2Nc + Nm uniformly spaced sample points
over [0,1], and selecting candidate features based on the corresponding segment/interval
in which each sample falls. In this manner, those candidates with longer subintervals of
[0,1] have a higher likelihood of being selected, or are selected more frequently.
The stochastic uniform selection process is illustrated via an example. Consider a case
where each generation has 6 candidates where each successive generation requires Ne = 1,
Nc = 4, and Nm = 1 candidates to be produced through elitism, crossover and mutation
for the next generation. Thus, the number of candidates required to be selected from the
current generation is 10 (i.e. Ne + 2Nc + Nm = 10). Of these, 9 are selected using the
stochastic uniform selection method for crossover and mutation. Figure 4.3 depicts the
operation of the stochastic uniform selection method using the expectation scores for this
scenario.
In figure 4.3, the unit interval is depicted by the blue dotted line. On top of the unit
interval, a segmented black solid line represents the segments associated with candidates,
where the length of the segment is proportional to a candidate’s expectation score. The
fittest candidate, ranked 1, is the most likely candidate to be selected and thus possesses
the longest segment on the line. Iterative selection occurs by selecting 9 equidistant points
(starting with a random point P1 in [0, 12Nc+Nm ]), as indicated using the green arrows.
The candidate corresponding to the segment in which each point falls is selected, in this
case, the selected candidates are 1,1,2,2,3,3,4,5,6.
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the stochastic uniform selection method.
Elitism
Elitism is a mechanism that is incorporated into GAs for guaranteeing that the average
fitness does not decrease from one generation to the next [131]. The elitism operation
duplicates the Ne selected candidates Fsel,elite in the next generation Felite (i.e. they
appear unchanged in the next generation).
Crossover
Scattered crossover is subsequently performed on the first 2Nc selected candidates Fsel,cross,
which produces Nc new candidates Fcross for the next generation. The pseudocode for
the scattered crossover operation is provided in algorithm 4.5.
The algorithm constructs chromosomes that represent the candidate feature subsets of the
current generation. Each chromosome is a bit string, as described in section 4.4. The
algorithm iteratively selects two consecutive candidates to cross, A and B from Fsel,cross,
and iterates through each bit of A and B. The new candidate is produced by randomly
assigning the bit from either candidate A or candidate B, with equal probability, to a new
chromosome. The crossover algorithm concludes by constructing the candidate feature
subsets Fcross(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nc associated with the new chromosomes for the next
generation.
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Algorithm 4.5 Scattered crossover algorithm
Function [Fcross] = GA Crossover(Fsel,cross, Nc, NF )
Inputs:
Fsel,cross(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , 2Nc . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for crossover
Nc, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via crossover in current generation
NF , . Dimensionality of full, initial feature set
Output:
Fcross . Candidates in next generation obtained via crossover
Variables:
B(d) . Chromosomes representing selected candidates from Fsel,cross for crossover
B′(d) . Chromosomes representing candidates obtained via crossover in Fcross
. Create chromosomes B(d) for each candidate in Fsel,cross(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , 2Nc
. Binary string where a bit is set to one if the corresponding feature is present
. in the candidate feature subset
1: B(d)← [B1(d),B2(d), . . . ,BNF (d)] . where Bi(d)← 0, if feature fi /∈ Fsel,cross(d)
. and Bi(d)← 1, if feature fi ∈ Fsel,cross(d)
2: index← 1 ;
3: for d = 1 to Nc do
4: for fnum = 1 to NF do
5: rand val← Random number drawn uniformly from [0, 1] ;
6: if (rand val < 0.5) then
7: Bfnum
′(d)← Bfnum(index) ; . Bit from candidate A
8: else
9: Bfnum
′(d)← Bfnum(index+ 1) ; . Bit from candidate B
10: end if
11: end for
12: index← index+ 2 ;
13: end for
. Construct feature subsets Fcross(d) obtained via crossover from
. new chromosomes B′(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nc
14: Fcross(d)← {fnum ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NF } : Bfnum ′(d) = 1} ;
15: Return Fcross
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Mutation
Mutation is subsequently applied to the Fsel,mut(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nm candidate feature
subsets, in order to obtain mutated candidates Fmut for the next generation. The pseu-
docode for the uniform mutation operation is provided in algorithm 4.6.
As was the case with the crossover operation, the algorithm constructs chromosomes for
feature subsets in Fmut(d). The algorithm iterates through each bit of each chromosome,
and randomly inverts certain bits. Each bit has a pm percentage chance of being inverted.
Candidate feature subsets Fmut are derived from the mutated chromosomes and returned.
Algorithm 4.6 Uniform mutation algorithm
Function [Fmut] = GA Mutation(Fsel,mut, Nm, NF , pm)
Inputs:
Fsel,mut, . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for mutation
Nm, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via mutation in current generation
NF , . Dimensionality of full, initial feature set
pm, . Mutation probability for a feature
Output:
Fmut . Candidates in next generation obtained via mutation
Variables:
B(d) . Chromosomes representing selected candidates from Fsel,mut for mutation
B′(d) . Chromosomes representing candidates obtained via mutation in Fmut
. Create chromosomes B(d) for each candidate in Fsel,mut(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nm
. Binary string where a bit is set to one if the corresponding feature is present
. in the candidate feature subset
1: B(d)← [B1(d),B2(d), . . . ,BNF (d)] . where Bi(d)← 0, if feature fi /∈ Fsel,mut(d)
. and Bi(d)← 1, if feature fi ∈ Fsel,mut(d)
2: for d = 1 to Nm do
3: for fnum = 1 to NF do
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4: rand val← Random number drawn uniformly from [0, 1] ;
5: if (rand val < pm) then
6: Bfnum
′(d)← 1−Bfnum(d) ; . Mutation
7: else
8: Bfnum




. Construct feature subsets Fmut(d) obtained via mutation from
. new chromosomes B′(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nm
12: Fmut(d)← {fnum ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NF } : Bfnum ′(d) = 1} ;
13: Return Fmut
4.4.2 Multi-objective genetic algorithm
This section describes the genetic algorithm that was applied in this research for optimiza-
tion over multiple objective functions (i.e. where the fitness of each candidate solution is
measured against multiple criteria). Specifically, the multi-objective GA attempts to find
feature subsets that minimize the NDB index as a first objective, as well as minimize the
number of features in the subset as a second objective, as discussed in section 4.3.
Multi-objective GAs are similar to single-objective GAs in the sense that selection, crossover
and mutation operations are applied to chromosomes over multiple generations, in an at-
tempt to find more “fit” solutions. The key difference between these algorithms lies in the
ranking of candidates during the selection step. The single-objective GA ranks candidates
according to their fitness scores obtained from the evaluation of the single objective func-
tion. In contrast, the multi-objective GA attempts to find solutions that are considered
to provide a superior trade-off between the objective functions, as compared to competing
solutions. These solutions are referred to as the Pareto-optimal front.
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In this research, a variant2 of the improved Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm, or
NSGA-II, was used [135]. The NSGA-II applies the non-dominated sorting algorithm and
the crowding distance algorithm prior to selecting candidate feature subsets for crossover
and mutation. The non-dominated sorting algorithm ranks candidate feature subsets
based on the trade-off between the objective functions, where higher ranked candidates
provide a better trade-off than lower ranked candidates. The crowding distance algorithm
maintains diversity amongst selected candidate feature subsets by measuring the spread
amongst the candidates in the objective space. The pseudocode for the multi-objective
genetic algorithm, as applied in this research, is provided in algorithm 4.7.







(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Current generation (i.e. generation t) of M
. candidate feature subsets
NDBavg
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Average NDB index value corresponding to
. candidate feature subsets in Fs
(t)(d)
t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Ng . Current generation number
Output:
Fs
(t+1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Next generation of M candidate feature subsets
Constants:
M , . Number of candidate feature subsets in each generation
NF , . Dimensionality of full, initial feature set
rc, . Percentage of candidates to produce from crossover,
. for possible appearance in generation t+ 1
pm, . Mutation probability for a feature
Ng . Maximum number of generations
2NSGA-II is an improvement over the ordinary NSGA algorithm in the sense that it incorporates
elitism, whereas ordinary NSGA does not. It is also computationally less expensive owing to its use of a
more efficient sorting algorithm [134].
Chapter 4. Proposed Feature Selection Algorithm 120
1: if t = 0 then . If this is the first generation
2: for d = 1 to M do . Produce initial generation of candidate feature subsets
. Uniformly draw candidate feature subsets from a collection
. of all candidate feature subsets
3: Fs





. Compute the second objective function,
. the feature cardinality for each candidate feature subset




. Assign each candidate to a pareto front
10: Rank← Non Dominated Sorting(NDBavg(t),Fcard(t)) . Algorithm 4.8
. Compute crowding distance of each candidate
11: Xdistance ← Crowding Distance(NDBavg(t),Fcard(t)) . Algorithm 4.9
12: if t = Ng then . If this is the final generation
13: i← 1 ;
14: for d = 1 to M do
15: if (Rank(d) = 1) then
16: front1(i)← d ; . where front1 contains the indices of those candidates
. belonging to the Pareto-optimal front




(Ng+1) ← Fs(Ng)(front1) ; . Return all candidates belonging to the first
21: Return Fs
(Ng+1) . pareto front, in the current generation
22: end if
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23: Nc ← round(M × rc) ; . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via crossover in current generation
24: Nm ← (M −Nc) ; . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via mutation in current generation
. Selection (Algorithm 4.10)
. Select candidates for elitism, crossover and mutation
25: [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut]←MOGA Selection(Fs(t), Nc, Nm, NF , Rank,Xdistance)
. Elitism
. All candidates in generation t have the possibility to appear unchanged
. in the next generation t+ 1
26: [Felite]← Fsel,elite ; . Equivalent to Fs(t)
. Scattered Crossover (Algorithm 4.5)
. Produce Nc candidates for possible appearance in next generation through crossover
27: [Fcross]← GA Crossover(Fsel,cross, Nc, NF ) ;
. Uniform Mutation (Algorithm 4.6)
. Produce Nm candidates for possible appearance in next generation through mutation
28: [Fmut]← GA Mutation(Fsel,mut, Nm, NF , pm) ;
. Collection of 2M pre-selected candidates for possible appearance in generation t+ 1,
. consisting of all candidates from generation t, and candidates obtained through
. the application of crossover and mutation to candidates in generation t
29: Fs,pre−sel(1, . . . ,M)← Felite ;
30: Fs,pre−sel(M + 1, . . . ,M + 2Nc)← Fcross ;
31: Fs,pre−sel(M + 2Nc + 1, . . . , 2M)← Fmut ;
. In order to select the top M candidates from Fs,pre−sel for the next generation (t+1),
. the computation of the rank and crowding distances for the collection of Fs,pre−sel
. candidates is required. This in turn requires the computation of the NDBavg and
. Fcard values for those crossed and mutated candidates
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32: NDBavg,pre−sel(1, . . . ,M)← NDBavgt ; . First M candidates belong
33: Fcard,pre−sel(1, . . . ,M)← Fcardt ; . to generation t
. Perform clustering on the candidates obtained from crossover and mutation
34: [C, L]← repeated kmeans(X,K,Fs,pre−sel(M + 1, . . . , 2M), CR) ;
. Compute the average NDB index values for those candidates obtained
. from crossover and mutation
35: NDBavg,pre−sel(M + 1, . . . , 2M)← Avg CV I(X,K,C,L, CR) ;
. Compute the second objective function, the feature cardinality for
. those candidates obtained from crossover and mutation
36: for d = (M + 1) to 2M do
37: Fcard,pre−sel(d)← sum(Fs,pre−sel(d)) ;
38: end for
. Assign each candidate in Fs,pre−sel to a Pareto front
39: Rank← Non Dominated Sorting(NDBavg,pre−sel, Fcard,pre−sel) ; . Algorithm 4.8
. Compute crowding distance of each candidate in Fs,pre−sel
40: Xdistance ← Crowding Distance(NDBavg,pre−sel, Fcard,pre−sel) ; . Algorithm 4.9
41: for j = 1 to max(Rank) do . The number of pareto fronts
42: i← 1 ;
43: for d = 1 to 2M do
44: if (Rank(d) = j) then
45: frontj(i)← d ; . where frontj contains the indices of those candidates
. in Fs,pre−sel belonging to the j
th Pareto front
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50: j ← 1 ;
51: repeat
. Add those candidates belonging to frontj to the next generation
52: Fs
(t+1)(|Fs(t+1)|+ 1, . . . , |Fs(t+1)|+ |frontj|)← Fs,pre−sel(frontj) ;
53: j ← j + 1 ;
54: until (|Fs(t+1)|+ |frontj | ≥M) . Until the next generation cannot accomodate
. all candidates belonging to the next front
. Sort the candidates of the remaining front in descending order of crowding distance,
. such that Xdistance(Rank(d))← sorted Xdistance(d), for d = 1, 2, . . . ,M
55: [sorted Xdistance,Rank]← sort(Xdistance(frontj), descending) ;
56: Fs
(t+1)(|Fs(t+1)|+ 1, . . . ,M)← Fs,pre−sel(frontj(Rank(1 : (M − |Fs(t+1)|))) ;
57: Return Fs
(t+1) ;
The multi-objective genetic algorithm first determines whether the first generation Fs
(1)
is to be constructed (t = 0), or whether the Pareto-optimal front is to be selected from the
final generation Fs
(Ng) (corresponding to t = Ng). In the former case, the GA constructs
an initial population Fs
(1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , of M candidate feature subsets, where
each candidate is randomly and uniformly selected from all possible candidate feature
subsets. The algorithm subsequently returns this set of candidates. In the latter case,
the GA selects and returns the candidate feature subsets from the final generation Fs(d)
that belong to the Pareto-optimal front. If neither the first case (t = 0) nor the last case
(t = Ng) applies, the GA performs the steps of selection, elitism, crossover and mutation
to produce the next generation Fs
(t+1)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Candidate feature subsets of the current generation are ranked using the non-dominated
sorting algorithm according to the normalized DB index and the number of features as cri-
teria (refer to algorithm 4.8). The algorithm subsequently calculates the crowding distance
of each candidate feature subset (refer to algorithm 4.9). The ranking of the candidate
feature subsets and their corresponding crowding distances are used in the selection of
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candidates for crossover and mutation. The selection process is provided in algorithm
4.10, whereas the crossover and mutation operations are identical to those carried out for
the single-objective GA (refer to algorithms 4.5 and 4.6).
Following the crossover and mutation operations, the algorithm returns the top-ranked M
candidates in the union between the current generation and the candidates obtained via
crossover and mutation.
Non-dominated sorting algorithm
The non-dominated sorting algorithm ranks candidates based on how well each candidate
provides a trade-off between the multiple objective functions. The superiority of the
trade-off provided by a candidate, as compared to other candidates, is established using
the concept of domination. To define this concept, consider a generation of candidate
feature subsets Fs(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , and the corresponding objective function values
W(d) = (w1(d),w2(d) . . . ,wNo(d)) that are to be minimized as a function of the feature
subset, where No represents the number of objective functions where No ≥ 2. A candidate
feature subset Fs(d1) dominates another candidate feature subset Fs(d2) if both of the
following conditions are satisfied [135–137]:
1. wi(d1) ≤ wi(d2) for all objective function scores, i = 1, 2, . . . , No
2. wi(d1) < wi(d2) for at least one objective function score, i = 1, 2, . . . , No
The pseudocode for performing non-dominated sorting of candidate feature subsets, which
ranks the candidates in the current generation according to the concept of domination, is
provided in algorithm 4.8 [134].
The ranking of candidates is carried out as follows. Starting with the full generation of
candidate feature subsets, those candidates that are not dominated by any other candidates
are assigned a rank of one, and are collectively referred to as the Pareto-optimal front.
These candidates are removed from the current generation for the remainder of the non-
dominated sorting algorithm. The remaining candidates that are not dominated by any
other candidates in the current generation are assigned a rank of two, and constitute
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Algorithm 4.8 Non-dominated sorting
Function [front] = Non Dominated Sorting(NDBavg,Fcard)
Inputs:
NDBavg, . Average normalized DB index value for each candidate
. feature subset over all CR clustering results
Fcard . Number of features present in each candidate feature subset
Output:
front . Consists of the indices of those candidates
. belonging to each pareto front
Variables:
Nd(i) ; . Counts the number of candidates that dominate candidate i
p front ; . Contains the set of indices of those candidates assigned to front
. currently being constructed
1: Nfront ← 1 ; . Front counter, determines which Pareto front is under construction
2: while |NDBavg| 6= 0 do
3: nf ← 0 ; . Stores the number of candidates currently assigned
. to pareto front Nfront
4: for i = 1 to |NDBavg| do
5: Nd(i)← 0 ;
6: for j = 1 to |NDBavg| do
7: if (j = i) then
8: continue ;
9: end if
. Test if candidate j dominates candidate i
10: if (NDBavg(j) ≤ NDBavg(i)) ∧ (Fcard(j) ≤ Fcard(i)) then
11: cond1← true ; . where cond1 represents the first condition that is
12: else . required to be satisfied for domination
13: cond1← false ;
14: end if
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15: if (NDBavg(j) < NDBavg(i)) ∨ (Fcard(j) < Fcard(i)) then
16: cond2← true ; . where cond2 represents the second condition that is
17: else . required to be satisfied for domination
18: cond2← false ;
19: end if
. If both conditions are true, candidate j dominates candidate i
20: if (cond1 = true) ∧ (cond2 = true) then
21: Nd(i)← Nd(i) + 1 ; . Count the number of candidates that
. dominate candidate i
22: end if
23: end for
24: if ( Nd(i) = 0 ) then . Candidate i belongs to the Pareto front Nfront
25: nf = nf + 1 ;
26: p front(nf )← i ; . Add index of candidate i to the Pareto
. front being constructed
27: end if
28: end for
29: front(Nfront)← p front ; . Store indices of those candidates
. belonging to front Nfront
30: Nfront ← Nfront + 1 ;
31: NDBavg(p front) = Inf ; . Exclude those candidates already
32: Fcard(p front) = Inf ; . assigned to a pareto front
33: end while
34: Return front
the second Pareto front. These candidates are subsequently removed from the current gen-
eration for the remainder of the non-dominated sorting algorithm. This process is repeated
until no candidates remain in the current generation, thereby producing a succession of
Pareto fronts. Candidates are ranked according to the Pareto front to which they belong,
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with candidates in a specific Pareto front dominated by all candidates in preceding fronts.
That is, candidates in Pareto front i are considered as providing a superior trade-off be-
tween the objective functions as compared to candidates in successive Pareto fronts i+1,
i+2, etc.
Crowding distance algorithm
The Pareto-optimal front represents those candidate solutions that provide a superior
trade-off between objective functions. These candidates may be represented by points in
the No-dimensional space corresponding to the range of possible values of the No objective
functions (referred to as the ‘objective space’). As the solution most relevant to the
researcher may be biased towards particular objective functions, it is desirable that the
Pareto optimal front contain a diverse set of candidates that are located far apart in the
objective space; this increases the likelihood of points appearing in the relevant region of
the objective space. Should this be achieved, the researcher is provided the opportunity to
select a candidate solution from the Pareto optimal front that is relevant to the problem
context.
In order to maintain diversity within a set of Pareto-optimal solutions, the NSGA-II algo-
rithm calculates what is known as a crowding distance for each candidate. The crowding
distance associated with a candidate of interest is inversely proportional to the density of
candidates surrounding the candidate of interest in the objective space, and serves as a
measure of the diversity of the candidate solution with respect to the remaining candidates.
During selection, those candidates that have a higher crowding distance are favoured.
The crowding distance is an estimate of the side length of the largest rectangle that sur-
rounds the solution in the objective space, but which does not contain any other solutions
(refer to figure 4.4). The crowding distance of candidate i is computed by considering
distances over each singular dimension of the objective space. Specifically, the nearest
neighbour on either side of the candidate in each dimension of the solution space is found,
and the distance between these neighbours is calculated in that dimension; this distance
is normalized by the distance between the two furthest points in the dimension of interest.
These distances are added to obtain the crowding distance. Those candidates that are at
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the edges of the objective space (i.e. which have no neighbours on one of its sides in any of
the dimensions of the objective space) are assigned a crowding distance of infinity, which
implies that these candidates are given preference during selection.
Figure 4.4: Crowding distance computation (from [3]).
The pseudocode for the computation of the crowding distance for each candidate in a
Pareto-optimal front [134] is provided in algorithm 4.9.
Algorithm 4.9 Crowding distance assignment
Function [Xdistance] = Crowding Distance(NDBavg,Fcard)
Inputs:
NDBavg, . Average normalized DB index value for each candidate
. feature subset over all CR clustering results
Fcard . Number of features present in each candidate feature subset
Output:
Xdistance . The crowding distance for each candidate
1: W← [NDBavg, Fcard] ; . Set of objective function scores
2: for d = 1 to |NDBavg| do
3: Xdistance(d)← 0 ;
4: end for
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5: for j = 1 to |W| do . For each objective function wj
6: Xdistance(1)← Xdistance(N)←∞ ; . Boundary points always selected
. Vector “indices” contains the indices of each candidate sorted based on the
. objective function w(j) values under consideration, such that
. w(j)(indices(j))← sorted scores(j), where j = 1, 2, . . . , |NDBavg|
7: [sorted scores, indices]← sort(w(j), ascending) ;
8: for ( d = 2 to (|NDBavg| − 1) ) do




The algorithm uses the normalized DB index of the candidate feature subset, as well as
the number of features in the subset, as objectives. It subsequently iterates over the two
dimensions of the objective space. The objective scores corresponding to the dimension
are sorted; the sorted indices are used to find the two neighbours on either side of each
candidate. The normalized distance between the neighbours are calculated, and added to
the total over all dimensions to obtain the crowding distance. A value of infinity is assigned
to the candidates in each dimension with the smallest and largest objective scores.
Selection
The multi-objective GA selects M , Nc and Nm candidate feature subsets for elitism,
crossover and mutation (Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut), respectively. The selection of
candidates for crossover and mutation, is carried out using the tournament selection al-
gorithm, thereby producing feature subsets for each operation. It is worth noting that
the multi-objective algorithm ranks the collection consisting of the elite candidates and
the candidates obtained via crossover and mutation using the non-dominated sorting al-
gorithm and constructs the next generation as the top M candidates, as discussed in
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section 4.4.2. Hence, those candidates selected for elitism, and the candidates obtained
via crossover and mutation, may not necessarily form part of the next generation; only
their availability for the next generation is ensured. This implies that the definition of
elitism for the multi-objective GA differs from that of the single-objective GA, in that
selection for elitism does not guarantee appearance in the next generation.
The pseudocode for the tournament selection algorithm is provided in algorithm 4.10.
Unlike the single-objective genetic algorithm, the multi-objective genetic algorithm selects
the entire current generation for elitism. The selection of the candidates for crossover and
mutation involves the iterative random selection of pairs of candidate feature subsets from
the current generation, which are compared in terms of their rank. The higher ranked
candidate is included in the collection of features selected for crossover and mutation; if
both candidates are of equal rank, the candidate with the larger crowding distance is se-
lected. Using this approach, those candidates that have a higher rank and larger crowding
distance are favoured, and are more likely to be selected / selected more frequently than
other candidates.
Elitism, crossover and mutation
The multi-objective genetic algorithm ensures that the entire generation is made available
as candidates for the next generation through elitism. The same algorithms for crossover
(algorithm 4.5) and mutation (algorithm 4.6), as used in the single-objective genetic algo-
rithm (algorithm 4.3), were used in the multi-objective genetic algorithm. Following the
application of elitism, crossover and mutation, a collection of candidate feature subsets of
size 2M is obtained.
The collection of 2M candidate feature subsets is ranked using the non-dominated sorting
algorithm, and the crowding distance of each candidate is computed. The next generation
Fs
t+1(d) is created by successively including the candidate feature subsets from each Pareto
front, starting with the first Pareto front, or the optimal front, until there are M candidate
solutions in the next generation. If the final front to be included has more than the required
number of candidates, those candidates with the largest crowding distances are selected
from the final considered Pareto front. The resulting collection of M candidate feature
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subsets are returned by the algorithm as the next generation (provided that the initial or
final generation is not to be produced - refer to section 4.4.2 for these cases).
Algorithm 4.10 Multi-objective GA selection algorithm
Function [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut]
= MOGA Selection(Fs
(t), Nc, Nm, NF , Rank,Xdistance)
Inputs:
Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M , . Current generation (i.e. generation t) of M
. candidate feature subsets
Nc, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via crossover in current generation
Nm, . Number of candidates in next generation obtained
. via mutation in current generation
Rank, . Ranking of each candidate feature subset in Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
. based on the pareto front that each candidate belongs to
Xdistance . Crowding distance of each candidate feature subset in
. Fs
(t)(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M
Outputs:
Fsel,elite(d), d = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for elitism
Fsel,cross(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , 2Nc . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for crossover
Fsel,mut(d), d = 1, 2, . . . , Nm . Feature subsets from Fs
(t) selected for mutation
1: Fsel,elite ← Fs(t) ; . Select all candidates from Fs(t) for elitism
2: for d = 1 to (2Nc +Nm) do
3: A← rand(1 : M) ; . Random number between 1 and total number of candidates
4: repeat
5: B ← rand(1 : M) ; . Random number between 1 and total number of
6: until (B 6= A) . candidates
. If Fs
(t)(A) and Fs
(t)(B) belong to the same front (i.e. have the same rank),
. select either Fs
(t)(A) or Fs
(t)(B) based on crowding distance
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7: if Rank(A) = Rank(B) then
8: if Xdistance(A) > Xdistance(B) then
9: Fsel(d)← Fs(t)(A) ;
10: continue ;
11: else




. Select the candidate with the better (lower integer value) rank
16: if Rank(A) < Rank(B) then
17: Fsel(d)← Fs(t)(A) ;
18: continue ;
19: else




24: Fsel ← Random permutation(Fsel) ;
. Select 2Nc candidates for crossover from current generation
25: Fsel,cross ← Fsel(1, . . . , 2Nc) ;
. Select Nm candidates for mutation from current generation
26: Fsel,mut ← Fsel(2Nc + 1, . . . , 2Nc +Nm) ;
27: Return [Fsel,elite, Fsel,cross, Fsel,mut]
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4.5 Flowchart of the proposed feature selection algorithm
A flowchart of the proposed feature selection algorithm is provided in figure 4.5. The
inputs of the feature selection algorithm are the dataset, the number of clusters K, the
maximum number of generations of the GA (Ng), the population size (M), and the number
of repetitions to perform the k–means clustering algorithm over each candidate feature
subset (CR). The dataset is transformed using the normalization and encoding techniques
described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. Following data transformation, the
feature selection algorithm iteratively applies the k–means clustering algorithm to the
dataset over generations of candidate feature subsets, computes the relative cluster validity
indices corresponding to the clustering results, and selects the subsequent generation via
the genetic algorithm.
During the first iteration, the initial generation of candidate feature subsets is drawn
uniformly with replacement from the set of all possible candidate feature subsets (the
pseudocode for this selection appears in algorithm 4.7, the multi-objective GA). In each
iteration, k–means clustering is applied to the transformed dataset over each candidate
feature subset a number of CR executions, each with random starting positions for the
cluster centres (refer to algorithm 4.1). This is followed by the calculation of the average
normalized DB index (equation 4.7) for both the single and multi-objective GAs (refer
to algorithm 4.2). The corresponding genetic algorithm (i.e. single or multi-objective)
(refer to algorithms 4.3 or 4.7) is subsequently executed. If the final generation is reached,
the highest ranked candidate feature subset from the final generation is returned as the
optimized feature subset of the feature selection algorithm in the case of the single-objective
optimization. In the case of the multi-objective optimization, those candidates with the
highest rank (those belonging to the Pareto-optimal front) are returned as the optimized
collection of feature subsets.
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Figure 4.5: Flow diagram of the proposed feature selection algorithm.
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4.6 Experimental results
In this section the results obtained from the application of the proposed unsupervised
feature selection algorithm are presented, compared and discussed. The feature sub-
sets obtained using the proposed feature selection algorithm, as well as the classification
performance obtained by applying the proposed classifier in chapter 3 to the NSL-KDD
dataset [25] over the optimized feature subsets produced by the GA, are presented. The
classification results are compared to feature subsets produced by wrapper and filter tech-
niques from the literature. The false positive and true positive percentages, as well as the




1. the setup of the proposed feature selection algorithm, as used to perform feature
selection on the NSL-KDD dataset [25],
2. the benchmark feature subsets derived using wrapper and filter-based techniques
from the literature, and
3. the performance metrics used to evaluate the classification performance of feature
subsets.
4.6.1.1 Feature selection algorithm parameters
The parameters for each block of the proposed feature selection algorithm’s functional
block diagram (figure 4.1) is provided.
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Table 4.1: Parameters of the proposed feature selection algorithm.
Dataset (Feature vectors)
Dataset selected NSL-KDD training set 2
Section 3.2.2. Table 3.3 provides
the dataset distribution.
Data transformation
Normalization of numeric features Statistical Normalization Section 3.3.1
Encoding of non-binary categorical features Frequency Encoding Section 3.3.2
Encoding of binary categorical features Ordinal Encoding Section 3.3.2
Clustering
Clustering algorithm K–means Section 3.4.1.1
Initialization Initial cluster centres - K randomly selected data samples —
Distance metric Euclidean distance —
Number of clusters (K) 5 - 7 —
Number of repetitions with different
cluster centres (CR)
100 —
Computation of relative CVIs
Relative CVI selected Normalized Davies-Bouldin (NDB) index Section 4.3, equation 4.6
Single-Objective Genetic Algorithm (SOGA)
Objective function Average normalized DB index Section 4.3, algorithm 4.2
Chromosome 40-bit binary string —
Population size (M) 50 —
Max number of generations (Ng) 150 —
Ranking method Fitness scaling - sorted NDB index values —
Selection method Stochastic uniform Section 4.4.1, algorithm 4.4
Crossover method Scattered Section 4.4.1, algorithm 4.5
Mutation method Uniform Section 4.4.1, algorithm 4.6
Percentage of elite candidates (re) 5% of population size (Ne = M × re) —
Percentage of candidates created via
crossover (rc)
80% of (M −Ne) —
Mutation probability (pm) 1% —
Stopping criteria Max number of generations reached —
Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA)
Objective functions Average normalized DB index, feature cardinality Section 4.3, algorithm 4.2
Chromosome 40-bit binary string —
Population size (M) 50 —
Max number of generations (Ng) 150 —
Ranking method Non-dominated sorting Section 4.4.2, algorithm 4.8
Selection method Tournament Section 4.4.2, algorithm 4.10
Crossover method Scattered Section 4.4.1 algorithm 4.5
Mutation method Uniform Section 4.4.1, algorithm 4.6
Percentage of candidates created via
crossover (rc)
80% of (M) —
Mutation probability (pm) 1% —
Stopping criteria Max number of generations reached —
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4.6.1.2 Feature subsets
The feature subsets obtained using the proposed feature selection algorithm were compared
against two wrapper-based feature selection algorithms, obtained from [31]. The feature
subsets obtained from these wrapper-based techniques were optimized for use with the k–
means clustering algorithm, as part of the experimental work. Refer to section 2.4.2 and
Appendix A for details on the implementation of these wrapper-based feature selection
algorithms. Additionally, the feature subsets obtained using the proposed feature selection
algorithm were compared against two filter-based feature selection algorithms found in
the literature [35], in which the feature subsets produced by these methods, in [35], were
directly used.
Table 4.2 provides the feature subsets that were compared to the feature subsets obtained
from the proposed feature selection algorithm.
Note that the wrapper-based feature selection algorithms produced feature subsets by
applying the training set to each of the feature selection algorithms. The feature subsets
were tested by applying the training, as well as two test sets to the proposed classifier with
K = 2, . . . , 10, producing composite ROC curves for each of the training and test sets.
Table 4.2: Feature set descriptions of the full feature set and of those feature subsets
produced by several feature selection algorithms.
Name # Features Feature List Method Reference
FS1 40 All excl. feature ’20’ Full feature set, excluding feature ’20’ —
Wrapper-1 (FRM) 15 1,2,3,4,12,23,25,26,27,28,31,34,35,36,39
Feature Removal Method (FRM) optimized for
the k–means clustering algorithm
—
Wrapper-2 (SFM) 8 2,3,18,23,25,26,29,35
Sole Feature Method (SFM) optimized for the
k–means clustering algorithm
—
Filter-1 (FS7) 10 3,4,5,6,14,16,27,28,37,39 Best of articles [7, 26–29] [35]
Filter-2 (FS8) 10 2,3,4,5,6,8,23,30,34,36 Degree of Correlation + Greedy Stepwise [35]
4.6.1.3 Performance metrics
As in the previous chapter, the TP and FP percentages were used as performance measures,
and the performance is illustrated using the composite ROC curve as defined in section
3.6.1.3.a, and illustrated in figure 3.4.
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4.6.2 Results and analysis
This section presents the feature subsets that were obtained using the proposed feature
selection algorithm. The classification performance of the feature subsets produced by
the proposed feature selection algorithm over different datasets, is provided and discussed.
Additionally, a comparison of the classification performance of the full feature set, the
filter-based feature subsets, the best performing wrapper-based feature subsets and the
best performing feature subsets produced by the genetic algorithm, is provided and dis-
cussed.
4.6.2.1 Feature subsets produced by the genetic algorithm
This section provides the feature subsets that were produced by the proposed feature
selection algorithm for both the single-objective and multi-objective optimization. Of
these feature subsets, the best performing ones, in terms of average MCC values, are
compared against the feature subsets presented in table 4.2.
4.6.2.1.a Single-objective genetic algorithm
The proposed feature selection algorithm using single-objective optimization and the train-
ing set produced three feature subsets for each value of K = 5, . . . , 7. These feature subsets
are provided in table 4.3. The proposed classifier was applied to the training set, as well
as two test sets, over each feature subset with K = 2, . . . , 10, producing composite ROC
curves corresponding to each feature subset. These composite ROC curves are provided
in figure 4.6.
Table 4.3: Feature subsets produced by the proposed feature selection algorithm using
single-objective optimization.




Proposed feature selection algorithm using the





Proposed feature selection algorithm using the





Proposed feature selection algorithm using the
single-objective GA with K = 7
Novel
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4.6.2.1.b Multi-objective genetic algorithm
The proposed feature selection algorithm using multi-objective optimization and the train-
ing set produced multiple feature subsets for each value of K = 5, . . . , 7 (i.e. three Pareto-
optimal fronts).
The proposed classifier was applied to the training set, as well as two test sets, over all
feature subsets with K = 2, . . . , 10, producing composite ROC curves corresponding to
each feature subset in each of the three Pareto-optimal fronts. The average MCC value for
each composite ROC curve was computed, and the feature subset with the largest average
MCC value in each Pareto-optimal front was selected. This resulted in the selection of
three feature subsets, where each represents the best performing feature subset amongst
those produced using a different value of K = 5, . . . , 7. The composite ROC curves of the
best performing feature subsets are provided in figure 4.7.
Table 4.4: Best performing feature subsets from each Pareto-optimal front, produced by
the proposed feature selection algorithm using multi-objective optimization.
Name # Features Feature List Method Reference
MOGA-1 15 4,7,8,9,14,15,18,21,22,25,26,27,28,39,41
Proposed feature selection algorithm using the
multi-objective GA with K = 5
Novel
MOGA-2 15 4,9,10,14,15,18,21,22,25,26,27,28,38,39,41
Proposed feature selection algorithm using the





Proposed feature selection algorithm using the
multi-objective GA with K = 7
Novel
4.6.2.2 Performance of feature subsets produced by the GA
This section presents the classification performance of the three feature subsets produced
by the single-objective GA, and the three selected feature subsets produced by the multi-
objective GA. The classification performance was measured by applying the training set,
and two test sets to the proposed classifier over each of the six feature subsets (in table
4.3 and 4.4), and subsequently computing the composite ROC curves. The test sets used
are described in section 3.2.2 and the distribution of the test sets can be found in table
3.3.
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Figure 4.6 consists of the composite ROC curves for each dataset over each of the three
feature subsets produced by the single-objective GA. Figure 4.7 consists of the composite
ROC curves for each dataset over each of the three selected feature subsets produced by
the multi-objective GA.
Figure 4.6 reveals that classification performed over the training set produces the best
performance compared to that produced over the test sets, with higher TP percentages
at the same FP percentages. For instance, at an FP percentage of 10%, the training set
produces TP percentages between 80% and 85%, while test set 1 produces TP percentages
between 61% and 71%. Test set 2, however, produces TP percentages between 30% and
40%.
Figure 4.7 reveals a similar trend, where classification performed over the training set
produces the best performance compared to that produced over the test sets, with higher
TP percentages at FP percentages greater than 2%. This figure, however, illustrates that
the MOGA-1 and MOGA-2 composite ROC curves for each dataset maintain low FP
percentages as the TP percentages increase. At most, these composite ROC curves attain
a 7% FP percentage, with corresponding TP percentages of 80%, 63% and 54% for the
training set, test set 1, and test set 2, respectively. An interesting observation is that test
set 1 over MOGA-1 and MOGA-2, attains approximately 1% to 5% lower FP percentages
than the training set over MOGA-1 and MOGA-2.
It is observed that all composite ROC curves for test set 2 in figure 4.6 and 4.7, typically
exhibit lower TP percentages than all remaining feature subsets. This is owing to the
fact that test set 2 consists of a majority of attack data samples (refer to table 3.3).
Given the cluster labelling scheme used in the proposed classifier, the largest cluster will
typically consist of a larger quantity of attack data samples, which are incorrectly classified
as legitimate data samples, thus decreasing the TP percentage. Table 4.5 illustrates a
typical clustering result obtained by applying the k–means clustering algorithm over the
full feature set with K = 6. The table provides the contents of each cluster which shows
that the largest cluster consists of a majority of attack data samples, as evident in cluster
6.
Chapter 4. Proposed Feature Selection Algorithm 141
False Positive Percentage





























SOGA-1 (Test Set 1)
SOGA-2 (Test Set 1)
SOGA-3 (Test Set 1)
SOGA-1 (Test Set 2)
SOGA-2 (Test Set 2)
SOGA-3 (Test Set 2)
Figure 4.6: Composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed classifier to the
training and test sets over the feature subsets produced by the single-objective genetic
algorithm over multiple values of K.
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MOGA-1 (Test Set 1)
MOGA-2 (Test Set 1)
MOGA-3 (Test Set 1)
MOGA-1 (Test Set 2)
MOGA-2 (Test Set 2)
MOGA-3 (Test Set 2)
Figure 4.7: Composite ROC curves obtained by applying the proposed classifier to the
training and test sets over the feature subsets produced by the multi-objective genetic al-
gorithm over multiple values of K.
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Table 4.5: Contents of each cluster produced by applying k–means over test set 2, with
K = 6.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
DoS 43 1 019 853 202 0 2 242
Probe 376 689 262 103 555 417
R2L 220 75 18 0 0 2 557
U2R 9 0 4 0 0 54
Normal 99 71 25 5 0 1 952
Total 747 1 854 1 162 310 555 7 222
4.6.2.3 Comparison of feature selection algorithms
This section compares the classification performance obtained by applying the proposed
classifier to each of the training and test sets over each of the feature subsets of those
depicted in table 4.2, and the best performing feature subsets depicted in table 4.3 and 4.4.
The best performing feature subsets were selected as those feature subsets that produced
the highest average MCC value as computed over the composite ROC curves produced by
the application of the proposed classifier over the training set. The selected subsets are
SOGA-3 and MOGA-3.
Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 consists of the composite ROC curves produced by each feature
subset as well as the full feature set (FS1), by applying the proposed classifier to the
training set, test set 1, and test set 2, respectively. Figures 4.8b, 4.9b and 4.10b provide a
closer inspection of the composite ROC curves presented in figures 4.8a, 4.9a and 4.10a.
It is observed in figure 4.8, that a majority of the feature subsets (Wrapper-1, Wrapper-2,
Filter-1, SOGA-3, MOGA-3) produce superior performance with TP percentages of 85%,
at corresponding FP percentages of 10%. While at the same FP percentage, the full feature
set (FS1) and Filter-2 produce TP percentages of 77% and 65%, respectively. However,
Filter-2 produces the highest TP percentage amongst all remaining feature subsets of
approximately 97%, but with corresponding FP percentages of more than 30%. The feature
subsets produced by the proposed feature selection algorithm (SOGA-3 and MOGA-3)
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shows comparable performance to both Wrapper-1 and Wrapper-2, as well as Filter-1.
At lower FP percentages, between 7% and 10%, SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 typically exhibit
a marginal reduction in TP percentage of approximately 5%, at most. However, at FP
percentages greater than 16%, both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 produce, at most, 5% higher
TP percentages than Filter-1. The marginal reduction in TP percentages produced by
both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 is acceptable given that these feature subsets were selected
using an unsupervised feature selection algorithm, whereas the remaining feature subsets
(excluding FS1), were selected using supervised feature selection algorithms. An important
observation is that both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 produce classification performances that
are superior to that produced by the full feature set FS1.
Figure 4.9 reveals that Filter-1, SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 all provide superior performance
when compared to the remaining feature subsets. Filter-1 produces the lowest FP per-
centage of approximately 1%, however, Filter-1 only attains a maximum TP percentage
of 65%, whereas all remaining feature subsets produce maximum TP percentages that are
greater than 80%. Although, this only occurs at corresponding FP percentages between
20% and 49%. SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 consistently produce higher TP percentages than
that produced by both wrapper-based subsets, both filter-based subsets and the full feature
set, over the entire range of FP percentages. At FP percentages above 5%, both SOGA-3
and MOGA-3 provide a minimum increase of approximately 5% and a maximum increase
of approximately 15%, to TP percentages, when compared to all feature subsets excluding
Filter-1. Similarly, at TP percentages above 60%, both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 provide
a minimum reduction of approximately 4% and a maximum reduction of approximately
30%, to FP percentages, when compared to all feature subsets excluding Filter-1. This
is an important observation as the SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 feature subsets were selected
such that the clustering result of the training set would be optimized. However, when
applied to a new dataset (i.e. test set 1), with data samples previously unseen by the pro-
posed unsupervised feature selection algorithm, both feature subsets produce classification
performances that outperform a majority of the classification performance produced by
feature subsets selected using supervised wrapper-based and filter-based feature selection
algorithms, as well as the full feature set.
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Figure 4.10 reveals that the classification performance produced by Filter-1 is superior to
all remaining feature subsets, with FP percentages of less than 9%, at a maximum TP
percentage of 56%. At the same TP percentage (56%), all other feature subsets produce
FP percentages that are between 32% and 70%, depending on the feature subset observed.
The classification performance produced by both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 is marginally
improved when compared to that produced by sevearl of the feature subsets, excluding
Filter-1, where both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 produce improved TP percentages within
certain ranges of FP percentages, while both produce lower TP percentages with regards
to certain feature subsets, within other ranges.
In figure 4.10, at an FP percentage of 10% SOGA-3 provides the same TP percentage as
the full feature set (FS1), approximately 36%, while both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 exhibit
higher TP percentages than Wrapper-1, Wrapper-2 and Filter-2; SOGA-3 produces a 7%,
16% and 19% improvement in TP percentages, respectively, and MOGA-3 produces a
2%, 10% and 13% improvement in TP percentages, respectively. At an FP percentage of
20%, however, SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 produced higher TP percentage than all remaining
feature subsets, excluding Filter-1. When compared to FS1, Wrapper-1, Wrapper-2 and
Filter-2, both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 produce a 4%, 4%, 14% and 20% improvement in TP
percentage, respectively. At a higher FP percentage of 40%, SOGA-3 and MOGA-3 both
produce higher TP percentage than all remaining feature subsets, excluding Filter-1 and
Wrapper-1. When compared to FS1, Wrapper-2 and Filter-2, both SOGA-3 and MOGA-3
produce a 8%, 12% and 17% improvement in TP percentage, respectively.
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False Positive Percentage

































(a) Comparison over training set 2
False Positive Percentage

































(b) Closer inspection of the comparison over training set 2
Figure 4.8: Comparison of the performance attained by applying the proposed classifier
to the training set over the feature subsets produced by several feature selection algorithms,
which includes the proposed feature selection algorithm.
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(a) Comparison over test set 1
False Positive Percentage































(b) Closer inspection of the comparison over test set 1
Figure 4.9: Comparison of the performance attained by applying the proposed classifier
to test set 1 over the feature subsets produced by several feature selection algorithms, which
includes the proposed feature selection algorithm.
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(a) Comparison over test set 2
False Positive Percentage






























(b) Closer inspection of the comparison over test set 2
Figure 4.10: Comparison of the performance attained by applying the proposed classifier
to test set 2 over the feature subsets produced by several feature selection algorithms, which
includes the proposed feature selection algorithm.
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4.6.2.4 Analysis of the convergence of the single-objective GA
This section presents an analysis of the convergence of the single-objective GA, starting
from the initial randomly generated set of candidates until the final generation, in which
the NDB index is minimized and the optimized feature subset is returned. Figure 4.11
shows the minimization of the NDB index value over each generation, when applying
the proposed feature selection algorithm to the training set with K = 8. Each point
corresponds to a generation, that is, each point corresponds to a set of candidate feature
subsets. The blue points represent the mean of the NDB index values over the set of
candidate feature subsets, and the black points represent the smallest NDB index value
over the set of candidate feature subsets. The three circled points that exhibit an abrupt
reduction in the minimum NDB index value in the set of candidate feature subsets will be
discussed in what follows.
Figure 4.11: The convergence of the genetic algorithm in searching for an optimized
feature subset, that minimizes the average NDB index value.
Figure 4.12 shows the step-by-step progression of the minimization of the NDB index value.
On the left, the region of interest is illustrated, and on the right are several of the composite
ROC curves that are produced using the sets of candidate feature subsets directly above
the coloured blocks. The points above each coloured block in the figure indicates that
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those points (i.e. those candidate feature subsets), produced the corresponding composite
ROC curves of the same colour.
Figure 4.12a illustrates the initial stage of the genetic algorithm in which it searches for an
appropriate set of candidate feature subsets which produces smaller average NDB index
values. At this stage, the search space of the GA is large as it has only begun to progress
to an improved feature subset. Figure 4.12a indicates that the blue and red composite
ROC curves constitute a diverse or wide spread region of the TP and FP space.
Figure 4.12b illustrates that the GA locates sets of candidate feature subsets that pro-
vide classification performance that is, in general, better than the red curves (higher TP
percentages), but worse than the blue curves (lower TP percentages), at the same FP
percentages. However, upon closer inspection, it is observed that the green curves exhibit
a marginally reduced FP percentage than the blue curves, approximately 0.5% to 1%, at
TP percentages less than 40%. All points above the green block produce similar composite
ROC curves until the next region of interest is reached.
Figure 4.12c illustrates the region where the GA locates sets of candidate feature subsets
that produce composite ROC curves (the black curves) that exhibit an improved level of
performance over the composite ROC curves produced by the previous candidate feature
subsets. The black curves exhibit a 5% to 8% improvement in TP percentages when
compared to the blue curves, at FP percentages between 5% and 8%. All points above
the black block produce similar composite ROC curves until the next region of interest is
reached.
Figure 4.12d illustrates the final region of interest in which the GA locates sets of candidate
feature subsets which further minimizes the NDB index value, however, these subsets do
not increase the TP percentages when compared to the black curves. At an FP percentage
of 5%, the pink composite ROC curves reach a maximum TP percentage of 80%, while
the black composite ROC curves also produce an 80% TP percentage. However, the black
curves reach a maximum TP percentage of 88%, at a corresponding FP percentage of 8%.
At TP percentages less than 60%, the pink curves exhibit a marginal reduction in FP
percentages, up to 2%, when compared to the black curves. All points above the pink
block produce similar composite ROC curves for the remaining generations.
Chapter 4. Proposed Feature Selection Algorithm 150
Given that the algorithm favoured the green curves over the blue curves in figure 4.12b,
and the pink curves over the black curves in figure 4.12d, it is assumed that the NDB index
favours lower false positive percentages over higher true positive percentages. However,
this assumption requires further investigation.
(a) Stage 1
(b) Stage 2
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(c) Stage 3
(d) Stage 4
Figure 4.12: Analysis of four significant stages of the progression of a particular imple-
mentation of the genetic algorithm to produce an optimized feature subset.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter an unsupervised cluster validity-based feature selection algorithm for use
in network intrusion detection was presented. A functional block diagram of the proposed
feature selection algorithm was provided, and each block was discussed in further detail.
The blocks consist of the dataset utilized, the data transformation using normalization
and encoding methods, clustering of the dataset using the k–means clustering algorithm,
the computation of the Davies-Bouldin cluster validity index, and the implementation of
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a genetic algorithm. A flowchart of the proposed feature selection algorithm was also
provided.
The proposed feature selection algorithm was applied using both single-objective and
multi-objective optimizations, using fixed values of K for the k–means clustering algo-
rithm. This produced three feature subsets for the single-objective optimization, and
three Pareto-optimal fronts for the multi-objective optimization.
The experimental work consisted of two experiments. The first compared the classification
performance of the three subsets produced through the single-objective optimization and
the three best performing subsets in each Pareto-optimal front produced through the
multi-objective optimization, over different datasets. The second experiment compared
the classification performance of the best performing feature subsets produced by the
proposed feature selection algorithm, based on average MCC value, to the full feature
set, two feature subsets obtained through filter-based methods, and two feature subsets
obtained through wrapper-based methods. The classification performance was measured
by applying the proposed classifier to a training set and to two test sets over each of the
feature subsets, which produced composite ROC curves for each feature subset.
The comparison of the classification performance produced by the feature subsets returned
by the GA over different datasets, revealed that the best performance is typically achieved
when classification is performed over the same dataset that was used in the selection of
the feature subsets. It was observed that the feature subsets produced by the multi-
objective GA enables the k–means clustering algorithm to attain lower FP percentages
when compared to that produced by the single-objective GA. Specifically, when applied
to test set 1, MOGA-1 and MOGA-2 produce FP percentages of less than 1%, at a TP
percentage of 63%. Additionally, it was observed that the proposed classifier suffers in
performance when applied to a dataset that does not contain a majority of legitimate data
samples. This is evident in the fact that test set 2 typically produces lower TP and higher
FP percentages, when compared to the performance attained when using the training set
and test set 1.
The comparison between the subsets produced by all feature selection algorithms consid-
ered in this chapter, revealed that the proposed feature selection algorithm is capable of
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producing feature subsets that perform comparably, or outperforms the remaining feature
selection algorithms. For the training set, the SOGA and MOGA feature subsets perform
comparably to the remaining subsets. These feature subsets exhibit a marginal reduction
in TP percentages when compared to a majority of the remaining feature subsets, at sim-
ilar FP percentages. For test set 1, it was discovered that the SOGA and MOGA feature
subsets outperformed all remaining feature subsets, excluding feature subset Filter-1, with
higher TP percentages throughout the entire range of FP percentages. For test set 2, the
SOGA and MOGA feature subsets produced superior performance to all feature subsets,
excluding the Filter-1 and Wrapper-1 subsets. It is important to note that the proposed
feature selection algorithm did not use labelled data in the selection of the feature subsets,
while all remaining feature subsets used labelled data to select features. Additionally, an
important observation is that both the single-objective and multi-objective feature sub-
sets attained improved classification performances than that produced by the full feature
subset, which was attained with fewer features than the full feature set.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This research consists of three main objectives, which includes the comparison of clustering
algorithms and feature subsets and the implementation of an unsupervised feature selection
algorithm, all in the context of anomaly-based network intrusion detection.
The comparison of four clustering algorithms and 10 feature subsets found in the literature,
in addition to the full feature set, was achieved through the design and implementation
of an unsupervised anomaly-based classifier for network intrusion detection. The pro-
posed classifier consists of several stages, data transformation using normalization and
encoding techniques, clustering and cluster labelling. The performance of the classifier
was subsequently measured using true positive and false positive percentages, which were
illustrated using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, as well as a composite of
these curves, which was introduced in this research.
The proposed classifier was applied using four different clustering algorithms: k–means, k-
medoids, k–means with distance-based outlier detection and the expectation-maximization
clustering algorithms. Each classifier was subsequently applied to the NSL-KDD training
set [25] over the full feature set, as well as 10 different feature subsets. This allowed for
the comparison of the classification performance produced by each clustering algorithm
over the full feature set and different feature subsets.
The experimental results revealed that from the four clustering algorithms considered in
this research, one single clustering algorithm does not outperform all other clustering
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algorithms over all feature subsets. For instance, when clustering is performed over the
full feature set, the k–medoids algorithm outperforms all others, while clustering over
feature subset FS9 reveals that the k–means algorithm outperforms all others. It was
observed that performing clustering using all four clustering algorithms over feature subset
FS7, produced classification performances that were superior to all other feature subsets.
In addition to FS7, it was observed that several feature subsets enabled each clustering
algorithm to produce classification performances that are superior to that produced by the
full feature set. This was attained using fewer features than that found in the full feature
set, which motivates the need for feature selection. An interesting observation is that there
is no direct correlation between feature cardinality and TP and FP performance. Feature
subsets with the same number of features were demonstrated to provide classification
performances that are highly dissimilar to one another.
The design and implementation of the unsupervised feature selection algorithm was driven
by the lack of labelled network data in practical environments. The proposed feature
selection algorithm consists of several stages which include, data transformation using
normalization and encoding techniques, clustering using the k–means clustering algorithm,
the computation of the Davies-Bouldin cluster validity index and the application of both
a single-objective and multi-objective genetic algorithm.
The feature subsets produced by the proposed feature selection algorithm were demon-
strated to produce classification performances that outperformed that produced by the
full feature set. When compared against two wrapper-based and two filter-based feature
selection algorithms, the proposed feature sets produced TP and FP percentages that were
comparable to the subsets of the remaining feature selection algorithms, and in some cases
outperformed the subsets of the remaining feature selection algorithms when applied to
different datasets. The proposed classifier was applied to a test set over the feature subsets
produced by each feature selection algorithm. It was observed that the feature subsets of
the proposed feature selection algorithm produced up to a 15% improvement in TP per-
centages, for FP percentages above 5%, over a majority of the remaining feature subsets.
This is an important observation as it demonstrates that the proposed feature selection
algorithm is capable of producing feature subsets that provide superior classification per-
formance when applied to a dataset containing data samples that were not present during
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the feature selection stage.
These results demonstrate that an unsupervised feature selection algorithm for use in net-
work intrusion detection was successfully designed and implemented. The proposed feature
selection algorithm did not use labelled network data to produce feature subsets, while the
benchmark feature subsets, were produced through both filter-based and wrapper-based
feature selection algorithms that required labelled data to select features.
Chapter 6
Future Work
This chapter highlights several aspects of this research that, if extended upon or altered,
could potentially improve the performance of the unsupervised feature selection algorithm.
The first aspect involves the use of an alternate cluster validity index. In this research,
the Davies-Bouldin cluster validity index was used to evaluate the clustering quality of the
clustering results returned by various clustering algorithms. This index was subsequently
used as an indicator of the quality of the feature subsets returned by the genetic algorithm.
It is believed that an alternate cluster validity index may better discriminate between
high and low quality clustering results, which may subsequently improve the quality of
the feature subsets returned by the genetic algorithm. Future work would involve the use
of other cluster validity indices in the feature selection algorithm, where alternate indices
were specified in section 4.3.
The normalization of the Davies-Bouldin index was performed to counter the bias that
the index places towards lower dimensional spaces. This normalization was achieved by
dividing the index value by the feature subset cardinality. This method of normalization
may be improved upon as there are other methods that may be used to normalize the
Davies-Bouldin index, which would aid in producing better quality feature subsets. Future





The following sections describe the derivation of the wrapper-based feature subsets pro-
vided in table 4.2, which were compared against the feature subsets produced by the
proposed feature selection algorithm.
A.1 Feature Removal Method (FRM)
The feature removal method, a wrapper-based feature selection algorithm, that was sum-
marized in section 2.4.2, was used to produce a feature subset for comparison. The FRM
algorithm was implemented in this research using the k–means clustering algorithm as a
classifier, thereby producing feature subsets optimized for use with k–means.
The FRM algorithm performs feature selection in two steps. The initial step involves the
ranking of each feature based on a performance measure, as calculated after clustering
and cluster labelling was performed. The second step involves the selection of a suitable
number of the top ranked features to constitute the final feature subset produced by the
FRM feature selection algorithm.
In the first step, the FRM algorithm iteratively ranks each feature present in the full
feature set, as described in what follows.
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• A feature is removed from the full feature set.
• The proposed classifier with k–means clustering, is applied to the dataset over the
reduced feature set for K ∈ {2, . . . , 10}.
• The TP and FP percentages are computed for each value of K.
• The composite ROC curve using the obtained TP and FP percentages is constructed.
• The average Matthew’s Correlation Coefficient (MCC) over the TP and FP percent-
ages of the composite ROC curve is computed.
MCC measures the quality of the classification produced by a binary classifier by taking
into account the number of TPs, FPs, TNs and FNs that were produced by the classifier.
It is computed as
MCC =
(TP )(TN)− (FP )(FN)√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
. (A.1)
The MCC value is between [-1,1], where -1 indicates that none of the data samples were
correctly classified, 1 indicates that all data samples were correctly classified, and 0 indi-
cates that the equivalent of a random classification was performed.
The result of this iterative process is an average MCC value corresponding to each feature.
The FRM algorithm associates smaller average MCC values with more significant features.
That is, if the removal of a feature results in a significant reduction in the average MCC
value, then the removed feature is considered significant. The output of the first step is a
list of features ranked in ascending order with regards to average MCC values.
The second step of the FRM algorithm involves the construction of feature subsets pro-
duced by the FRM algorithm, and the selection of the best performing feature subset.
Given the ranked list of features, the algorithm constructs NF feature subsets, where the
ith feature subset consists of the top i features. That is, the first feature subset consists
of only the top ranked feature; the second feature subset consists of the two top ranked
features, and so on. From the candidate NF feature subsets, the algorithm selects the
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best feature subset according to classification performance. The proposed classifier is ap-
plied to the dataset over each of the NF feature subsets produced by the FRM algorithm,
and the composite ROC curves corresponding to each feature subset is computed. The
average MCC value for each composite ROC curve is calculated and the feature subset
corresponding to the highest MCC score is selected. (i.e. Wrapper-1 in table 4.2).
A.2 Sole Feature Method (SFM)
The sole feature method, a wrapper-based feature selection algorithm, that was summa-
rized in section 2.4.2, was used to produce a feature subset for comparison. The SFM
algorithm was implemented in this research using the k–means clustering algorithm as a
classifier, thereby producing feature subsets optimized for use with k–means.
The SFM algorithm performs feature selection in two steps. The initial step involves the
ranking of each feature based on a performance measure, as calculated after clustering
and cluster labelling was performed. The second step involves the selection of a suitable
number of the top ranked features to constitute the final feature subset produced by the
SFM feature selection algorithm.
In the first step, the SFM algorithm iteratively ranks each feature present in the full feature
set, as described in what follows.
• A single feature is selected from the full feature set.
• The proposed classifier with k–means clustering, is applied to the dataset over the
selected feature for K ∈ {2, . . . , 10}.
• The TP and FP percentages are computed for each value of K.
• The composite ROC curve using the obtained TP and FP percentages is constructed.
• The average Matthew’s Correlation Coefficient (MCC) over the TP and FP percent-
ages of the composite ROC curve is computed.
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The result of this iterative process is an average MCC value corresponding to each feature.
The SFM algorithm associates larger average MCC values with more significant features.
The output of the first step is a list of features ranked in descending order with respect to
the average MCC values.
The second step of the SFM algorithm involves the construction of feature subsets pro-
duced by the SFM algorithm, and the selection of the best performing feature subset.
This step is identical to that of the second step of the FRM feature selection algorithm
described in section A.1. The composite ROC curve with the highest average MCC value
was selected for comparison (i.e. Wrapper-2 in table 4.2).
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